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ABSTRACT
On the Interaction of Information and Decisions in Dynamic Networked Systems
by
Yi Ouyang
Chair: Demosthenis Teneketzis
Efficient operation of modern dynamic networked systems, such as communica-
tion systems, queueing networks, power systems, and surveillance systems, can sig-
nificantly improve our quality of life. The operation of a dynamic networked system
involves series of decision making processes by many decision makers (DMs) who may
or may not have the same information, and may or may not share the same objective.
The quality of each DM’s decision depends on the quality of the information
available for decision-making in the network. Since the network is dynamic, the in-
formation available to the DMs over time is a dynamic process that depends on the
DMs’ decision rules. Information affects decisions, and decisions influence informa-
tion. This interaction between information and decisions in dynamic networks results
in complex decision-making problems.
In this thesis, we study the impact of the information-decision interaction on
system performance within the context of: (i) centralized stochastic control; (ii) de-
centralized stochastic control; and (iii) game theory. Specifically, within the context
of centralized stochastic control, we study a multi-state channel sensing problem,
ix
and discover sets of conditions sufficient to guarantee the optimality of a myopic
policy. Within the context of decentralized stochastic control, we consider a decen-
tralized routing problem as well as a multiple access communication problem; we
discover an optimal decentralized routing policy for the routing problem, and an ef-
ficient decentralized multiple access protocol. Within the context of game theory,
we study a general model of dynamic stochastic games with asymmetric information;
we introduce the concept of common information based perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(CIB-PBE), and provide a sequential decomposition for the dynamic games that leads
to an algorithm to determine CIB-PBE.
x
CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Background
Many modern social-technological systems such as communication systems, queue-
ing networks, power systems, surveillance systems and social networks are dynamic
networked systems. Efficient operation of such networked systems can significantly
improve our quality of life. The operation of a dynamic network involves a series of de-
cision making processes by one decision maker (DM) or multiple DMs. For example,
data communication in a communication system depends on the users’ transmission
strategies; a queueing network’s operation is based on the scheduling and routing
strategies of the routers; a surveillance system’s performance depends on the commu-
nication and control strategies of sensors and controllers.
A key challenge in the design of efficient decision strategies is the presence of un-
certainty in the network. The uncertainty includes the randomness in the network
dynamics, in the measurements/observations, and in the human behavior. In the
presence of uncertainty, the quality of each DM’s decision depends on the quality
of information available for decision-making; more accurate information about the
uncertain network leads to higher quality of decisions. In a dynamic network, each
DM collects information generated throughout the network from his own measure-
ments as well as the actions/signals generated by other DMs. Since the network is
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dynamic, information generation is a dynamic process that depends on the DMs’
control/decision strategies over time. For example, the information available to a
surveillance camera depends on its direction, and the direction is determined by the
camera’s rotation strategy. Therefore, the quality of the DMs’ future information
is affected by the DMs’ current decisions which themselves are influenced by their
current information. This interaction between information and decisions determines
the operation of a dynamic networked system. Research on the interaction between
information and decisions plays a key role in determining efficient designs of modern
social-technological systems.
In this thesis, we study the impact of the information-decision interaction on
a networked system’s performance. Since the interaction between information and
decisions has different features under different information structures and different
models on DMs’ behavior, we introduce below the concept of information structure
along with the model on DMs’ behavior.
1.1.1 Information Structure
The information structure of a dynamic networked system specifies the informa-
tion that is available at each time to each DM for decision-making purposes. Infor-
mation structures can be classified into centralized and decentralized.
1.1.1.1 Centralized Information Structure
A dynamic network has centralized information structure if there is either one
DM or multiple DMs that share the same information at every time. Furthermore,
the DMs have perfect recall so that at each time they remember all the information
available at previous times. Centralized information structure arises in many classical
networked systems where a centralized coordinator collects all information in the
network. It also arises in small systems with zero-delay communication among DMs.
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In a networked system with centralized information structure, the DMs’ decisions
affect the system’s evolution and its performance, and determine the quality of the
information that will be collected in the future. Consequently, an efficient decision
strategy needs to consider two factors: (a) its effect on the network dynamics and
the system’s performance, and (b) its effect on future information collection. This
dual function of a decision strategy is called dual-control in the stochastic control
literature [1].
1.1.1.2 Decentralized Information Structure
A dynamic networked system has decentralized information structure if its in-
formation is not centralized (see [2] for a comprehensive discussion of decentralized
information structure). As the size of modern networks grows, it may be impossible
for a centralized coordinator to collect all information in a large scale network; it is
also unrealistic to assume zero-delay communication among DMs. Therefore, under-
standing the operation of modern dynamic networked systems requires the analysis
of systems with decentralized information structure.
In contrast to centralized information, each DM in a networked system with de-
centralized information structure has different information about the system from
other DMs. Since a DM’s decision is selected based on his available information,
this decision implicitly reveals part of the DM’s information. By observing a DM’s
decision (or the effect of the decision on the system), other DMs can infer part of that
DM’s information. Such a phenomenon is called signaling in decentralized control [3]
and in signaling games [4].
Similar to centralized networks, a DM’s decision in a decentralized network affects
the system’s evolution, its performance, and the DM’s future information collection.
Furthermore, in the presence of signaling, each DM’s decision also affects other DM’s
future information collection. As a result, in a networked system with decentral-
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ized information structure, the selection of a DM’s decision strategy should consider
three factors: (a) the strategy’s effect on the network dynamics and the system’s
performance; (b) its effect on the DM’s future information collection; (c) its effect on
the other DM’s future information collection. Thus, in systems with decentralized
information, a decision strategy has a triple function.
1.1.2 Model on DMs’ Behavior
In a dynamic networked system, there are two different models on DMs’ behavior
depending on their objectives. Either the DMs cooperatively accomplish a common
objective (non-strategic), or they attempt to achieve their own objectives through
strategic interaction (strategic).
1.1.2.1 Non-Strategic Behavior
When the DMs in a dynamic networked system are non-strategic, they share the
same objective; their decision-making problem is to design decision strategies that
optimize the system’s performance. Such problems are also called team problems
(see [3]). Team problems arise in many networked control systems where each DM is
a non-strategic controller.
In the team situation, the DMs cooperate with each other to improve the quality of
their information as well as to enhance the performance of the system. As a result, the
DMs’ strategies (functional forms, not the realized decisions) are commonly known
by all of them because they can all agree on the strategies before the system begins to
operate. This means that non-strategic DMs have a consistent view of the interaction
between information and decisions in the system.
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1.1.2.2 Strategic Behavior
When the DMs in a dynamic networked system are strategic, they attempt to
achieve their own objectives through strategic interaction. The DMs’ strategic be-
havior results in a dynamic stochastic game. Game problems arise in systems where
the DMs are strategic agents having different (partially conflicting) interests.
In this situation, a DM will attempt to hide information from his competitors,
and reveal part of it only when this revelation improves his utility. Consequently,
the strategies of strategic DMs are not commonly known among them. Therefore,
each DM needs to predict other DMs’ strategies to make decisions. Since each DM
knows that all the DMs maximize their objectives, any reasonable prediction about
a DM’s strategy should be constructed based on the following conditions: (i) the
DM maximizes his own objective under his predictions, and (ii) the DM’s predictions
about other DMs’ strategies are also constructed based on (i) and (ii). Such circular
construction of predictions leads to the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE)
(see [5, 6]). A BNE is a collection of predictions about the DMs’ strategies, such
that, each DM’s strategy in the BNE maximizes his objective when he uses the BNE
to predict other DMs’ strategies. BNE is the proper solution concept to analyze
stochastic games because a BNE consists of reasonable predictions that satisfy (i)
and (ii). The networked system will operate according to a BNE when each DM uses
his BNE strategy along with the BNE predictions about other DMs’ strategies. Then
the BNE strategies are commonly known by all DMs, and information will interact
with decisions based on the BNE strategies.
1.2 Decision-Making Problems Investigated in the Thesis
Depending on the information structure and the model on DMs’ behavior of a dy-
namic networked system, there are four classes of decision-making problems described
5
by the following table.
Centralized Decentralized
Non-Strategic Centralized Stochastic Control Decentralized Stochastic Control
Strategic Dynamic Stochastic Games with Dynamic Stochastic Games with
Symmetric Information Asymmetric Information
Below we discuss issues on the interaction of information and decisions associated
with the four classes of problems defined in the table above. In this thesis we focus
on the three classes of problems: (i) centralized stochastic control; (ii) decentralized
stochastic control; and (iii) dynamic stochastic games with asymmetric information.
For dynamic stochastic games with symmetric information, we refer the interested
reader to [5–9] and references therein.
1.2.1 Centralized Stochastic Control
In a centralized networked system with non-strategic DMs, all the cooperative
DMs can be viewed as a centralized DM who selects decisions to optimize the system’s
performance. The centralized DM’s decision-making problem results in a centralized
stochastic control problem. Centralized stochastic control can be formulated in the
general framework of partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDPs) [1].
In POMDP, the DM’s decision depends on the information state that summarizes
the DM’s available information. The information state belongs to a high-dimensional
space in general. Because of the high-dimensional space, solving a general POMDP
numerically has very high complexity (PSPACE-complete [10]). Such high complexity
is referred to as the curse of dimensionality.
One approach to dealing with the curse of dimensionality in POMDP is to discover
properties for the information states. For that matter, we investigate a general multi-
state channel sensing problem.
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In the channel sensing problem, a DM has access to a communication network
consisting of multiple channels. Each channel is modeled as a Markov chain. At each
time instant the DM selects one channel, observes its state, and uses it to transmit
data. A reward depending on the state of the selected channel is obtained for each
transmission. The objective is to design a channel sensing policy that maximizes the
expected total reward collected over a finite or infinite horizon. The above channel
sensing problem arises in opportunistic scheduling over fading channels and cognitive
radio networks [11]. In this channel sensing problem, in addition to transmission,
the decision/selection allows the DM to observe the quality of the selected channel.
Therefore, different selections provide different information about the states of the
channels; hence, different decisions result in different information states for the DM.
We study the effect of decisions on information states for the DM, and discover
properties that allow us to order information states under certain conditions. Such
properties lead to the optimality of a myopic sensing policy.
1.2.2 Decentralized Stochastic Control
In a decentralized networked system with non-strategic DMs, multiple DMs coop-
eratively optimize the system’s performance. The design of DMs’ optimal strategies
results in a decentralized stochastic control problem. In a decentralized stochastic
control problem, a DM’s information is not directly observed by other DMs. Never-
theless, when a DM’s strategy depends on his information, part of his information
may be revealed/transmitted through his actions. This phenomenon is referred to
as signaling as discussed in Section 1.1.1.2. Using a signaling strategy, a DM can
transmit part of his information to improve the quality of some other DM’s future
information. When signaling occurs, each DM’s decision will affect both his future in-
formation as well as the future information of all other DMs in the network. Therefore,
signaling complicates the interaction between information and decisions, and makes
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the design of efficient strategies conceptually and computationally challenging. The
computational complexity to solve a general decentralized stochastic control problem
is NEXP-hard [12].
Recently, the common information approach to decentralized stochastic control,
proposed in [13, 14], addresses some of the conceptual difficulties arising from sig-
naling. When all DMs have perfect recall, the DMs’ common information at a time
includes the information available to all DMs at that time. Each DM’s private in-
formation at a time includes his information that is not common information. The
common information approach uses the DMs’ common information to coordinate
their strategies by identifying an information state sufficient for performance evalu-
ation (see [15]). This information state is a common belief on the system state and
the DMs’ private information based on the common information. The common belief
allows the DMs to consistently assess the status of the system and to consistently
predict how the DMs use their private information. Thus, the common information
approach allows us to focus on the interaction of the common belief and decisions
when signaling occurs. We show how the this approach works in a decentralized
routing problem and a multiple access communication problem.
1.2.2.1 Decentralized Routing
Routing problems arise in many modern technological systems such as commu-
nication networks, transportation networks and sensor networks. There are many
results on centralized routing in networked systems. However, very few results on
optimal routing under decentralized information are currently available.
In this thesis, we consider a decentralized routing problem in a system consisting
of two service stations in parallel and two DMs, each DM is affiliated with one service
station. Each station has an infinite size queue with Bernoulli arrivals and departures.
The network is informationally decentralized: each DM only knows perfectly the
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information about its own station. At any time, a DM can route one of the customers
waiting in its own station to the other station. At each time a holding cost is incurred
at each station due to the customers waiting at that station. The objective is to
determine routing strategies for the DMs that minimize the average cost per unit
time over a finite horizon or infinite horizon.
In this routing network, signaling occurs between the two DMs through their
routing decisions; whenever a DM decides to send or not to send a customer from
its own station to the other station it communicates partial information about its
queue length to the other station. For example, by receiving a customer from the
other station, a DM may infer that the queue length at the other station is above a
pre-specified threshold. This information from signaling may allow the DM to have
a better estimate of the queueing system. Based on how signaling affects the DMs’
common beliefs (the information state constructed from their common information),
we explicitly determine optimal decentralized routing policies for the DMs.
1.2.2.2 Multiple Access Communication
Multiple access communication has played a crucial role in the operation of many
communication systems, including satellite networks, radio networks, wired and wire-
less Local Area Networks (LANs). One important feature of multiple access is its
decentralized information structure. Consequently, when multiple users share a com-
mon communication channel, coordination among them is essential to resolve collision
issues. The design of efficient coordination mechanisms/protocols is a challenging
problem.
We consider a slotted multiple access system where multiple DMs share a common
collision channel. Each DM is equipped with an infinite size buffer and observes
Bernoulli arrivals to its own queue. In addition to their local information, all DMs
receive a common feedback from the channel. The feedback indicates whether the
9
previous transmission was idle, successful or collision.
Using signaling through the DMs’ common beliefs (the information state con-
structed from the common feedback), we design a common information-based multiple
access protocol (CIMA). In CIMA, each DM constructs upper bounds on the lengths
of the queues of all DMs, including himself, based on previous transmission strate-
gies and the common feedback. Since the upper bounds are common knowledge, the
DMs can coordinate their transmission to avoid collision through the common upper
bounds. We prove that without knowledge of any statistics, CIMA achieves the full
throughput region of the collision channel and an average delay that is linear in the
number of the DMs.
1.2.3 Dynamic Stochastic Games with Symmetric Information
Dynamic centralized networked systems with strategic DMs result in dynamic
stochastic games with symmetric information. In these games, all the DMs share the
same information but have different objectives. Therefore, each DM makes decisions
anticipating other DMs’ strategies. An appropriate solution concept for this class
of games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) [16], a refinement of BNE. At each
stage of a dynamic game with symmetric information, there is an information state
(Markov state) that can summarize the DMs’ history of information. The information
state can be utilized to provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game, and
MPE can be computed through backward induction.
1.2.4 Dynamic Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Information
Dynamic decentralized networked systems with strategic DMs result in dynamic
stochastic games with asymmetric information. In such problems, the DMs have dif-
ferent objectives and different information. Therefore, each DM needs to anticipate
the other agents’ strategies and to form beliefs about the other DMs’ private infor-
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mation. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), a refinement of BNE, is an appropriate
solution concept for this class of games. A PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile
and a belief system for all DMs that jointly must satisfy sequential rationality and
consistency [5, 6]. That is, every DM’s strategy should be a best response under the
belief system, and the belief system should be consistent with the DMs’ strategies
when signaling occurs (see the discussion of signaling in Section 1.1.1.2). This circu-
lar dependence between information (belief system) and decisions (strategy) makes
it difficult to compute PBE. As a result, sequential computation of equilibria for
stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information is available only for special
instances (see [14, 17–26] and references therein).
In this thesis, we study the interaction between information and decisions in a
general model of dynamic stochastic games with asymmetric information. We iden-
tify an information state from the DMs’ common information using ideas from the
common information approach described in Section 1.2.2 for decentralized stochastic
control. Using the information state, we introduce a subclass of PBE called common
information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE) and provide a sequential
decomposition for the dynamic game. Such a decomposition leads to a backward in-
duction algorithm to compute CIB-PBE. CIB-PBE and the associated decomposition
resembles MPE for dynamic games with symmetric information.
1.3 Organization and Contributions of the Thesis
1.3.1 Chapter II-Centralized Stochastic Control: Multi-State Channel
Sensing
We investigate the channel sensing problem in Chapter II. We generalize the “pos-
itively correlated” condition for two-state channels (see [27]) to multi-state channels
and discover sets of conditions sufficient to guarantee the optimality of a myopic sens-
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ing policy. We also develop a MDP approximation for the multi-state channel sensing
problem resulting in a dynamic programming algorithm that is computationally fea-
sible for a small number of channels. In addition, we consider the situation where the
DM can select multiple channels at each time. We compare the performance of the
myopic policy and the near-optimal policy generated from the MDP approximation
when multiple selections are available.
1.3.2 Chapter III-Decentralized Stochastic Control-Part I: Decentralized
Routing
We formulate a routing problem with decentralized information structure in Chap-
ter III. We show that an optimal decentralized strategy is described by a single
threshold routing policy where the threshold depends on the common information
between the two DMs/controllers. We explicitly determine this threshold. For the
case of decentralized routing with bursty arrivals, we construct a decentralized routing
policy described by multiple thresholds that are functions of the common informa-
tion. When bursty arrivals are finite, the decentralized routing policy can balance
the queueing system.
1.3.3 Chapter IV-Decentralized Stochastic Control-Part II: Multiple Ac-
cess Communication
We study the multiple access communication problem in Chapter IV. We present
a common information-based multiple access protocol (CIMA) that has the following
features: it is collision-free, it achieves full throughput and average delay that is
linear in the number of DMs. The CIMA protocol is simple to implement, as at each
time instant it only requires knowledge of the upper bounds on each DM’s queue
length. The upper bounds on the DMs’ queue lengths are common knowledge and
are updated in a simple manner.
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1.3.4 Chapter V-Dynamic Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Informa-
tion
We consider a general model of dynamic stochastic games with asymmetric infor-
mation in Chapter V. The key contributions of Chapter V are: (1) The introduction
of a subclass of PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria
(CIB-PBE) for dynamic games with asymmetric information. A CIB-PBE consists
of a pair of strategy profile and a belief system that are sequentially rational and
consistent. (2) The sequential decomposition of stochastic dynamic games with the
asymmetric information through an appropriate choice of information state. This de-
composition provides a backward induction algorithm to find CIB-PBE for dynamic
games where signaling occurs. The decomposition and the algorithm are illustrated
by an example from multiple access communication. (3) The proof of existence of
CIB-PBE for a subclass of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information.
1.3.5 Chapter VI-Conclusion and Future Directions
We conclude in Chapter VI and provide some thoughts on future directions that
could extend the solution methods and results presented in this thesis.
1.4 Notation
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters, their realization by the corre-
sponding lower case letter. In general, subscripts are used as time index while super-
scripts are used to index users/agents/controllers/stations. For time indices t1 ≤ t2,
Xt1:t2 (resp. ft1:t2(·)) is the short hand notation for the variables (Xt1 , Xt1+1, ..., Xt2)
(resp. functions (ft1(·), . . . , ft2(·))). When we consider the variables (resp. func-
tions) for all time, we drop the subscript and use X to denote X1:T (resp. f(·) to
denote f1:T (·)). For variables X1t , . . . , XNt (resp. functions f 1t (·), . . . , fNt (·)), we use
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Xt := (X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t ) (resp. ft(·) := (f 1t (·), . . . , fNt (·))) to denote the vector of the
set of variables (resp. functions) at t, and X−nt := (X
1
t , . . . , X
n−1
t , X
n+1
t , . . . , X
N
t )
(resp. f−nt (·) := (f 1t (·), . . . , fn−1t (·), fn+1t (·), . . . , fNt (·))) to denote all the variables
(resp. functions) at t except the one indexed by n. For a policy/strategy/protocol
g, we use Xg to indicate that the random variable Xg depends on the choice of g.
P(·) and E(·) denote the probability and expectation of an event and a random vari-
able, respectively. For a set X , ∆(X ) denotes the set of all beliefs/distributions/PMFs
(Probability Mass Functions) on X . We use vectors in RZ+ to denote PMFs in ∆(Z+),
where Z+ denotes the set of non-negative integers. We also use a constant in Z+ to
denote the corner PMF that represents a constant r.v.. i.e. a constant c ∈ Z+ denotes
the PMF whose entries are all zero except the cth. For random variables X, Y with
realizations x, y, P(x|y) := P(X = x|Y = y) and E(X|y) := E(X|Y = y). For a
policy g, a PMF pi and a parameter λ, we use Pλ,gpi (·) (resp. Eλ,gpi (·)) to indicate that
the probability (resp. expectation) depends on the choice of g, pi and the parameter
λ. We use 1{x}(y) to denote the indicator that X = x is in the event {Y = y}.
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CHAPTER II
Centralized Stochastic Control: Multi-State
Channel Sensing
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
Consider a communication system, shown in Fig. 2.1, consisting of N independent
channels. Each channel is modeled as a K-state (K finite) Markov chain (M.C.)
with known matrix of transition probabilities. At each time period a user selects one
channel to sense and uses it to transmit information. A reward depending on the state
of the selected channel is obtained for each transmission. The objective is to design
a channel sensing policy that maximizes the expected total reward (respectively, the
expected total discounted reward) collected over a finite (respectively, infinite) time
horizon.
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Channels
...
...
DestinationUser
Figure 2.1: The channel sensing problem.
The above channel sensing problem arises in cognitive radio networks, opportunis-
tic scheduling over fading channels, as well as on resource-constrained jamming ([11]).
In cognitive radio networks a secondary user may transmit over a channel only when
the channel is not occupied by the primary user. Thus, at any time instant t, state
1 of the M.C. describing the channel can indicate that the channel is occupied at
t by the primary user, and states 2 through K indicate the quality of the channel
that is available to the secondary user at t. In opportunistic transmission over fading
channels, states 1 through K of the M.C. describe, at any time instant, the quality
of the fading channel. In resource-constrained jamming a jammer can only jam one
channel at a time, and any given jamming/channel sensing policy results in an ex-
pected reward for the jammer due to successful jamming. The physical channels in all
of the above problems have memory. Introducing a finite state (K-state) Markovian
model for each channel allows us to capture the effect of the channel’s memory on its
current quality by allowing K to take large values1.
This channel sensing problem is also an instance of restless bandit problems
([28, 29]). Restless bandit problems arise in many areas, including wired and wire-
less communication systems, manufacturing systems, economic systems, statistics,
biomedical engineering, business, computer science, information systems etc. (see
[28, 29]).
1We can create a Markovian model of a finite-memory system by appropriate state expansion.
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The problem described above can be formulated as a Partially Observed Markov
Decision Process (POMDP) (see [30]) and can be solved, for any selection of the
channels’ transition probabilities and any selection of the reward process, by numerical
methods. Such an approach has two drawbacks: (i) it does not provide any insight into
the nature of optimal sensing strategies; (ii) it has very high computational complexity
(PSPACE-complete, see [10]). For this reason we focus on identifying instances of
the general problem where it is possible to explicitly characterize optimal sensing
strategies. In this chapter we discover sets of conditions under which the optimal
sensing strategy is the myopic policy, that is, the policy that selects at every time
instant the best (in the sense of stochastic order [31]) channel. We also develop a MDP
approximation for the channel sensing problem resulting in a dynamic programming
algorithm that is computational feasible for a small number of channels.
2.1.2 Related Work
The channel sensing problem has been studied in [30] using a POMDP framework.
For channels described by two-state Markov chains (henceforth called two-state chan-
nels), the myopic policy was studied in [32], where its optimality was established when
the number of channels is two. For more than two channels, the optimality of the
myopic policy was proved in [33] under certain conditions on channel parameters.
This result for two-state channels was extended in [27] under a relaxed “positively
correlated” condition. In [34], under the same “positively correlated” channel con-
dition, the myopic policy was proved to be optimal for two-state channels when the
user can select multiple channels at each time instance.
For general restless bandit problems, there is a rich literature; however, contrary
to classical multi-armed bandit problems (see [29] and [35]), the structure (if any) of
optimal strategies for general restless bandit problems is not currently known. To gain
insight into the nature of restless bandit problems, research has focused on identifying
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instances where an optimal strategy or qualitative properties of optimal strategies can
be explicitly determined. In [28] it has been shown that the Gittins index rule (see [29]
and [35] for the definition of the Gittins index rule) is not optimal for general restless
bandit problems. Moreover, this class of problems is PSPACE-hard in general [10].
In [28] Whittle introduced an index policy (referred to as Whittle’s index) and an
“indexability condition”; the asymptotic optimality of Whittle’s index was addressed
in [36]. Issues related to Whittle’s indexability condition were discussed in [28, 29, 36–
39]. For the two-state channel sensing problem, Whittle’s index was computed in
closed-form in [38, 39], where performance simulation of that index was provided. For
some special classes of restless bandit problems, the optimality of index-type policies
was established under certain conditions (see [40, 41]). Approximation algorithms for
the computation of optimal policies for a class of restless bandit problems similar to
the one studied in this chapter were investigated in [42].
2.1.3 Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present the
model and the formulation of the optimization problem associated with the channel
sensing problem. In Section 2.3, we consider the finite horizon problem and identify
sets of conditions sufficient to guarantee the optimality of the myopic policy; we
briefly discuss the extension of our results to the infinite horizon. In Section 2.5 we
show that under one particular set of conditions the myopic policy coincides with
the Gittins index rule. In Section 2.6 we develop a MDP approximation that leads
to a near-optimal policy, and we compare it with the myopic policy using numerical
simulations. In Section 2.7 we consider the multiple selection version of the channel
sensing problem, and use a MDP approximation method to numerically find a near-
optimal policy when multiple selections are available. We conclude in Section 2.8.
The proofs of several technical results of this chapter appear in Appendix A.
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2.2 Model and the Optimization Problem
2.2.1 The Model
Consider a communication system consisting of N identical channels as shown in
Fig. 2.1. Each channel is modeled as a K-state (K finite) Markov chain (M.C.) with
state space S := {1, 2, . . . , K} and (the same) matrix of transition probabilities P ,
P =

p11 p12 · · · p1K
p21 p22 · · · p2K
...
...
. . .
...
pK1 pK2 · · · pKK

=

P1
P2
...
PK

, (2.1)
where P1, P2, ..., PK are row vectors. As pointed out in Section 2.1, channels that have
memory can still be modeled by Markov chain by expanding the number of states
in the M.C. to account for the channel’s memory. The K-state M.C. model here
captures the memory characteristics of a larger class of communication channels. We
assume that the channel’s quality increases as the number of its state increases. We
want to use this communication system to transmit information. For that matter, at
each time t = 0, 1, ..., T , we can select one channel, observe its state, and use it to
transmit information.
Let Xnt denote the state of channel n at time t, and let Ut denote the decision
made at time t; Ut ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, where Ut = n means that channel n is chosen for
data transmission at time t.
Initially, before any channel selection is made, we assume that we have probabilis-
tic information about the state of each of the N channels. Specifically, we assume
that at t = 0 the user/decision-maker knows the probability mass function (PMF)
on the state space of S each of the N channels; that is, the decision-maker knows
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pi0 := (pi
1
0, pi
2
0, . . . , pi
N
0 ), where
pin0 := (pi
n
0 (1), pi
n
0 (2), . . . , pi
n
0 (K)) ∈ ∆(S), n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (2.2)
pin0 (i) := P (X
n
0 = i), i = 1, 2, . . . , K. (2.3)
Then, in general,
U0 = g0(pi0), (2.4)
Ut = gt(Y
t−1, U t−1, pi0), t = 1, 2, . . . , (2.5)
where Y t−1 := (Y0, Y1, . . . , Yt−1), U t−1 := (U0, U1, . . . , Ut−1), (2.6)
and Yt = X
Ut
t denotes the observation at time t; Yt gives the state of the channel that
is chosen at time t (that is, if Ut = 2, Yt gives the state of channel 2 at time t).
Let R(t) denote the reward obtained by the transmission at time t. We assume that
R(t) depends on the state of the channel chosen at time t. That is
R(t) = Ri, i = 1, 2, . . . , K, (2.7)
if the state of the channel chosen at t is i. Let R := [R1, R2, R3, . . . , RK ]
T . Since
channel’s quality increases as the number of its state increases, we have R1 ≤ R2 ≤
· · · ≤ RK .
2.2.2 The Optimization Problem
Under the above assumptions, the objective is to solve (i) the finite horizon (T )
optimization problem (P1):
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Problem (P1)
max
g∈Gs
Eg
[
T∑
t=0
βtR(t)
]
, (2.8)
and (ii) its infinite horizon counterpart, problem (P2):
Problem (P2)
max
g∈Gs
Eg
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtR(t)
]
, (2.9)
where β is the discount factor (0 < β ≤ 1) and Gs is the set of separated policies
g := (g0, g1, . . . ) (see [1], Chapter 6), that are such that
Ut = gt(pit) for all t, (2.10)
pit := (pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) ∈ ∆(S), (2.11)
pint := (pi
n
t (1), pi
n
t (2), . . . , pi
n
t (K)), n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (2.12)
pint (i) := P (X
n
t = i|Y t−1, U t−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , K, (2.13)
and pit evolves as follows. If Ut = n, Y
n = i, then
pint+1 = Pi, (2.14)
pijt+1 = pi
j
tP, for all j 6= n. (2.15)
2.2.3 Characteristics of the Optimization Problem
The optimization problems (P1) and (P2) formulated above are POMDPs; they
can be solved by numerical methods, but such an approach has the drawbacks pointed
out in Section 2.1.1.
Problems (P1) and (P2) can also be viewed as an instance of restless bandit
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problems as follows. We can view the N channels as N arms with their PMFs as the
states of the arms. The decision maker knows perfectly the states of the N arms at
every time instant. One arm is operated (selected) at each time t, and an expected
reward depending on the state of the selected arm is received. If arm n (channel n)
is not selected at t, its PMF pint evolves according to
pint+1 = pi
n
t P ; (2.16)
if arm n (channel n) is selected at t, its PMF evolves according to
pint+1 = PYt , P(Yt = x) = pint (x). (2.17)
Since the selected bandit process evolves in a way that differs from the evolution of
the non-selected bandit processes, this problem is a restless bandit problem.
In general, restless bandit problems are difficult to solve because forward induction
(the solution methodology for the classical multi-armed bandit problem) does not
result in an optimal policy [29]. Consequently, optimal policies may not be of the
index type, and the form of optimal policies for general restless bandit problems
(hence, the channel sensing problem) is still unknown.
To gain insight into the nature of the channel sensing problem (as well as general
restless bandit problems), it is important to discover special instances of the problem
where it is possible to explicitly determine optimal strategies or the structure of
optimal strategies. For this season, in this chapter we focus on the “myopic policy”
and we discover sets of conditions under which it is optimal. We define the myopic
policy as follows. We define the concept of stochastic dominance/order (see [31]).
Stochastic dominance ≥st between two row vectors x, y ∈ ∆(S) is defined as follows:
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x ≥st y if
K∑
j=i
x(j) ≥
K∑
j=i
y(j), for i = 2, 3, . . . , K. (2.18)
Definition II.1. The myopic policy gm := (gm0 , g
m
1 , . . . , g
m
T ) is the policy that selects
at each time instant the channel with the largest expected reward; that is
gmt (pit) = i if pi
i
tR ≥ pijtR ∀j 6= i. (2.19)
Equivalently, from properties of stochastic order (see [31]), the myopic policy selects
at each time instant the best (in the sense of stochastic order) channel; that is,
gmt (pit) = i if pi
i
t ≥st pijt ∀j 6= i. (2.20)
2.3 Analysis of the Finite Horizon Problem
We will prove the optimality of the myopic policy gm for Problem (P1) under
certain specific assumptions on the structure of the Markov chains describing the
channels, on the instantaneous rewards R = [R1, R2, R3, . . . , RK ]
T and on the initial
PMFs pi10, pi
2
0, . . . , pi
N
0 . We proceed as follows. In Section 2.3.1 we discuss why the
problem under consideration is not a trivial extension of the instance where each
channel has only two states (studied in [27]). This discussion helps to justify the
key assumptions/conditions we make in Section 2.3.2. These assumptions/conditions
reduce to those of [27] when K = 2. The main result of the chapter is stated in
Section 2.3.3; its proof appears in Section 2.3.4 to 2.3.7. The key features of the
solution approach and the role of the conditions in the approach are discussed in
Section 2.3.8.
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2.3.1 Difficulties in Establishing the Optimality of the Myopic Policy
The situation where each channel has two states, i.e. K = 2, has been previously
investigated in [27] where the optimality of the myopic policy is established under
some conditions. In the two-state channels situation, the PMF in equation (2.12)
(called the information state of the POMDP, see [1]) can be described by a number,
the conditional probability of the “best state”. As a result of this feature, the infor-
mation states of all channels can be totally ordered at any time regardless of channels’
evolution. Such an ordering is needed for the derivation of the results in [27]. In our
problem the information state defined by equation (2.12) is a (K − 1)-dimensional
vector; (K − 1)-dimensional vectors can not, in general, be ordered at every time
instant. This difference between the information state of two-state channels and the
one in this chapter results in a lot of complications in extending the results of [27] to
multi-state channels.
In general, an extension of the results on the optimality of the myopic policy for
two-state channels to multi-state channels would require: (i) An ordering of the chan-
nels’ information states (PMFs defined by eq. (2.12)) at every time instant. Such
an ordering can only be ensured under certain conditions (Conditions (A1)-(A3) ap-
pearing in Section 2.3.2) on the evolution of the channels. (ii) If the myopic policy is
to be optimal, the instantaneous expected gain incurred by choosing the best chan-
nel (say channel n) versus any other channel (say channel m) must overcompensate
expected future losses in performance resulting in when channel m is chosen instead
of channel n. We have K channel states and this leads to K − 1 inequalities in Con-
dition (A4) (appearing in Section 2.3.2) on the separation of instantaneous rewards.
Condition (A4) describes how much the instantaneous rewards obtained in states i
and i − 1, i = 2, 3, ..., K, should be separated so as to ensure the optimality of the
myopic policy.
The above discussion provides the rationale for Conditions (A1)-(A4) appearing
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below.
2.3.2 Key Assumptions/Conditions
We make the following assumptions/conditions
(A1)
PK ≥st PK−1 ≥st · · · ≥st P1. (2.21)
Note that the quality of a channel state increases as its number increases. As-
sumption (A1) ensures that the higher the quality of the channel’s current state
the higher is the likelihood that the next channel state will be of high quality.
This requirement is the same as the “positively correlated” condition when
K = 2 in [27].
(A2) Let ∆(S)P := {piP : pi ∈ ∆(S)}. At time 0,
pi10, pi
2
0, . . . , pi
N
0 ∈ ∆(S)P, (2.22)
and pi10 ≤st pi20 ≤st · · · ≤st piN0 . (2.23)
Assumption (A2) states that initially the channels can be ordered in terms of
their quality, expressed by the PMF on S. Moreover, the initial PMFs of the
channels are in ∆(S)P . The requirement expressed by (2.22) is always satisfied
since the channels evolve before we begin sensing them. Requirement (2.22)
also ensures that the initial PMFs on the channel states are in the same space
as all subsequent PMFs.
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(A3) There exists some L, 2 ≤ L ≤ K such that
P1P ≥st PL−1, (2.24)
PKP ≤st PL. (2.25)
Assumption (A3) along with (A2) ensure that, any PMF pi reachable from a non-
selected channel has quality between PL−1 and PL, that is PL ≥st pi ≥st PL−1
(see also Property II.4, Section 2.3.4).
As pointed out in Section 2.3.1, (A1)-(A3) ensure that the channels’ information
states are ordered at any time t (see Property II.5, Section 2.3.4).
(A4)
Ri −Ri−1 ≥β(Pi − Pi−1)M
≥β(Pi − Pi−1)U ≥ 0, for i 6= L, (2.26)
RL −RL−1 ≥β(h− PL−1R) ≥ 0, (2.27)
where M and U are vectors given by
M := U + β
∑
i≥L
pKiPU, (2.28)
Ui := Ri for i = 1, 2, . . . , L− 1, (2.29)
Ui := Ri + β(Pi − PL−1)U, for i = L,L+ 1, . . . , K, (2.30)
and h is given by
h =
PKR− β
∑
i<L pKiPiR
1− β∑i<L pKi . (2.31)
Assumption (A4) states that the instantaneous rewards obtained at different
26
states of the channel are sufficiently separated (see (2.26) and (2.27)). The
reason for such a separation was discussed in Section 2.3.1.
We note that (A1)-(A4) describe sets of sets of assumptions/conditions; for every
value of L,L = 2, 3, ..., K, we have a distinct set of conditions.
Before we proceed with the analysis of Problem (P1) based on conditions (A1)-
(A4), we show that (A1)-(A4) can be simultaneously satisfied. Consider the following
situation:
K = 5, L = 5, N = 6, β = 1 (2.32)
P =

P1
P2
...
P5

=

0.0656 0.0458 0.1044 0.4745 0.3096
0.0655 0.0458 0.1030 0.4454 0.3403
0.0652 0.0457 0.0966 0.4019 0.3907
0.0434 0.0336 0.1126 0.4102 0.4001
0.0206 0.0205 0.0142 0.4475 0.4972

, (2.33)
with
R =
[
0 1 2 3 4
]T
(2.34)
pi10 = pi
2
0 = P1, pi
3
0 = P2, pi
4
0 = P3, pi
5
0 = P4, pi
6
0 = P5 (2.35)
By their definition, P1, P2, ..., P5 satisfy (A1). By the definition of pi
1
0, pi
2
0, ..., pi
6
0 and
the definition of ∆(S)P , (A2) is satisfied.
By direct computation we can show that
P1P =
[
0.0411 0.0322 0.0795 0.4267 0.4205
]
≥st
[
0.0434 0.0336 0.1126 0.4102 0.4001
]
= P4, (2.36)
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Moreover, P5P = p51P1 + p52P2 + +...+ p55P5 ≤st P5. Therefore, (A3) is satisfied.
By direct computation, we get
U =
[
0 1 2 3 4.3214
]T
(2.37)
M =
[
1.4997 2.5206 3.5577 4.6003 6.0815
]T
(2.38)
h =3.7776, (2.39)
So we can compute
β(P2 − P1)M = 0.0470 ≤ R2 −R1 (2.40)
β(P3 − P2)M = 0.0829 ≤ R3 −R2 (2.41)
β(P4 − P3)M = 0.0897 ≤ R4 −R3 (2.42)
β(h− P4R) = 0.7766 ≤ R5 −R4 (2.43)
Therefore, (A4) is satisfied.
Assumptions (A1)-(A4) are also satisfied when R,P, pi10, pi
2
0, ..., pi
6
0, chosen as above, are
slightly perturbed. It is also possible to find other ranges of values of R,P, pi10, pi
2
0, ..., pi
6
0
which satisfy (A1)-(A4).
When K = 2 the above Conditions (A1)-(A4) reduce to those of [27] as follows.
When K = 2, L = K. Then, our Conditions (A1)-(A4) reduce to
p2,2 ≥ p1,2, (2.44)
pin0 = (1− pn, pn), p1,2 ≤ pn ≤ p2,2 for n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (2.45)
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pN . (2.46)
Condition (2.44) is precisely the “positively correlated” condition in [27]. Condition
(2.45) is satisfied, if the channels evolve before we begin sensing them (before time
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t = 0). Condition (2.46) is always satisfied by renumbering of the channels.
2.3.3 The Main Result
The main result we establish in this chapter is given by Theorem II.2 below.
Theorem II.2. Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), the myopic policy gm, that is, the
policy that selects at every time instant the best (in the sense of stochastic order)
channel is optimal for Problem (P1).
We proceed to establish the optimality of the myopic policy gm as follows. In sec-
tions 2.3.4-2.3.6 we develop preliminary results needed for the proof of Theorem II.2.
Specifically: In section 2.3.4 we present three properties of the evolution of the PMFs
on the channel states. In section 2.3.5 we present a property of the instantaneous
expected reward. In section 2.3.6 we define a class of ordering-based channel sensing
policies GO which includes the myopic policy gm; using the results of sections 2.3.4
and 2.3.5 we discover four properties of the expected reward resulting from any policy
in GO. In section 2.3.7 we use the results of section 2.3.6 to establish the optimality
of the myopic policy for Problem (P1). The properties’ proofs appear in Appendix
A.
2.3.4 Properties of the Channels’ Evolution
Under assumptions/conditions (A1)-(A4) stated in section 2.3.2, the following
properties hold.
Proposition II.3. Let x, y ∈ ∆(S). Under Assumption (A1),
x ≥st y =⇒ xP ≥st yP. (2.47)
An implication of Property II.3 is the following. If at any time t the information
states of two channels (expressed by the PMFs on their state space) are stochastically
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ordered and none of these channels is sensed at t, then the same stochastic order
between the information states at time t+ 1 is maintained.
Proposition II.4. Let pi = xP 2 ∈ ∆(S)P 2, ∆(S)P 2 := {pi = xP 2, x ∈ ∆(S)}.
Under (A1)-(A3),
PL ≥st xP 2 ≥st PL−1. (2.48)
Property II.4 says the following. By Condition (A2) a channel’s information state
(the PMF on its state space) is always in ∆(S)P . If the channel is not sensed at time
t, then at time t+ 1 its information state is in ∆(S)P 2, moreover it is stochastically
always between PL−1 and PL. If the channel is sensed at time t and its observed state is
larger than or equal to L (respectively smaller than L), then at time t+1 this channel
is in the stochastically largest (respectively stochastically smallest) information state
among all channels.
Proposition II.5. Under (A1)-(A3), we have either pint ≤st pimt or pimt ≤st pint for all
n,m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} for all t.
Property II.5 states that under (A1)-(A3) the information states of all channels
can be ordered stochastically at all times.
2.3.5 A Property of the Instantaneous Expected Reward
A direct consequence of Condition (A4) is the following property of the instanta-
neous expected reward:
Proposition II.6. Let x, y ∈ ∆(S). Let v be a column vector in increasing order,
i.e. vi ≥ vi−1 for i = 2, 3, . . . , K. If x ≥st y, we have
(i) (x− y)v ≥ 0.
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(ii) (x − y)M ≥ (x − y)U ≥ (x − y)R ≥ 0, where M,U,R are defined by equations
(2.26)-(2.30).
(iii) (x− y)M ≥ β(x− y)PM .
(iv) If x(i) = y(i) for all i ≥ L or x(i) = y(i) for all i < L, then
(x− y)R ≥ β(x− y)PM. (2.49)
Part (i) of Property II.6 says the following. Consider a reward vector such that
the reward increases as the quality of the channel state increases. Then the expected
reward increases as the information state of the channel increases stochastically.
Part (ii) is a restatement of part (i) when the reward vector v takes the values
M − U,U −R,R.
Part (iii) can be interpreted as follows. Consider the reward vector M defined by
(2.28). Consider two channels, channel i and channel j, that have information states
x and y respectively, such that x ≥st y. Consider the following scenarios: (SC1) Sense
channel i first, then sense channel j; (SC2) Sense channel j first, then sense channel i.
Afterwards, continue with the same channel selection sequence under both scenarios.
Then part (iii) of Property II.6 asserts that scenario (SC1) is better than scenario
(SC2) in terms of the expected accumulated rewards; that is, it is better to sense the
best (in the sense of stochastic order) channel first.
Part (iv) has an interpretation similar to that of part (iii) when x, y satisfy the
condition of part (iv).
2.3.6 Properties of the Reward Associated with Ordering-based Channel
Sensing Polices
In this section we introduce ordering-based policies and study their properties.
The reason for considering this class of policies is because under Conditions (A1)-
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(A4) we obtain the following: (i) The performance of any sensing policy can be
upper-bounded by an appropriately chosen ordering-based policy (see Section 2.3.7);
thus, for the solution of the original optimization problem (Problem (P1)) we can
restrict attention to ordering-based policies. (ii) The myopic policy is an optimal
ordering-based policy. Combining (i) and (ii) we establish the optimality of the
myopic policy for Problem (P1).
We note that Properties 1-4, developed so far, are essential for the discovery of the
properties of ordering-based policies that lead eventually to the solution of Problem
(P1) (see discussion in Section 2.3.8).
Let O be the set of all orderings/permutations of the N channels {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Consider the ordering-based selection function gˆ : O 7→ {1, 2, . . . , N} and the ordering
update mapping mˆ : O × {1, 2, . . . , K} 7→ O defined as follows. For every O :=
(O(1), O(2), . . . , O(N)) ∈ O,
gˆ(O) = O(N), (2.50)
mˆ(O, y) =
 O if y ≥ L,SO if y < L, (2.51)
where S is the cyclic shift operator on O such that
SO =: (O(N), O(1), O(2), . . . , O(N − 1)). (2.52)
Given a channel ordering Ot ∈ O at time t, we define an ordering-based channel
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sensing policy gOtt:T := (g
Ot
t , g
Ot
t+1, . . . , g
Ot
T ) as follows.
Ut =g
Ot
t (Ot) = gˆ(Ot) = O(N), (2.53)
Os =mˆ(Os−1, Ys−1), for s = t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , T, (2.54)
Us =g
Ot
s (Yt:s−1, Ut:s−1)
=gOts (Os) = gˆ(Os), for s = t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , T. (2.55)
At time s, t ≤ s ≤ T , gOts chooses the last channel in Os; the ordering Os is shifted to
the right by the update mapping mˆ whenever the observed state is less than L, and
remains the same otherwise. As a result of the above specification of gOtt:T , if at time
t channel n is on the right of channel m in the ordering Ot, channel n will be sensed
by policy gOtt:T before channel m.
Note that, the policy gOtt:T is not a separated policy in general. However, if the ordering
O0 = (O0(1), O0(2), . . . , O0(N)) at time 0 is such that pi
O0(1)
0 ≤st piO0(2)0 ≤st · · · ≤st
pi
O0(N)
0 , then g
O0
0:T is the myopic policy g
m, therefore; gO00:T = g
m ∈ Gs, as the following
property shows.
Proposition II.7. At time t = 0 consider the ordering O0 such that pi
O0(1)
0 ≤st
pi
O0(2)
0 ≤st · · · ≤st piO0(N)0 . Then, the ordering based policy gO00:T is just the myopic
policy gm.
The validity of Property II.7 crucially depends on Properties II.3 and II.4, which
say that stochastic order is maintained under the evolution of unobserved channels
(Property II.3), and the observed channel is either the stochastically best or the
stochastically worst among all channels (Property II.4). Without Properties II.3 and
II.4 the myopic policy is not an ordering-based policy.
Define Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) to be the expected reward collected from time t up
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to and including T due to the ordering-based policy gOtt:T . That is,
Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) := Eg
Ot
t:T
[
T∑
l=t
βl−tR(l)|pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt
]
. (2.56)
Then, Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) can be written recursively as follows.
VT (Ot, pi
1
T , pi
2
T , . . . , pi
N
T ) = pi
Ot(N)
T R, (2.57)
Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t )
=pi
Ot(N)
t R + β
∑
i<L
pi
Ot(N)
t (i)Vt+1(SOt, pi
1
t+1, . . . , pi
N
t+1)
+ β
∑
i≥L
pi
Ot(N)
t (i)Vt+1(Ot, pi
1
t+1, . . . , pi
N
t+1), (2.58)
where pint+1 =
 Pi for n = Ot(N),pint P otherwise. (2.59)
The function Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) defined above possesses Properties II.8-II.11 be-
low. We will explain the role of these properties in Section 2.3.8 after we prove the
main result on the optimality of the myopic policy in Section 2.3.7.
Proposition II.8. Let pˆi1t , pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ∈ ∆(S)P and Ot ∈ O.
Define
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) := Vt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t )− Vt(Ot, pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt ). (2.60)
If pˆi1t ≥st pi1t , and Ot(n) = 1, then for all m < n
0 ≤Lt(Ot, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt )− Lt(S−mOt, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt )
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )U, (2.61)
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where S−mOt is the counter-clockwise cyclic shift of Ot by m positions, that is,
S−mOt = (Ot(m+ 1), Ot(m+ 2), . . . , Ot(N), Ot(1), . . . , Ot(m)). (2.62)
Proposition II.9. For Ot ∈ O, define the operator Wnm as follows.
WnmOt(i) :=

Ot(n) for i = m,
Ot(m) for i = n,
Ot(i) otherwise.
(2.63)
If pˆi1t ≥st pi1t , and Ot(n) = 1, then for m < n
0 ≤Lt(Ot, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt )− Lt(WnmOt, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt )
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )M. (2.64)
The meaning of Properties II.8 and II.9 is the following. Restrict attention to
ordering-based policies. Take any channel, say channel 1. Replace it with a better
quality (in the sense of stochastic order) channel. Such a replacement will result in
an improvement in performance. This improvement is different for different channel
orderings. The earlier channel 1 is used (that is, the closer to the right-most position
in the ordering channel 1 is) the higher is the improvement. Properties II.8 and II.9
also provide bounds on the difference between maximum and minimum improvement.
These bounds are useful in proving Properties II.8 and II.9 by induction.
Proposition II.10. If pi
Ot(n)
t ≥st piOt(m)t , then for m < n then
Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) ≥ Vt(WnmOt, pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt ). (2.65)
Property II.10 states that if the position of two channels in any arbitrary but fixed
channel ordering are interchanged so that the better (in the stochastic order sense)
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channel comes closer to the right-most position (i.e. it is used earlier) in the new
ordering, the performance due to the ordering-based policy improves.
Proposition II.11. For Ot ∈ O, define the operator Anm as follows.
AnmOt(i) :=

Ot(n) for i = m,
Ot(i− 1) for i = m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n,
Ot(i) otherwise.
(2.66)
If pi1t ≤st pi1tP , and Ot(n) = 1, then
Vt(AnmOt, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t )− Vt(Ot, pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt ) ≤ h− pi1tPN−nR. (2.67)
Property II.11 states the following. Suppose that a channel, say channel 1, is such
that as long as it is not sensed its quality is continuously improving (i.e. its PMF
is continuously increasing stochastically). Then, no matter how late this channel
is sensed (that is, no matter how much we move the channel to the left from its
initial position in the original channel ordering) the change in performance due to an
ordering-based policy can not exceed a certain bound, given by the right hand side
of (2.67).
Properties II.8-II.11 are proved simultaneously in Appendix A. The idea of their
proof may be useful in stochastic scheduling problems where the optimality of “list
polices” ([43]) is investigated. In the analysis of “list polices”, it is important to
compare the performance due to different orders of task processing/scheduling. To
do this we consider an initial ordering of the tasks to be processed. We perturb the
ordering and study the resulting change in performance. Several types of pertur-
bation need to be examined. Typical types of such perturbations are described in
the statements of Properties II.8-II.11. The proof of Properties II.8-II.11 indicates
that such perturbations can not be analyzed in isolation but have to be considered
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simultaneously.
2.3.7 Proof of the Main Result (Theorem II.2)
Proof. We proceed by induction.
At T , the expected reward is the instantaneous expected reward. Since by part
(ii) of Property II.6 a better channel (in the sense of stochastic order) gives larger
instantaneous expected reward, the myopic policy gm is optimal at T . This establishes
the basis of induction.
The induction hypothesis is that the myopic policy gm is optimal at t + 1, t +
1, . . . , T .
Without loss of generality, we assume pi1t ≤st pi2t ≤st · · · ≤st piNt . Consider any
policy g. If g picks channel n at time t, then the expected reward collected from t on
due to the policy g is given by
Eg
[
T∑
l=t
βl−tR(l)|pi1t , . . . , piNt
]
=pinR +
K∑
i=1
pint (i)Eg
[
T∑
l=t+1
βl−tR(l)|pint+1 = Pi, pimt+1 = pimt P for m 6= n
]
≤pinR +
K∑
i=1
pint (i)Eg
m
[
T∑
l=t+1
βl−tR(l)|pint+1 = Pi, pimt+1 = pimt P for m 6= n
]
=pint R + β
∑
i<L
pint (i)Vt+1(SOt, pi
1
t+1, . . . , pi
N
t+1) + β
∑
i≥L
pint (i)Vt+1(Ot, pi
1
t+1, . . . , pi
N
t+1)
=Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , . . . , pi
N
t ). (2.68)
The inequality in (2.68) follows from the induction hypothesis and the ordering Ot :=
(1, 2, . . . , n− 1, n+ 1, . . . , N, n).
Since pint ≤st pimt for all m = n + 1, n + 2, . . . , N , repeatedly applying Property
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II.10 we get
Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , . . . , pi
N
t )
≤Vt((1, 2, . . . , n− 1, n, n+ 1, . . . , N), pi1t , . . . , piNt )
=Egm
[
T∑
l=t
R(l)|pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt
]
. (2.69)
Combining (2.68) (2.69) we obtain
Eg
[
T∑
l=t
βl−tR(l)|pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt
]
≤ Egm
[
T∑
l=t
βl−tR(l)|pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt
]
, (2.70)
which completes the proof.
2.3.8 Discussion
The key steps in establishing the optimality of the myopic policy, under the as-
sumptions made in the problem formulation, are the following:
(K1) The assertion that the performance of any separated policy can be upper-
bounded by the performance of an ordering-based policy. Consequently, for
the solution of the original optimization problem, one can restrict attention to
ordering-based policies.
(K2) The assertion that the performance of an ordering-based policy improves when
a better (in the sense of stochastic order) channel is used earlier. This assertion
implies the optimality of the myopic policy.
The assertion of (K1) is established in Theorem II.2 (its induction step). The asser-
tion of (K2) is established by Property II.10, provided that the myopic policy is an
ordering-based policy, and that stochastic order is maintained among all channels at
every time. The fact that the myopic policy is an ordering-based policy is ensured by
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Property II.7. The existence of a stochastic ordering among all channels at any time
t is ensured by Property II.5. To establish these properties we need Properties 1-9.
We now elaborate on the interdependence of Properties 1-9. Property II.5, which
asserts that channels can be ordered stochastically, is a consequence of Properties
II.3 and II.4 for the unobserved channels and the observed channel, respectively.
Properties II.3 and II.4 also ensure that the myopic policy gm belongs to the class of
ordering-based policies (Property II.7). Property II.10 is a special case of Property
II.9 when pˆi1t = pi
Ot(m)
t ≥st pi1t = piOt(n)t . Property II.9 is coupled with Properties II.8
and II.11, that is, Properties II.8, II.9 and II.11 need to be proven simultaneously.
The proof of Properties II.8, II.9 and II.11 requires Property II.6.
The upper bounds that appear in Properties II.8, II.9 and II.11 are essential in
establishing the optimality of the myopic policy. These bounds along with Condition
(A4) ensure that the instantaneous advantage in expected reward obtained by the use
of the myopic policy gm over any other policy g, overcompensates any future possible
expected reward losses of gm as compared to g.
2.4 The Infinite Horizon Problem
For the infinite horizon Problem (P2) we have the following theorem.
Theorem II.12. Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), the myopic policy gm is optimal for
Problem (P2).
Proof. From the theory of stochastic control [1] we know that for Problem (P2) there
exists a separated stationary policy g∗ that maximizes the total expected discounted
reward.
Let pi := (pi1, pi2, ..., piN); for any stationary separated policy g let
Jgβ(pi) := E
g
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtR(t)|pi0 = pi
]
. (2.71)
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Then the dynamic program for Problem (P2) is
Jg
∗
β (pi) = max
n=1,2,...,N
{
pinR + βE
[
Jg
∗
β (pi1)|pi0 = pi, U0 = n
]}
, (2.72)
where pi0, pi1 are defined by (2.11)-(2.13). The myopic policy g
m that is optimal for
the finite horizon T problem (by Theorem II.2) satisfies the dynamic program
Jg
m
β,T (pi) = max
n∈{1,2,...,N}
{
pinR + βE
[
Jg
m
β,T−1(pi1)|pi0 = pi, U0 = n
]}
, (2.73)
where
Jg
m
β,T (pi) :=E
gm
[
T∑
t=0
βtR(t)|pi0 = pi
]
. (2.74)
Since the reward R(t) ≤ RK is bounded, by the bounded convergence theorem we get
Jg
m
β (pi) =E
g
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtR(t)|pi0 = pi
]
= lim
T→∞
Eg
[
T∑
t=0
βtR(t)|pi0 = pi
]
= lim
T→∞
Jg
m
β,T (pi), (2.75)
Letting T →∞ in (2.73) and using the bounded convergence theorem we obtain
Jg
m
β (pi) = max
n∈{1,2,...,N}
{
pinR + βE
[
Jg
m
β (pi1)|pi0 = pi, U0 = n
]}
, (2.76)
Notice that (2.76) is exactly the dynamic programming equation (2.72); therefore,
Jg
m
β (pi) = J
g∗
β (pi); (2.77)
consequently, the myopic policy gm is optimal for the infinite horizon problem (P2).
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2.5 Myopic policy vs. Gittins index rule
In this section we investigate conditions under which the myopic policy coincides
with the Gittins index rule.
Select a channel, say channel n, n = 1, 2, . . . , N . For PMF pi ∈ ∆(S), the Gittins
index ([29, 35]) of channel n is defined is defined by
νn(pi) := max
τ
Egτ
[∑τ−1
t=0 β
tpint R|pin0 = pi
]
Egτ
[∑τ−1
t=0 β
t|pin0 = pi
] , (2.78)
where τ is any stopping time with respect to {pint , t = 0, 1, . . . } and gτ chooses channel
n from t = 0 up to t = τ − 1. The Gittins index rule ([29, 35]) chooses the channel
with the highest Gittins index at every time instant t.
In condition (A3) (Section 2.3.2) L is fixed; it can be any number form 2 to K.
In this section we show that when L = K, under conditions (A1)-(A4), after time 0
the myopic policy coincides with the Gittins index rule. We establish this result via
Theorems II.13 and II.14.
Theorem II.13. (i) For pi ∈ ∆(S)P , PK−1 ≤st pi ≤st PK, the Gittins index ν(pi)
is given by
ν(pi) =
piR + βpi(K) PKR
1−βpKK
1 + βpi(K) 1
1−βpKK
. (2.79)
(ii) If pix, piy ∈ ∆(S)P and PK−1 ≤st piy ≤st pix ≤st PK, then ν(pix) ≥ ν(piy).
(iii) If pi ∈ ∆(S)P and PK−1 ≤st pi ≤st PK, then ν(pi) ≥ ν(Pi) for i < K.
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Proof. (i) From Property II.4 and part (ii) of Property II.6 we know that
piR ≤ PKR for all pi ∈ ∆(S)P. (2.80)
Using (2.80) in the definition of Gittins index (2.78) we get
ν(pi) ≤ PKR for all pi ∈ ∆(S)P. (2.81)
Letting τ = 1 in (2.78), we get an lower bound on the Gittins index of PK
ν(PK) ≥ E[R(pi0)|pi0 = PK ] = PKR. (2.82)
Combining (2.81) and (2.82), ν(PK) = PKR and the PMF PK has the largest Gittins
index among all PMFs.
From Theorem 4.1 in [44] we know that the second largest Gittens index among PMFs
{pi, P1, P2, .., PK−1, PK} is given by
max
x={pi,P1,P2,..,PK−1}
νK(x), (2.83)
where
νK(x) :=
AK(x)
BK(x)
, (2.84)
AK(x) :=xR + βx(K)AK(PK), AK(PK) =
PKR
1− βPKK , (2.85)
BK(x) :=1 + βx(K)BK(PK), BK(PK) =
1
1− βPKK . (2.86)
We now show that for PK−1 ≤st pi ≤st PK
νK(pi) = max
x={pi,P1,P2,..,PK−1}
νK(x). (2.87)
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For that matter we need to show that ν(pix) ≥ ν(piy) whenever pix ≥st piy, pix, piy ∈
∆(S)P . From (2.84),
νK(pix) =
pixR + βpix(K)AK(PK)
1 + βpix(K)BK(PK)
=PKR +
pixR− PKR
1 + βpix(K)BK(PK)
≥PKR + piyR− PKR
1 + βpix(K)BK(PK)
≥PKR + piyR− PKR
1 + βpiy(K)BK(PK)
=νK(piy). (2.88)
The first inequality in (2.88) follows from part (ii) of Property II.6 and pix ≥st piy.
The second inequality in (2.88) holds because piyR− PKR ≤ 0 as piy ≤st PK .
Since pi ≥st Pi for i = 1, 2, . . . , K − 1, (2.88) ensures that νK(pi) ≥ νK(Pi) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , K − 1. Thus, pi is the PMF with the second largest Gittins index among
{pi, P1, P2, .., PK−1, PK}.
The Gittins index for pi ∈ ∆(S)P, PK−1 ≤st pi ≤st PK is given by
ν(pi) = νK(pi) =
piR + βpi(K) PKR
1−βpKK
1 + βpi(K) 1
1−βpKK
. (2.89)
This completes the proof of (i).
(ii) If pix, piy ∈ ∆(S)P and PK−1 ≤st piy ≤st pix ≤st PK , by (2.88) and (2.89), we get
ν(piy) = νK(piy) ≤ νK(pix) = ν(pix). (2.90)
(iii) From part (i) we know that for pi ∈ ∆(S)P and PK−1 ≤st pi ≤st PK , pi gives the
second largest Gittins index among {pi, P1, P2, .., PK−1, PK}. Consequently, ν(pi) ≥
ν(Pi) for i < K.
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Theorem II.14. Under Conditions (A1)-(A4) and L = K, after time t = 0 the
Gittins index rule is an optimal channel sensing policy for Problems (P1).
Proof. Consider any time t > 0. If the channel observed at time t − 1 is in state K
then the PMF of that channel at t is PK . The myopic policy senses this channel at
t. The Gittins index rule senses the same channel at t as PK is the PMF with the
largest Gittins index by Theorem II.13, part (ii).
If the channel observed at time t − 1 is in state i, i < K, then the PMF of that
channel at t is Pi and the PMFs of all other channels are stochastically ordered and
are stochastically larger than PK−1 and stochastically smaller than PK by Property
II.4. The myopic policy will choose the channel with the stochastically largest PMF
(among all channels that are not observed at t−1). By Theorem II.13 (ii), the Gittins
index of the same channel is the largest among the Gittins indices of all channels that
are not observed at t − 1. By Theorem II.13 (iii), the Gittins index of the channel
observed at time t − 1 is ν(Pi) ≤ ν(pi) for all PK−1 ≤st pi ≤st PK . Therefore, the
Gittins index chooses the same channel as the myopic policy. From the optimality
of the myopic policy, under Conditions (A1)-(A4) (Theorem II.2) and the condition
L = K, after time t = 0 the Gittins index rule is an optimal channel sensing strategy
for problem (P1) and (P2).
Note that, if two channels, say channel 1 and 2 are such that pi10, pi
2
0 ∈ {P1, . . . , PK−1}
then pi10, pi
2
0 ∈ ∆(S)P and thus, (A2) is satisfied. Nevertheless pi10, pi20 do not necessar-
ily satisfy the condition Pk−1 ≤st pii0 ≤st PK of Theorem II.13. Thus, at t = 0, the
assertion of Theorem II.13 may not be true for channels 1 and 2, thus the Gittins
index rule may not be optimal at time 0.
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2.6 MDP Approximation and Numerical Experiments
In this section, we consider the POMDP formulation of Problem (P1) for the
finite horizon channel sensing problem, and develop a MDP approximation for the
POMDP.
In the POMDP, each channel’s PMF pint ∈ ∆(S). However, not all vectors in
pint ∈ ∆(S) are possible PMFs for the channels. For any time t, if the last time
channel n is selected before t is t − s, and the state of channel n at t − s is k ∈ S,
then the PMF of channel at t is equal to
pint = PkP
s−1. (2.91)
Therefore, the PMF of a channel can always be characterized by a pair (k, s)
where k ∈ S, s ∈ N := {1, 2, 3, . . . }. Define ∆′(S) := {PkP s−1 : k ∈ S, s ∈ N}. The
set ∆′(S) of possible PMFs is a countable set. We can further approximate it with a
finite set ∆′M(S) for any number M such that
∆′M(S) =: {PkP s−1 : k ∈ S, s = 1, . . . ,M}. (2.92)
Using the finite approximation ∆′M(S) of the set of possible PMFs ∆
′(S), we can
construct a finite Markov decision process (MDP) that approximates the POMDP
for the channel sensing problem.
MDPM Approximation:
The state of the system at t is Zt = (Z
1
t , Z
2
t , . . . , Z
N
t ), where Z
n
t = (Z
n
t (1), Z
n
t (2)) ∈
S ×{1, . . . ,M} for all n for all t. Based on the action Ut = 1, 2, . . . , N at t, the state
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of the system evolves as
Znt+1(1) =
 Z
n
t (1) if Ut 6= n,
Y nt if Ut = n,
(2.93)
Znt+1(2) =
 min(Z
n
t (2) + 1,M) if Ut 6= n,
1 if Ut = n.
(2.94)
The reward incurred at time t is given by
R(t) = P
Z
Ut
t (1)
P (Z
Ut
t (2)−1)R. (2.95)
The above finite state MDPM can be solved by dynamic programming. Define a
map ηM : ∆
′(S) 7→ S × {1, . . . ,M} as
ηM(pi
n
t ) = (k,min(s,M)) when pi
n
t = PkP
s−1. (2.96)
Then, we can construct a separating channel sensing policy gM ∈ Gs from an optimal
policy g˜M for MDPM by
Ut = g
m
t (pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) = g˜
M
t (ηM(pi
1
t ), ηM(pi
2
t ), . . . , ηM(pi
N
t )). (2.97)
As M increases, limM→∞∆′M(S) = ∆
′(S). Therefore, we expect that the perfor-
mance of gM will approach the optimal policy as M increases. However, the com-
plexity of solving MDPM also increases with M because the size of the state space
in MDPM is (KM)
N .
In this section, we numerically solve MDPM for an instance with N = 3 channels
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and K = 3 states over time horizon T = 10 where
β = 1, (2.98)
P =

0.8 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.8 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.8
 , (2.99)
R =
[
1 2 3
]T
, (2.100)
pi10 = pi
2
0 = pi
3
0 = P1P
10. (2.101)
Note that, (A2) is not satisfied under the above parameters; therefore, the myopic
policy may not be optimal for this instance.
We use simulation to compare the performance of the myopic policy to the per-
formance of gM for different values of M . In the simulation, we ran the channel
sensing problem for 5000 times, and use the average reward over all experiments as
the performance criteria of a policy.
Fig. 2.2 shows the performance of the myopic policy gm, policy gM , random
selection, and the maximum reward if all channels’ states are available. It is shown
in Fig. 2.2 that the performance of policy gM increases as M increases. Furthermore,
policy gM outperforms the myopic policy when M is large (M ≥ 3).
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Figure 2.2: The performance of the myopic policy gm and policy gM
2.7 Multiple Selection
In this section, we consider the channel sensing problem with multiple selection.
That is, the user can select multiple channels to transmit data at each time. We
compare the performance of the myopic policy and the policy constructed from a
MDP approximation for the multiple selection channel sensing problem.
Suppose the user can select d channels at each time, then the user’s transmission
decision Ut is a set of channels of size d. Each channel in Ut ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} is used
by the user for transmission at t. The reward at t from transmission through the d
channels is
RMS(t) =
∑
i∈Ut
RXit . (2.102)
We define the multiple selection channel sensing problem MS(d) where the user
selects d channels at each time.
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Problem MS(d)
max
g∈GMS(d)
Eg
[
T∑
t=0
βtRMS(t)
]
, (2.103)
where GMS(d) is the set of all separated policies from ∆(S)N to the set of size d subsets
in {1, 2, . . . , N}.
When d = 1, the above described multiple selection problem MS(d) becomes the
single selection channel sensing problem (P1) formulated in Section 2.2.1.
For Problem MS(d), one simple policy is the myopic policy defined below.
Definition II.15. The myopic policy g(m,d) := (g
(m,d)
0 , g
(m,d)
1 , . . . , g
(m,d)
T ) is the policy
that selects at each time instant the d channels with the first d largest expected
reward; that is, if Ot is the channel ordering such that
pi
Ot(1)
t R ≥ piOt(2)t R ≥ · · · ≥ piOt(N)t R (2.104)
Then
g
(m,d)
t (pit) = {Ot(1), Ot(2), . . . , Ot(d)}. (2.105)
Using similar approximation ideas from Section 2.6, we can also construct finite
MDP approximation for Problem MS(d).
MS(d)−MDPM approximation
The state of the system at t is Zt = (Z
1
t , Z
2
t , . . . , Z
N
t ), where Z
n
t = (Z
n
t (1), Z
n
t (2)) ∈
S × {1, . . . ,M} for all n for all t. Based on the action Ut ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} at t, the
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state of the system evolves as
Znt+1(1) =
 Z
n
t (1) if n /∈ Ut
Y nt if n ∈ Ut
(2.106)
Znt+1(2) =
 min(Z
n
t (2) + 1,M) if n /∈ Ut
1 if n ∈ Ut
(2.107)
The reward incurred at time t is given by
R(t) =
∑
n∈Ut
PZnt (1)P
(Znt (2)−1)R. (2.108)
Similar to the case of single selection in Section 2.6, from any solution g˜(M,d) for
MS(d) −MDPM , we can construct a separating channel sensing policy g(M,d) ∈ Gs
by
Ut = g
(M,d)
t (pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) = g˜
(M,d)
t (ηM(pi
1
t ), ηM(pi
2
t ), . . . , ηM(pi
N
t )). (2.109)
We numerically solved MS(d) −MDPM for the problem instance in Section 2.6
with double selection (d = 2), and use simulation to compare the performance of
the myopic policy gm,2 to the performance of g(M,2) for different values of M . In the
simulation, we ran the multiple selection channel sensing problem for 5000 times, and
use the average reward over the 5000 experiments as the performance criteria of a
policy.
Fig. 2.3 shows the performance of the myopic policy g(m,2), policy g(M,2), random
selection, and the maximum reward if all channels’ states are available. Policy g(M,2)
performs better than the myopic policy g(m,2) when M ≥ 2. However, the performance
difference between g(M,2) and g(m,2) in the multiple selection problem MS(d) is smaller
than that between gM and gm in the single selection problem (P1) (see Fig. 2.2).
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The simulation results suggest that the performance loss due to the myopic policy,
resulting from its comparison with the optimal policy, is smaller when more channels
can be selected at each time instant.
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Figure 2.3: The performance of g(m,2) and g(M,2) in Problem MS(2).
2.8 Conclusion
The channel sensing problem we investigated in this chapter arises in communica-
tions and many other fields of science and technology, as it is an instance of restless
bandit problems. For the single selection problem, we identified conditions sufficient
to guarantee the optimality of the myopic policy, and conditions under which the
Gittins index rule coincides with the myopic policy (and is optimal). We also devel-
oped a MDP approximation that results in a dynamic programming algorithm for
computing a near-optimal policy. For the multiple selection problem, we computed
a near-optimal policy from a MDP approximation, and compared it with the myopic
policy in numerical simulations.
Our results on the optimality of the myopic policy for the single selection problem
extend previously known results on the same problem when each channel has two
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states. As pointed out in Section 2.3.1, such an extension is non-trivial and requires
significant insight into the nature of the problem (so as to identify the appropriate
assumptions/conditions), and much more careful and complicated analysis (so as to
discover qualitative properties of optimal sensing policies, such as the optimality of
the myopic policy).
Our results on the optimality of the Gittins index rule for the single selection
problem rely on : (i) the fact that the information state of any channel after t > 0
lies stochastically between PK−1 and PK , i.e. PK−1 ≤st pi ≤st PK ; and (ii) the fact
that ν(pˆi) ≥ ν(pi) whenever pˆi ≥st pi and both pˆi and pi are stochastically ordered
between PK−1 and PK . We have not been able to prove whether or not the Gittins
index rule coincides with the myopic policy when conditions (A1)-(A4) are valid and
L 6= K in (A3).
Our simulation results for the multiple selection problem suggest that the perfor-
mance loss due to the myopic policy, resulting from its comparison with the optimal
policy, is smaller when more channels can be selected at each time instant.
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CHAPTER III
Decentralized Stochastic Control-Part I:
Decentralized Routing
3.1 Introduction
Routing problems to parallel queues arise in many modern technological systems
such as communication, transportation and sensor networks. The majority of the
literature on optimal routing in parallel queues addresses situations where the infor-
mation is centralized, either perfect (see [45–57] and references therein) or imperfect
(see [58, 59] and references therein). Very few results on optimal routing to parallel
queues under decentralized information are currently available. The authors of [60]
present a heuristic approach to decentralized routing in parallel queues. In ([61–65]
and references therein), decentralized routing policies that stablize queueing networks
are considered. The work in [66] presents an optimal policy to a routing problem with
a one-unit delay sharing information structure.
In this chapter we investigate a decentralized routing problem in discrete time.
We consider a system consisting of two service stations/queues, called Q1 and Q2
and two controllers, called C1 and C2. Controller C1 (resp. C2) is affiliated with
service station Q1 (resp. Q2). Each station has an infinite size buffer. The processes
describing exogenous customer arrivals at each station are independent Bernoulli with
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parameter (λ). The random variables describing the service times at each station are
independent geometric with parameter (µ). At any time each controller can route one
of the customers waiting in its own queue to the other station. Each controller knows
perfectly the queue length in its own station, and observes the exogenous arrivals in
its own station as well as the arrivals of customers sent from the other station. At
the beginning, controller C1 (resp. C2) has a probability mass function (PMF) on the
number of customers in station Q2 (resp. Q1). These PMFs are common knowledge
between the controllers. At each time a holding cost is incurred at each station due
to the customers waiting at that station. The objective is to determine decentralized
routing policies for the two controllers that minimize either the total expected holding
cost over a finite horizon or the average cost per unit time over an infinite horizon.
In the above described routing problem, each controller has different information.
Furthermore, the control actions/routing decisions of one controller affect the infor-
mation of the other controller. Thus, the information structure of this decentralized
routing problem is non-classical with control sharing (see [67] for non-classical control
sharing information structures). Non-classical information structures result in chal-
lenging signaling problems (see [3]). Signaling occurs through the routing decisions
of the controllers. Signaling is, in essence, a real-time encoding/communication prob-
lem within the context of a decision making problem. By sending or not sending a
customer from Q1 (resp. Q2) to Q2 (resp. Q1) controller C1 (resp. C2) communicates
at each time instant a compressed version of its queue length to C2 (resp. C1). For
example, by sending a customer from Q1 to Q2 at time t, C1 may signal to C2 that
Q1’s queue length is above a pre-specified threshold lt. This information allows C2
to have a better estimate of Q1’s queue length and, therefore, make better routing
decisions about the customers in its own queue; the same arguments hold for the sig-
nals send (through routing decisions) from C2 to C1. Thus, signaling through routing
decisions has a triple function: communication, estimation and control.
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Within the context of the problems described above, there is enormous number of
signaling possibilities. For example, there is an arbitrarily large number of choices of
the sequences of pre-specified thresholds l1, l2, . . . , lt, . . . and these choices are only a
small subset of all the possible sequences of binary partitions of the set of non-negative
integers that describe all choices available to C1 and C2. All these possibilities result
in highly non-trivial decision making problems. It is the presence of signaling that
distinguishes the problem formulated in this chapter from all other routing problems
in parallel queues investigated so far.
Some basic questions associated with the analysis of this problem are:
What is an information state (sufficient statistic) for each controller? How is
signaling incorporated in the evolution/update of the information state? Is there an
explicit description of an optimal signaling strategy? We will answer these questions
in Section 3.3-3.6 and will discuss them further in Section 3.9.
Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the
model for the queueing system and formulate the finite horizon and infinite horizon
decentralized routing problems. In Section 3.3 we present structural results for opti-
mal policies. In Section 3.4 we present a specific decentralized routing policy, which
we call gˆ, and state some features associated with its performance. In Section 3.5,
we show that when the initial queue lengths in Q1 and Q2 are equal, gˆ is an optimal
policy for the finite horizon decentralized routing problem. In Section 3.6, we show
that gˆ is an optimal decentralized routing policy for the infinite horizon average cost
per unit time problem. In Section 3.7, we consider the system with bursty arrivals
and present the decentralized routing policy DRM . We present numerical examples
in Section 3.8 to illustrate the results developed in Section 3.2-3.7. We conclude in
Section 3.9.
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3.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
System Model
The queueing/service system shown in Figure 3.1, operates in discrete time.
Station Q1
Station Q2
Figure 3.1: The queueing system.
The system consists of two service stations/queues, Q1 and Q2 with infinite size
buffers. Controllers C1 and C2 are affiliated with queues Q1 and Q2, respectively.
Let X it denote the number of customers waiting, or in service, in Qi, i = 1, 2, at the
beginning of time t. Exogenous customer arrivals at Qi, i = 1, 2, occur according
to a Bernoulli process {Ait, t ∈ Z+} with parameter λ. Service times of customers
at Qi, i = 1, 2 are described by geometric random variables with parameter µ. We
define a Bernoulli process {Dit, t ∈ Z+} with parameter µ. Then {Dit1{Xit 6=0}, t ∈ Z+}
describes the customer departure process from Qi, i = 1, 2. At any time t, a controller
can route one of the customers in its own queue to the other queue. Let U it denote
the routing decision of controller Ci at t (i = 1, 2); if U
i
t = 1 (resp. 0) one customer
(resp. no customer) is routed from Qi to Qj (j 6= i). At any time t, each controller
Ci, i = 1, 2, knows perfectly the number of customers X
i
0:t, i = 1, 2, in its own queue;
furthermore, it observes perfectly the arrival stream Ai0:t to its own queue, and the
arrivals due to customers routed to its queue from the other service station up to
time t − 1, i.e. U j0:t−1, j 6= i. The order of arrivals Ait, departures Dit and controller
decisions U it concerning the routing of customers from one queue to the other is shown
in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: The order of variables
The dynamic evolution of the number of customers X it , i = 1, 2 is described by
X1t+1 = X
1
t − U1t + U2t , (3.1)
X2t+1 = X
2
t − U2t + U1t , (3.2)
where for i = 1, 2,
X
i
t =
(
X it −Dit
)+
+ Ait, (3.3)
and (x)+ := max(0, x). We assume that the initial queue lengths X10 , X
2
0 and the
processes {A1t , t ∈ Z+}, {A2t , t ∈ Z+}, {D1t , t ∈ Z+}, {D2t , t ∈ Z+} are mutually
independent and their distributions are known by both controllers C1 and C2. Let
pi10 and pi
2
0 be the PMFs on the initial queue lengths X
1
0 , X
2
0 , respectively. At the
beginning of time t = 0, C1 (resp. C2) knows X
1
0 (resp. X
2
0 ). Furthermore C1’s (resp.
C2’s) knowledge of the queue length X
2
0 (resp. X
1
0 ) at the other station is described
by the PMF pi20 (resp. pi
1
0). The information of controller Ci, i = 1, 2, at the moment
it makes the decision U it , t = 0, 1, . . . , is
I it :=
{
X i0:t, A
i
0:t, X
i
0:t, U
1
0:t−1, U
2
0:t−1, pi
1
0, pi
2
0
}
, i = 1, 2. (3.4)
The controllers’ routing decisions/control actions U it are generated according to
U it = g
i
t
(
I it
)
, i = 1, 2, t ∈ Z+, (3.5)
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where
git :(Z+)t+1 × {0, 1}t+1 × (Z+)t+1 × {0, 1}t×
× {0, 1}t × RZ+ × RZ+ 7→ U it . (3.6)
The control action space U it at time t depends on X it. Specifically
U it =
 {0} when X
i
t = 0,
{0, 1} otherwise.
(3.7)
Define Gd to be the set of feasible decentralized routing policies; that is
Gd = {(g1, g2) : gi = (gi0, gi1, . . . , git, . . . ), i = 1, 2
and git is of form given by (3.5)-(3.6)}. (3.8)
We study the operation of the system defined in this section, first over a finite
horizon, then over an infinite horizon.
3.2.1 The finite horizon problem
For the problem with a finite horizon T , we assume the holding cost incurred by
the customers present in Qi at time t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 is ct(X it), i = 1, 2, where ct(·)
is a convex and increasing function. Then, the objective is to determine decentralized
routing policies g ∈ Gd so as to minimize
JgT (pi
1
0, pi
2
0) := E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
ct
(
X1,gt
)
+ ct
(
X2,gt
))∣∣∣∣∣ pi10, pi20
]
(3.9)
for any PMFs pi10, pi
2
0 on the initial queue lengths.
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3.2.2 The infinite horizon average cost per unit time problem
For the infinite horizon average cost per unit time problem, we assume the holding
cost incurred by the customers present in Qi at each time is a convex and increasing
function ct(·) := c(·), i = 1, 2. Then, the objective is to determine decentralized
routing policies g = (g1, g2) ∈ Gd so as to minimize
Jg(pi10, pi
2
0)
:= lim sup
T→∞
1
T
JgT (pi
1
0, pi
2
0)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gt
)
+ c
(
X2,gt
))∣∣∣∣∣ pi10, pi20
]
(3.10)
for any PMFs pi10, pi
2
0 on the initial queue lengths.
3.3 Qualitative Properties of Optimal Policies
In this section we present a qualitative property of an optimal routing policy for
both the finite horizon and the infinite horizon problem. For that matter we first
introduce the following notation.
We denote by Π1t and Π
2
t the PMFs on X
1
t and X
2
t , respectively, conditional on
all previous decisions {U10:t−1, U20:t−1}. Πit, i = 1, 2 is defined by
Πit(x) := P
(
X it = x|U10:t−1, U20:t−1
)
, x ∈ Z+. (3.11)
Similarly, we define the conditional PMFs Π
1
t , Π
2
t on X
1
t and X
2
t , respectively, as
follows.
Π
i
t(x) := P
(
X
i
t = x|U10:t−1, U20:t−1
)
, i = 1, 2, x ∈ Z+. (3.12)
Note that for any policy g ∈ Gd all the above defined PMFs are functions of {U10:t−1, U20:t−1}.
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Since both controllers C1 and C2 know {U10:t−1, U20:t−1} at time t, the PMFs defined
by (3.11)-(3.12) are common knowledge [68] between the controllers.
We take X
i
t, i = 1, 2, to be station Qi’s state at time t. Combining (3.1)-(3.3) we
obtain, for i = 1, 2,
X
i
t+1 =
(
X
i
t − U it + U jt −Dit+1
)+
+ Ait+1
:=f it
(
X
i
t, U
i
t , U
j
t ,W
i
t
)
, (3.13)
where the random variables W it := (A
i
t+1, D
i
t+1), i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1, . . . are mutually
independent.
The holding cost at time t, t = 0, 1, . . . can be written as
ρt
(
X
1
t , X
2
t , U
1
t , U
2
t
)
:=ct+1
(
X
1
t − U1t + U2t
)
+ ct+1
(
X
2
t − U2t + U1t
)
=ct+1
(
X1t+1
)
+ ct+1
(
X2t+1
)
. (3.14)
Note that for any time horizon T the total expected holding cost due to (3.14) is
equivalent to the total expected holding cost defined by (3.9) since for any policy
g ∈ Gd
JgT (pi
1
0, pi
2
0)
=E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
ct
(
X1,gt
)
+ ct
(
X2,gt
))]
=E
[
T−2∑
t=0
(
ct+1
(
X1,gt+1
)
+ ct+1
(
X2,gt+1
))]
+ E
[
c0
(
X10
)
+ c0
(
X20
)]
=E
[
T−2∑
t=0
ρt
(
X
1,g
t , X
2,g
t , U
1
t , U
2
t
)]
+ E
[
c0
(
X10
)
+ c0
(
X20
)]
. (3.15)
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With the above notation and definition of system state and instantaneous holding
cost, we have a dynamic team problem with non-classical information structure where
the common information between the two controllers at any time t is their deci-
sions/control actions up to time t − 1. This information structure is the control
sharing information structure investigated in [67]. Furthermore, the independent as-
sumption we made about the exogenous arrivals and the service processes is the same
as the assumptions made about the noise variables in [67]. Therefore, the following
Properties III.1-III.3 hold by the results in [67].
Proposition III.1. For each t, and any given g1s(.), g
2
s(.), s ≤ t, we have
P
(
I1t = i
1
t , I
2
t = i
2
t |U10:t−1, U20:t−1
)
=P
(
I1t = i
1
t |U10:t−1, U20:t−1
)
P
(
I2t = i
2
t |U10:t−1, U20:t−1
)
. (3.16)
Proof. Same as that of Proposition 2 in [67].
Property III.1 says that the two subsystems are independent conditional on past
control actions.
Because of Property III.1 and (3.13), each controller Ci, i = 1, 2 can generate its
decision at any time t by using only its current local state X
i
t and past decisions of
both controllers. This assertion is established by the following property.
Proposition III.2. For the routing problems formulated in Section 3.2, without loss
of optimality we can restrict attention to routing policies of the form
U1t = g
1
t
(
X
1
t , U
1
0:t−1, U
2
0:t−1
)
, (3.17)
U2t = g
2
t
(
X
2
t , U
1
0:t−1, U
2
0:t−1
)
. (3.18)
Proof. Same as that of Proposition 1 in [67].
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Using the common information approach in [13], we can refine the result of Prop-
erty III.2 as follows.
Proposition III.3. For the two routing problems formulated in Section 3.2, without
loss of optimality we can restrict attention to routing policies of the form
U1t = g
1
t
(
X
1
t ,Π
1
t ,Π
2
t
)
, (3.19)
U2t = g
2
t
(
X
1
t ,Π
1
t ,Π
2
t
)
. (3.20)
Proof. Same as that of Theorem 1 in [67].
The result of Property III.3 will play a central role in the analysis of the decen-
tralized routing problems formulated in this chapter.
3.4 The Decentralized Policy gˆ and Preliminary results
In this section, we specify a decentralized policy gˆ and identify an information
state for each controller. Furthermore, we develop some preliminary results for both
the finite horizon problem and the infinite horizon problem formulated in Section 3.2.
To specify policy gˆ, we first define the upper bound and lower bound on the
support of the PMF, Πit, i = 1, 2 as
UBit := max(x : Π
i
t(x) 6= 0), (3.21)
LBit := min(x : Π
i
t(x) 6= 0). (3.22)
UBt := max(UB
1
t , UB
2
t ), (3.23)
LBt := min(LB
1
t , LB
2
t ). (3.24)
62
Similarly, we define the bounds on the support of the PMF, Π
i
t, i = 1, 2 as
UB
i
t := max(x : Π
i
t(x) 6= 0), (3.25)
LB
i
t := min(x : Π
i
t(x) 6= 0), (3.26)
UBt := max(UB
1
t , UB
2
t ), (3.27)
LBt := min(UB
1
t , UB
2
t ). (3.28)
Using the above bounds, we specify the policy gˆ := (gˆ1, gˆ2) as follows:
U it = gˆ
i
t
(
X
i
t, UBt, LBt
)
=
 1, when X
i
t ≥ THt,
0, when X
i
t < THt,
(3.29)
where
THt =
1
2
(
UBt + LBt
)
. (3.30)
Under gˆ, each controller routes a customer to the other queue when X
i
t, i = 1, 2, the
queue length of its own station at the time of decision, is greater than or equal to the
threshold given by (3.30).
Note that this decentralized routing policy gˆ is indeed of the form asserted by
Property III.3 since the upper and lower bounds UBt and LBt are both functions of
the PMFs Π
1
t ,Π
2
t . Therefore, the threshold THt, as a function of Π
1
t ,Π
2
t , is common
knowledge between the controllers. Using the common information, each controller
can compute the threshold according to (3.30) individually, and gˆ can be implemented
in a decentralized manner.
Under policy gˆ, the evolution of the bounds defined by (3.23)-(3.28) are determined
by the following lemma.
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Lemma III.4. At any time t we have
UB
gˆ
t = UB
gˆ
t + 1, LB
gˆ
t =
(
LBgˆt − 1
)+
. (3.31)
When (U1,gˆt , U
2,gˆ
t ) = (0, 0)
UB gˆt+1 = dTHte − 1, LBgˆt+1 = LBgˆt (3.32)
When (U1,gˆt , U
2,gˆ
t ) = (1, 1)
UB gˆt+1 = UB
gˆ
t , LB
gˆ
t+1 = dTHte (3.33)
When (U i,gˆt , U
j,gˆ
t ) = (1, 0), i = 1, 2, j 6= i
UB gˆt+1 = max
(
UB
i,gˆ
t − 1, dTHte
)
(3.34)
LBgˆt+1 = min
(
LB
j,gˆ
t + 1, dTHte − 1
)
(3.35)
where bxc = maximum integer ≤ x, and dxe = minimum integer ≥ x.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary III.5 below follows directly form (3.31)-(3.35) in Lemma III.4.
Corollary III.5. Under policy gˆ,
UB gˆt+1 − LBgˆt+1
≤

⌈
1
2
(
UB gˆt − LBgˆt
)⌉
when (U1,gˆt , U
2,gˆ
t ) = (0, 0),
UB gˆt − LBgˆt otherwise.
(3.36)
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Moreover, if UB gˆt0 − LBgˆt0 ≤ 1 for some time t0, then
(
UB gˆt − LBgˆt
)
≤ 1 for all t ≥ t0. (3.37)
Corollary III.5 shows that the difference between the highest possible number of
customers in Q1 or Q2 and the lowest possible number of customers in Q1 or Q2 is
non-increasing under the policy gˆ. Furthermore, the difference is reduced by half
when there is no customer routed from one queue to another one.
3.5 The finite horizon problem
In this section, we consider the finite horizon problem formulated in Section 3.2.1,
under the additional condition X10 = X
2
0 = x0, where x0 is arbitrary but fixed, and is
common knowledge between C1 and C2.
3.5.1 Analysis
The main result of this section asserts that the policy gˆ defined in Section 3.4 is
optimal.
Theorem III.6. When X10 = X
2
0 = x0 and x0 is common knowledge between C1 and
C2, the policy gˆ given by (3.29)-(3.30) is optimal for the finite horizon decentralized
routing problem formulated in Section 3.2.1, that is
J gˆT (x0, x0) ≤ JgT (x0, x0) (3.38)
for any feasible policy g ∈ Gd and any initial queue length x0.
Before proving Theorem III.6, we note that when X10 = X
2
0 = x0 Corollary III.5
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implies that
UB gˆt − LBgˆt ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 0. (3.39)
Equation (3.39) says that the difference between the highest possible number of cus-
tomers in Q1 or Q2 and the lowest possible number of customers in Q1 or Q2 is less
than or equal to 1 under policy gˆ. This property means that gˆ controls the length of
the joint support of the PMFs Π
1
t ,Π
2
t and balances the lengths of the two queues. A
direct consequence of (3.39) is the following corollary.
Corollary III.7. At any time t, we have
⌊
1
2
(X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t )
⌋
= min
(
X1,gˆt , X
2,gˆ
t
)
, (3.40)⌈
1
2
(X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t )
⌉
= max
(
X1,gˆt , X
2,gˆ
t
)
. (3.41)
As pointed out above, the policy gˆ balances the lengths of the two queues. This
balancing property suggests that the throughput of the system due to gˆ is high and the
total number of customers in the system is low. This is established by the following
lemma.
Lemma III.8. Under the assumption X10 = X
2
0 = x0, where x0 is common knowledge,
for any policy g of the form described by (3.19)-(3.20), we have
X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t ≤st X1,gt +X2,gt , (3.42)
where Z1 ≤st Z2 means that the r.v. Z1 is stochastically smaller than the r.v. Z2,
that is, for any a ∈ R, P(Z1 ≥ a) ≤ P(Z2 ≥ a) (see [31]).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Using Lemma III.8, we now prove Theorem III.6.
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Proof of Theorem III.6. For any feasible policy g, since the functions ct, t = 0, 1, ..., T ,
are convex, we have at any time t
E
[
ct
(
X1,gt
)
+ ct
(
X2,gt
)]
≥E
[
ct
(⌊
1
2
(X1,gt +X
2,g
t )
⌋)
+ ct
(⌈
1
2
(X1,gt +X
2,g
t )
⌉)]
. (3.43)
Furthermore, using Lemma III.8 and the fact that ct(·) is increasing, we get
E
[
ct
(⌊
1
2
(X1,gt +X
2,g
t )
⌋)
+ ct
(⌈
1
2
(X1,gt +X
2,g
t )
⌉)]
≥E
[
ct
(⌊
1
2
(X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t )
⌋)
+ ct
(⌈
1
2
(X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t )
⌉)]
=E
[
ct
(
min(X1,gˆt , X
2,gˆ
t )
)
+ ct
(
max(X1,gˆt , X
2,gˆ
t )
)]
=E
[
ct
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ ct
(
X2,gˆt
)]
. (3.44)
The inequality in (3.44) is true because X1,gt + X
2,g
t ≤st X1,gˆt + X2,gˆt (Lemma III.8)
and ct(·) is increasing. The first equality in (3.44) follows from Corollary III.7.
Combining (3.43) and (3.44) we obtain, for any t,
E
[
ct
(
X1,gt
)
+ ct
(
X2,gt
)] ≥ E [ct (X1,gˆt )+ ct (X2,gˆt )] . (3.45)
The optimality of policy gˆ follows from (3.9) and (3.45).
3.5.2 Comparison to the performance under centralized information
We compare now the performance of the optimal decentralized policy gˆ to the
performance of the queueing system under centralized information. The results of
this comparison will be useful when we study the infinite horizon problem in Section
3.6.
Consider a centralized controller who has all the information I1t and I
2
t at each
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time t. Then, the set Gc of feasible routing policies of the centralized controller is
Gc := {(g1, g2) : gi = (gi0, gi1, . . . , git, . . . ), i = 1, 2
and U it = g
i
t(I
1
t , I
2
t )}. (3.46)
By the definition, Gd ⊂ Gc. This means that the centralized controller can simulate
any decentralized policy g ∈ Gd adopted by controllers C1 and C2. Therefore, for any
initial PMFs pi10, pi
2
0
inf
g∈Gc
JgT (pi
1
0, pi
2
0) ≤ inf
g∈Gd
JgT (pi
1
0, pi
2
0) (3.47)
inf
g∈Gc
Jg(pi10, pi
2
0) ≤ inf
g∈Gd
Jg(pi10, pi
2
0). (3.48)
When X10 = X
2
0 = x0, Lemma III.8 and Theorem III.6 show that the cost given by gˆ
is smaller than the cost given by any policy g ∈ Gd. Furthermore we have:
Lemma III.9. Under the assumption X10 = X
2
0 = x0, where x0 is common knowledge,
we have
X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t ≤st X1,gt +X2,gt , (3.49)
for any g ∈ Gc, and
J gˆT (x0, x0) ≤ inf
g∈Gc
JgT (x0, x0). (3.50)
for any g ∈ Gc.
Proof. The proof of (3.49) is the same as the proof of Lemma III.8, and the proof of
(3.50) is the same as the proof of Theorem III.6.
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Since gˆ is a decentralized policy, (3.47) and Lemma III.9 imply that
J gˆT (x0, x0) = inf
g∈Gd
JgT (x0, x0) = inf
g∈Gc
JgT (x0, x0). (3.51)
Equation (3.51) shows that whenX10 = X
2
0 = x0 and x0 is common knowledge between
C1and C2, policy gˆ achieves the same performance as any centralized optimal policy.
3.5.3 The Case of Different Initial Queue Lengths
When X10 6= X20 , the policy gˆ is not necessarily optimal for the finite horizon
problem.
Consider an example where the horizon T = 1 (two-step horizon), λ = 0.1, µ = 0.5
and
P
(
X10 = 3
)
= 1, (3.52)
P
(
X20 = 1
)
= 0.9, P
(
X20 = 5
)
= 0.1, (3.53)
that is,
pi10 =(0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, . . . ), (3.54)
pi20 =(0, 0.9, 0, 0, 0, 0.1, 0, . . . ), (3.55)
where pi10, pi
2
0 denote the initial PMFs on the lengths of the queues.
Then, Π
1
0,Π
2
0 and the threshold TH0 are
Π
1
0 = (0, 0, 0.5, 0.4, 0.1, 0, 0, . . . ), (3.56)
Π
2
0 = (0.45, 0.36, 0.09, 0, 0.05, 0.04, 0.01, . . . ), (3.57)
TH0 =
1
2
(6 + 0) = 3. (3.58)
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Consider the cost functions c0(x) = 0 and c1(x) = x
2. Then, we have
Jg(pi10, pi
2
0)
=E
[(
X1,g1
)2
+
(
X2,g1
)2]
=E
[(
X
1
0 − U1,g0 + U2,g0
)2
+
(
X
2
0 − U2,g0 + U1,g0
)2]
. (3.59)
Using (3.56)-(3.58) and the specification of the policy gˆ, we can compute the expected
cost due to gˆ. It is
J gˆ(pi10, pi
2
0) =8.48. (3.60)
Consider now another policy g˜ described below. For i = 1, 2, i 6= j,
U i,g˜t = g˜t
(
X
i
t,Π
1
t ,Π
2
t
)
=
 1, when X
i
t ≥ E
[
X
j
t |Πjt
]
,
0, when X
i
t < E
[
X
j
t |Πjt
]
,
(3.61)
Then, from (3.56)-(3.57) and (3.61) we get
U1,g˜0 =
 1, when X
1
0 ≥ 1,
0, when X
1
0 < 1,
(3.62)
U2,g˜0 =
 1, when X
2
0 ≥ 2.6,
0, when X
2
0 < 2.6,
(3.63)
Therefore, the expected cost due to the policy g˜ is given by
J g˜(pi10, pi
2
0) =8.28. (3.64)
Since J g˜(pi10, pi
2
0) = 8.28 < 8.48 = J
gˆ(pi10, pi
2
0), policy gˆ is not optimal.
In this example, each controller has only one decision to make, the decision at
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time 0. As a result, signaling does not provide any advantages to the controllers, and
that is why the policy gˆ is not the best policy.
3.6 Infinite horizon
We consider the infinite horizon decentralized routing problem formulated in Sec-
tion 3.2.2, and make the following additional assumptions.
Assumption III.10. µ > λ.
Assumption III.11. The initial PMFs pi10, pi
2
0 are finitely supported and common
knowledge between controllers C1 and C2. i.e. there exists M <∞ such that pi10(x) =
pi20(x) = 0 for all x > M .
Let g0 denote the open-loop policy that does not do any routing, that is, at any
time t
U1,g0t = U
2,g0
t = 0. (3.65)
Assumption III.12.
lim
T→∞
1
T
Jg0T (pi
1
0, pi
2
0) := J
g0 <∞ a.s., (3.66)
where Jg0 is a constant that denotes the infinite horizon average cost per unit time
due to policy g0.
Remark III.13. Due to policy g0, the queue length {X i,g0t , t ∈ Z+}, i = 1, 2 is a positive
recurrent birth and death chain with arrival rate λ and departure rate µ1{Xg0,it 6=0}.
Therefore, as T → ∞, the average cost per unit time converges to a constant a.s. if
the expected cost under the stationary distribution of the process is finite (see [69,
chap. 3]). Assumption III.12 is equivalent to the assumption that the expected cost
is finite under the stationary distribution of the controlled queue lengths.
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We proceed to analyze the infinite horizon average cost per unit time for the model
of Section 3.2 under Assumptions III.10-III.12.
3.6.1 Analysis
When X10 6= X20 , the policy gˆ, defined in Section 3.4, is not necessarily optimal for
the finite horizon problem (see the example in Section 3.5.3). Nevertheless, the policy
gˆ still attempts to balance the queues. Given enough time, policy gˆ may be able to
balance the queue lengths even if they are not initially balanced. In this section we
show that this is indeed the case.
Specifically, we prove the optimality of policy gˆ for the infinite horizon average
cost per unit time problem, as stated in the following theorem which is the main
result of this section.
Theorem III.14. Under Assumptions III.10-III.12, the policy gˆ, described by (3.29)-
(3.30), is optimal for the infinite horizon average cost per unit time problem formu-
lated in Section 3.2.2.
To establish the assertion of Theorem III.14 we proceed in four steps. In the first
step we show that the infinite horizon average cost per unit time due to policy gˆ is
bounded above by the cost of the uncontrolled queues (i.e. the cost due to policy g0).
In the second step we show that under policy gˆ the queues are eventually balanced, i.e.
the queue lengths can differ by at most one. In the third step we derive a result that
connects the performance of policy gˆ under the initial PMFs (0, 0) to the performance
of the optimal policy under any arbitrary initial PMFs pi10, pi
2
0 on queues Q1 and Q2.
In the forth step we establish the optimality of policy gˆ based on the results of steps
one, two and three.
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Step 1
We prove that J gˆ(pi10, pi
2
0) ≤ Jg0 . To do this, we first establish some preliminary
results that appear in Lemmas III.15 and III.16.
Lemma III.15. There exists processes {Y 1t , t ∈ Z+} and {Y 2t , t ∈ Z+} such that
{Y it , t ∈ Z+} has the same distribution as {X i,g0t , t ∈ Z+} (3.67)
for i = 1, 2, and for all times t
X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t ≤ Y 1t + Y 2t a.s., (3.68)
max
i
(
X i,gˆt
)
≤ max
i
(
Y it
)
a.s. (3.69)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma III.15 means that the uncontrolled queue lengths are longer than the queue
lengths under policy gˆ in a stochastic sense. Note that (3.68) and (3.69) are not true
if Y it , i = 1, 2, is replaced by X
i,g0
t , i = 1, 2, as the following example shows.
Example
When X1,g0t = 4, X
2,g0
t = 6 and X
1,gˆ
t = X
2,gˆ
t = 5, the analogues of (3.68) and (3.69)
where Y it are replaced by X
i,g0
t , i = 1, 2 are
X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t = X
1,g0
t +X
2,g0
t = 10, (3.70)
max
i
(
X i,gˆt
)
= 5 ≤ 6 = max
i
(
X i,g0t
)
. (3.71)
However, if A1t+1 = 1, A
2
t+1 = 0 and D
1
t+1 = 0, D
2
t+1 = 1 we get X
1,g0
t+1 = X
2,g0
t+1 = 5 and
X1,gˆt+1 = 6, X
2,gˆ
t+1 = 4, then
max
i
(
X i,gˆt+1
)
= 6 > 5 = max
i
(
X i,g0t+1
)
, (3.72)
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and the analogue of (3.69), when Y it is replaced by X
i,g0
t , i = 1, 2, does not hold.
The stochastic dominance relation asserted by Lemma III.15 implies that the
instantaneous cost under policy gˆ is almost surely no greater than the instantaneous
cost due to policy g0. This implication is made precise by the following lemma.
Lemma III.16. The processes {Y 1t , t ∈ Z+} and {Y 2t , t ∈ Z+} defined in Lemma
III.15 are such that at any time t
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
)
≤ c (Y 1t )+ c (Y 2t ) a.s. (3.73)
Proof. See Appendix B.
In order to apply the result of Step 1 as the time horizon goes to infinity, we
need the following result on the convergence of the cost due to {Y 1t , t ∈ Z+} and
{Y 2t , t ∈ Z+}.
Lemma III.17. Let {Y 1t , t ∈ Z+} and {Y 2t , t ∈ Z+} be the processes defined in
Lemma III.15. Let WT denote
WT :=
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(
c(Y 1t ) + c(Y
2
t )
)
. (3.74)
Under Assumptions III.11 and III.12,
lim
T→∞
WT = J
g0 a.s. (3.75)
Moreover, {WT , T = 1, 2, . . . } is uniformly integrable, so it also converges in expec-
tation.
Proof. See Appendix B.
A direct consequence of Lemmas III.15, III.16 and III.17 is the following.
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Corollary III.18. If limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆ
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆ
))
converges a.s., then,
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆ
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆ
)) −→ J gˆ(pi10, pi20) (3.76)
in expectation and a.s. as T →∞. Furthermore,
J gˆ(pi10, pi
2
0) ≤ Jg0 <∞. (3.77)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Step 2
We prove that under policy gˆ the queues are eventually balanced. For this matter
we first establish some preliminary results that appear in Lemmas III.19 and III.20.
Lemma III.19. Let T0 be a stopping time with respect to the process {X1,gˆt , X2,gˆt , t ∈
Z+}. Define the process {St = S gˆt , t ≥ T0 + 1} as follows.
ST0+1 :=X
1,gˆ
T0+1
+X2,gˆT0+1 (3.78)
St+1 :=St −D1t −D2t + A1t + A2t
+ 1{St=1}
(
1{X1,gˆt =0}(D
1
t −D2t ) +D2t
)
+ 1{St=0}
(
D1t +D
2
t
)
(3.79)
If µ > λ > 0, then {St, t ≥ T0 + 1} is an irreducible positive recurrent Markov chain.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma III.19 holds for arbitrary stopping time T0 with respect to {X1,gˆt , X2,gˆt , t ∈
Z+}. By appropriately selecting T0 we will show later that St is coupled with X1,gˆt +
X2,gˆt , i.e. for all t > T0, St = X
1,gˆ
t + X
2,gˆ
t . This result along with the fact that the
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process {St, t ≥ T0 + 1} is an irreducible positive recurrent Markov chain will allow
us to analyze the cost due to policy gˆ.
Lemma III.20. Under policy gˆ,
P
((
U1,gˆt , U
2,gˆ
t
)
= (0, 0) i.o.
)
= 1. (3.80)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma III.20 means that the event { there exists t0 < ∞ such that at least one
of the queue lengths is above the threshold defined by (3.30) for all t > t0 } can not
happen. The idea of Lemma III.20 is the following. If one of the queues, say Q1, has
length above the threshold, hence above the lower bound LBgˆt , then, the length of Q2
does not decrease, because under policy gˆ, Q2 receives one customer from Q1 and has
at most one departure at this time. Therefore, both queue lengths at the next time
are bounded below by the current lower bound LBgˆt . When at least one of the queue
lengths is above the threshold for all t > t0, the queue lengths are bounded below by
LBgˆt0 for all t > t0. This kind of lower bound can not exist if the total arrival rate 2λ
to the system is less than the total departure rate 2µ from the system.
Lemma III.20 and Corollary III.5 in Section 3.4 can be used to establish that
under policy gˆ the queues are eventually balanced. This is shown in the corollary
below.
Corollary III.21. Let
T0 := inf{t : UB gˆt − LBgˆt ≤ 1}. (3.81)
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Then
P(T0 <∞) = 1, (3.82)(
UB gˆt − LBgˆt
)
≤ 1 for all t ≥ T0. (3.83)
Step 3
We compare the finite horizon cost J gˆT (0, 0) (respectively, the infinite horizon cost
J gˆ(0, 0)) due to policy gˆ under initial PMFs (0, 0) to the minimum finite horizon cost
infg∈Gd J
g
T (pi
1
0, pi
2
0) (respectively, the minimum infinite horizon cost infg∈Gd J
g(pi10, pi
2
0))
under arbitrary initial PMFs (pi10, pi
2
0).
Lemma III.22. For any finite time T and any initial PMFs pi10, pi
2
0.
J gˆT (0, 0) = inf
g∈Gc
JgT (0, 0) ≤ inf
g∈Gc
JgT (pi
1
0, pi
2
0) ≤ inf
g∈Gd
JgT (pi
1
0, pi
2
0), (3.84)
and
J gˆ(0, 0) = inf
g∈Gc
Jg(0, 0) ≤ inf
g∈Gc
Jg(pi10, pi
2
0) ≤ inf
g∈Gd
Jg(pi10, pi
2
0). (3.85)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma III.22 states that the minimum cost achieved when the queues are initially
empty is smaller than the minimum cost obtained when the system’s initial condition
is given by arbitrary PMFs on the lengths of queues Q1 and Q2. This result is
established through the use of the corresponding centralized information system that
is discussed in Section 3.5.2.
77
Step 4
Based on the results of Steps 1, 2 and 3 we now establish the optimality of policy
gˆ for the infinite horizon average cost per unit time problem formulated in Section
3.2.2. First, we outline the key ideas in the proof of Theorem III.14, then we present
its proof. Step 2 ensures that policy gˆ eventually (in finite time) balances the queues.
Step 1 ensures that the cost J gˆ(pi10, pi
2
0) is finite. These two results together imply
that the cost due to policy gˆ is the same as the cost incurred after the queues are
balanced. Furthermore, we show that the cost of policy gˆ is independent of the initial
PMFs on the queue lengths. Then, the result of Step 3 together with the results on
the finite horizon problem establish the optimality of policy gˆ.
Proof of Theorem III.14. Define T0 to be the first time when the length of the joint
support of PMFs Π1,gˆt ,Π
2,gˆ
t is no more than 1. That is
T0 = inf{t : UB gˆt − LBgˆt ≤ 1}. (3.86)
The random variable T0 is a stopping time with respect to the process {X1,gˆt , X2,gˆt , t ∈
Z+}. From Corollary III.21 we have
P(T0 <∞) = 1, (3.87)
UB gˆt − LBgˆt ≤ 1 for all t ≥ T0. (3.88)
Furthermore, for all t ≥ T0
∣∣∣X1,gˆt −X2,gˆt ∣∣∣ ≤ UB gˆt − LBgˆt ≤ 1. (3.89)
Consider the process {St, t ≥ T0 + 1} defined by (3.78) and (3.79) (in Lemma III.19).
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We claim that for all t ≥ T0 + 1
X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t = St. (3.90)
We prove the claim in Appendix B. Suppose the claim is true. Since
∣∣∣X1,gˆt −X2,gˆt ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
for all t ≥ T0 + 1, the instantaneous cost at time t ≥ T0 + 1 is equal to
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
)
=c
(⌊
1
2
(X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t )
⌋)
+ c
(⌈
1
2
(X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t )
⌉)
=c
(⌊
1
2
S gˆt
⌋)
+ c
(⌈
1
2
S gˆt
⌉)
. (3.91)
Then, the average cost per unit time due to policy gˆ is given by
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
))
=
1
T
T0∑
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
))
+
1
T
T−1∑
t=T0+1
(
c
(⌊
1
2
S gˆt
⌋)
+ c
(⌈
1
2
S gˆt
⌉))
. (3.92)
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Since T0 <∞ a.s., we obtain
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
))
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T0∑
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
))
+ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=T0(+1
(
c
(⌊
1
2
S gˆt
⌋)
+ c
(⌈
1
2
S gˆt
⌉))
= lim
t→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=T0+1
(
c
(⌊
1
2
S gˆt
⌋)
+ c
(⌈
1
2
S gˆt
⌉))
=
∞∑
s=0
pigˆ(s)
(
c
(⌊
1
2
s
⌋)
+ c
(⌈
1
2
s
⌉))
a.s. (3.93)
where pigˆ(s) is the stationary distribution of {St = S gˆt , t ≥ T0 + 1}. The second
equality in (3.93) holds because T0 <∞ a.s.; the last equality in (3.93) follows by the
Ergodic theorem for irreducible positive recurrent Markov chains [69, chap. 3].
Since the sum 1
T
∑T−1
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
))
converges a.s., from Corollary III.18
we have
J gˆ(pi10, pi
2
0) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆ
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆ
))
=
∞∑
s=0
pigˆ(s)
(
c
(⌊
1
2
s
⌋)
+ c
(⌈
1
2
s
⌉))
. (3.94)
Since the right hand side of equation (3.94) does not depend on the initial PMFs
pi10, pi
2
0, we obtain
J gˆ(pi10, pi
2
0) = J
gˆ(0, 0). (3.95)
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Combining (3.95) and Lemma III.22 we get
J gˆ(pi10, pi
2
0) = J
gˆ(0, 0) ≤ inf
g∈Gd
Jg(pi10, pi
2
0). (3.96)
Thus, gˆ is an optimal routing policy for the infinite horizon problem.
3.7 The Case of Bursty Arrivals
In this section, we consider the same model as that of Section 3.2 except that
we allow multiple arrivals to and multiple departures from each queue at each time
instant. Suppose the maximum burst of customers at each time is a number K. Then,
the arrival process {Ait, t ∈ Z+} is i.i.d. with Ait ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K} and E[Ait] = λi
for i = 1, 2; the departure process {Dit, t ∈ Z+} is i.i.d. with Dit ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K}
and E[Dit] = µi for i = 1, 2. The arrival rates λ1, λ2 and departure rates µ1, µ2 can
capture various queueing systems with heterogeneous stations. To ensure the total
number of arrivals to the system is less the total number of departures, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption III.23. λ1 + λ2 < µ1 + µ2.
In the situation of bursty arrivals, we allow each controller to route up to K
customers from its own queue to the other queue at each time. We use U it ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , K} to denote the routing decision of controller Ci at t (i = 1, 2); if
U it = k, k customers are routed from Qi to Qj (j 6= i).
The objective for the system with bursty arrivals is to design decentralized policies
that balance the two queues (in the sense we describe below).
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3.7.1 The Decentralized Policy DRM
Given the maximum burst of customer K, we introduce a family of decentralized
routing policies DRM := (DRM
1,DRM
2) for any number M ≥ 1 as follows:
U it = DRM
i
(
X
i
t, UBt, LBt
)
= k, when γt(k) ≤ X it < γt(k + 1) (3.97)
where γt(0) = LBt, and for k = 1, 2, . . . , K + 1
γt(k) = LBt +
⌊
(2k +M − 1) max
(
1,
UBt − LBt + 1
2K +M + 1
)⌋
(3.98)
where bxc denotes the integer part of x.
We will show later in Theorem III.27 that policy DRM can balance the two queues
such that the difference between the queues is at most M for any value of M .
Under DRM , each controller routes k customers to the other queue when X
i
t, i =
1, 2, the queue length of its own station at the time of decision, is between the
thresholds γt(k) and γt(k + 1) for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Note that, the threshold vector
γt, as a function of Π
1
t ,Π
2
t , is common knowledge between the controllers. Using the
common information, each controller can compute the thresholds according to (3.30)
individually, and DRM can be implemented in a decentralized manner.
The evolution of the bounds defined by (3.21)-(3.28) have dynamics described by
the following lemma.
Lemma III.24. At any time t we have
UB
DRM
t = UB
DRM
t +K, LB
DRM
t =
(
LBDRMt −K
)+
. (3.99)
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and
UBi,DRMt+1 = γt(U
i,DRM
t + 1)− U i,DRMt + U j,DRMt − 1 (3.100)
LBi,DRMt+1 = γt(U
i,DRM
t )− U i,DRMt + U j,DRMt . (3.101)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Using the bounds’ evolution in Lemma III.4, we obtain the following result.
Lemma III.25. Under policy DRM
UBDRMt+1 − LBDRMt+1 −M
≤
⌊
2 max(U1,DRMt , U
2,DRM
t ) +M + 1
2K +M + 1
(
UB
DRM
t − LBDRMt − 2K −M
)+⌋
≤
⌊
2 max(U1,DRMt , U
2,DRM
t ) +M + 1
2K +M + 1
(
UBDRMt − LBDRMt −M
)+⌋
≤ (UBDRMt − LBDRMt −M)+ . (3.102)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that UBt − LBt describes the largest difference/gap between the two queue
lengths. Lemma III.25 shows that the the difference between the number M and the
above largest gap is non-increasing under the policy DRM .
A direct consequence of Lemma III.25 is the following corollary.
Corollary III.26. If UBDRMt0 − LBDRMt0 ≤M for some time t0, then
(
UBDRMt − LBDRMt
) ≤M for all t ≥ t0. (3.103)
Corollary III.26 says that once the difference between the lengths of the two queues
becomes less than or equal to M , it will always remain less than or equal to M
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afterwards. Therefore, we need to ensure that the event {UBDRMt − LBDRMt ≤ M}
will eventually happen. The following theorem asserts that the above event occurs
with probability one.
Theorem III.27. Let τM = min{t : UBt − LBt ≤ M} be the first time when the
largest difference between the lengths of the two queues is at most M . Then under
Assumption III.23, policy DRM ensures that
E
[
τDRMM
]
<∞. (3.104)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem III.27 guarantees that the two queues will become balanced, so that the
largest difference between their lengths is at most M under DRM . When M = 1, the
two queues will be eventually balanced (they will be differ by at most one customer);
however, the smaller M is, the more customers are routed at each time. When routing
cost is taken into account and the total instantaneous cost includes both holding cost
and routing cost, DRM could achieve minimum total cost by selecting an optimal
value of M .
3.8 Numerical Example
In this Section, we use numerical simulations to illustrate the results developed
in this chapter. Section 3.8.1 presents an example of single arrivals (the model of
Section 3.2), and Section 3.8.2 presents an example of bursty arrivals (the model of
Section 3.7).
3.8.1 Single Arrivals
We consider the queueing system in Section 3.2 with arrival rate λ = 0.4 and
service rate µ = 0.5. We assume that the holding cost is c(x) = x2, and the initial
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PMFs pi10 and pi
2
0 are both uniformly distributed in the set [0, 50]. It is not hard to
verify that Assumptions III.10-III.12 are satisfied.
In the numerical simulation, we set the initial queue lengths to be X10 = 5 and
X20 = 40.
Fig. 3.3 shows the evolution over time of the bounds UB gˆt , LB
gˆ
t and queue lengths
X1,gˆt , X
2,gˆ
t ; it also shows that gˆ balances the queue lengths X
1,gˆ
t , X
2,gˆ
t . Moreover,
policy gˆ controls the difference between the upper bound UB gˆt and the lower bound
LBgˆt . This difference is non-increasing and converges to one at time T0 = 26 (as
asserted in Corollary III.21).
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Figure 3.3: The evolution of queue lengths under policy gˆ
3.8.2 Bursty Arrivals
We consider the queueing system in Section 3.7 with maximum bursts K = 5. Let
Ait be binomial(5, 0.4) and D
i
t be binomial(5, 0.5) for i = 1, 2 at each time t. Then
λ1 = λ2 = 2 and µ1 = µ2 = 2.5. We assume that the initial PMFs pi10 and pi
2
0 are both
uniformly distributed in the set [0, 50].
Since λ1 + λ2 < µ1 + µ2, Assumption III.23 is satisfied.
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In the numerical simulation, we set the initial queue lengths to be X10 = 5 and
X20 = 40.
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Figure 3.4: The evolution of queue lengths under policy DRM with M = 1
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Figure 3.5: The evolution of queue lengths under policy DRM with M = 5
Fig. 3.4 shows the numerical results under DRM when M = 1 and Fig. 3.5
shows the numerical results under DRM when M = 5. In Fig. 3.4, the queue lengths
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X1,DRMt , X
2,DRM
t are eventually balanced by DRM with M = 1. Fig. 3.5 shows that
the difference between X1,DRMt , X
2,DRM
t is eventually less than 5 under DRM with
M = 5. These results illustrate the assertion of Theorem III.27.
3.9 Discussion and Conclusion
Based on the results established in Sections 3.3-3.6, we now discuss and answer
the questions posed in Section 3.1.
Controllers C1 and C2 communicate with one another through their control ac-
tions; thus, each controller’s information depends on the decision rule/routing policy
of the other controller. Therefore, the queueing system considered in this chapter has
non-classical information structure [70]. A key feature of the system’s information
structure is that at each time instant each controller’s information consists of one
component that is common knowledge between C1 and C2 and another component
that is its own private information. The presence of common information allows us
to use the common information approach, developed in [13], along with specific fea-
tures of our model to identify an information state/sufficient statistic for the finite
and infinite horizon optimization problem. The identification/discovery of an appro-
priate information state proceeds in two steps: In the first step we use the common
information approach (in particular [67]) to identify the general form of an informa-
tion state (namely
(
X
i
t,Π
1
t ,Π
2
t
)
) for controller Ci, i = 1, 2 (and the corresponding
structure of an optimal policy, Properties III.3). In the second step we take advan-
tage of the features of our system to further refine/simplify the information state;
we discover a simpler form of information state, namely,
(
X
i
t,
{
UB
j
t , LB
j
t
}
j=1,2
)
for controller Ci, i = 1, 2. The component
{
UB
j
t , LB
j
t
}
j=1,2
of the above informa-
tion state describes the common information between controllers C1 and C2 at time
t, t = 1, 2, . . . .
Using this common information, we established an optimal signaling strategy gˆ
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for the queueing system with signal arrivals, and analyzed the family of signaling
strategy DRM for the system with bursty arrivals.
For the single arrivals case, the update of
{
UB
j
t , LB
j
t
}
j=1,2
is described by (3.32)-
(3.35) and explicitly depends on the signaling policy gˆ. Specifically, if a customer is
sent fromQi toQj (i 6= j) at time t the lower bound on the queue length ofQi increases
because both controllers know that the length of Qi is above the threshold THt at
the time of routing; if no customer is sent from Qi to Qj at time t, the upper bound
on the length of Qi decreases because both controllers know that the length of Qi is
below the threshold THt at the time of routing. The update of common information
incorporates the information about a controller’s private information transmitted to
the other controller through signaling. Similar updates for the bursty arrivals case
are given by (III.24), which depends on the signaling policy DRM .
The signaling policies gˆ and DRM (with M = 1) communicate information in such
a way that eventually the difference between the upper bound and the lower bound
on the queue lengths is no more than one. Thus, signaling through gˆ and DRM (with
M = 1) results in a balanced queueing system under single arrivals or bursty arrivals.
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CHAPTER IV
Decentralized Stochastic Control-Part II: Multiple
Access Communication
4.1 Introduction
Multiple access communication has played a crucial role in the operation of many
networked systems, including satellite networks, radio networks, wired/wireless Local
Area Networks (LANs), and data centers. One important feature of multiple access
communication is its decentralized information structure. In general, when multiple
users share the communication system, coordination among them is essential to re-
solve collision issues. In the absence of a centralized controller, it is challenging to
design efficient user coordination mechanisms.
We consider a typical slotted multiple access communication system where mul-
tiple users share a common collision channel. Each user is equipped with an infinite
size buffer and observes Bernoulli arrivals to its own queue. In addition to the local
information, all users receive a common broadcast feedback from the channel. The
feedback indicates whether the previous transmission was successful (exactly one user
transmitted), or it was a collision (more than one users transmitted), or the channel
was idle. The objective is to design a transmission protocol that effectively coordi-
nates the users’ transmissions under the above described information structure. In
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the design of transmission protocols, there are two major performance metrics of in-
terest: throughput and delay. The throughput region of a protocol is the set of arrival
rates for which the users’ queues are stable (see detailed definition in Section 4.2.2)
under the protocol. The delay performance of a protocol is the average waiting time
of a packet in the communication system. An efficient transmission protocol should
achieve the maximum throughput region and incur low transmission delay.
In this chapter, we propose a common information (see [13, 71]) based multiple
access protocol (CIMA) that uses the common channel feedback to coordinate users.
In CIMA, each user constructs upper bounds on the lengths of the queues of all
users, including itself, based on previous transmission strategies and the common
feedback. Since the upper bounds are common knowledge, users can coordinate their
transmissions through these common upper bounds to avoid collision. We prove that
without knowledge of any statistics, CIMA achieves the full throughput region of the
collision channel. We also prove that the CIMA protocol incurs low transmission
delay; the delay is upper-bounded by a linear function of the number of users.
There is rich literature on multiple access communications. Below we present a
survey of this literature.
Related Work
There are primarily two classes of protocols for the situation where the alpha-
bet of the feedback channel is {0, 1, e} = {no transmission, successful transmis-
sion, collision}: collision-free and contention-based protocols. Time-division-multiple-
access (TDMA) [72] and adaptive TDMA [73, 74] are collision-free protocols. In
adaptive TDMA protocols the (common) information provided by the feedback is
used to adaptively coordinate users to avoid collision. Adaptation resolves the prob-
lems due to asymmetric arrivals, and collision avoidance results in higher throughput
and lower delay than TDMA. However, there is no theoretical analysis of adaptive
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TDMA protocols. Backoff-type protocols and Aloha protocols [72] allow for con-
tention/collision. Due to collision, most contention based protocols can not achieve
full throughput. However, polynomial back-off protocols, presented and analyzed
in [75], achieve full throughput. Nevertheless, polynomial back-off protocols have
exponential delay performance in simulation.
Several types of multiple access protocols were proposed when the common in-
formation among the users is more than {0, 1, e}. The authors of [76–78] proposed
decentralized random access protocols that achieve full throughput when each user
knows the maximum queue length in the system or all other users’ transmission
results. When channel sensing is allowed, carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) pro-
tocols, proposed in [79–84], achieve full throughput when the channel sensing portion
of time is not taken into account in the throughput calculation. A survey of CSMA
protocols is presented in [85]. In terms of delay performance, the CSMA protocols
proposed in [83, 84] achieve delay that is linear in the number of users.
Multiple access protocols for adversarial queueing models were presented in [86,
87]. In [86, 87] it is proved that these protocols achieve full throughput and have
linear delay in the number of users.
Other models for multiple access have also been proposed in the literature. In
[88], channel switching policies that achieve high throughput for multiple access have
been considered within the context of the slotted Aloha protocol and the IEEE 802.11
WLANs protocol. The stability region of the multi-packet reception multiple access
channel has been investigated in [89]. Multiple access with noisy channels has been
considered in [61, 62], and the stability region of policies with delayed shared infor-
mation has been determined.
91
Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we present the
system model and formulate the problem under investigation. In section 4.3 we
present the CIMA protocol. In Section 4.4 we prove that the CIMA protocol achieves
full throughput and linear (in the number of users) delay. We present simulation
results and compare the delay of our protocol with the delay of other protocols that
achieve full throughput in Section 4.5. We conclude in Section 4.6. We present proofs
of the technical results in Appendix C.
4.2 System Model and Objective
4.2.1 System Model
Q1t
Q2t
...
QNt
channel
A1t
A2t
...
ANt
Figure 4.1: Multiple Access Collision Channel.
We consider a slotted communication system, described by Fig. 4.1, where N
users, indexed by 1, 2, . . . , N , share a common collision channel; we denote by N :=
{1, 2, . . . , N} the set of channel users. Each user n is associated with an infinite size
buffer with queue length Qnt at the beginning of each time slot t. We assume that
each queue is initially empty.
At each time slot t each user can transmit one packet in its queue through the
shared channel. If only one user transmits in a time slot, the transmission is successful
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and the transmitted packet is removed form the queue; if more than one users transmit
simultaneously, a collision occurs and all packets involved in the collision remain in
their queue. We consider Bernoulli arrivals to the system. Let Ant denote the packet
arrival to user n at time t; Ant = 1 means that a packet arrives at queue n right
after the transmission at time t. The arrival Ant is a Bernoulli random variable with
parameter λn, and the arrival processes {Ant , t = 0, 1, . . . }, n ∈ N are independent.
Let Unt denote the transmission decision of user n at time slot t; U
n
t = 1 (resp. 0)
indicates that user n transmits (resp. does not transmit) at time t. The dynamics of
queues are given by
Qnt+1 = A
n
t +
(
Qnt − Unt
∏
m6=n
(1− Umt )
)+
, (4.1)
where (·)+ := max(·, 0). We assume that at the end of each time slot t, every user
receives a feedback Ft ∈ {0, 1, e} from the channel/receiver indicating whether no
packets, one packet, or more than one packet (a collision) were transmitted, respec-
tively, in this time slot. This communication system is decentralized; each user can
only observe its own queue length, its arrivals and the common feedback. More-
over, the arrival rates λ := (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN) are not known to the users. There-
fore, the users’ decisions according to any decentralized transmission policy/protocol
g = {gnt , n = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 0, 1, . . . } are generated by
Unt = g
n
t (Q
n
0:t, A
n
0:t−1, U
n
0:t−1, F0:t−1), (4.2)
n = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
In this chapter, we consider throughput and queueing delay as the performance
metrics of a decentralized transmission policy/protocol. The objective is to design a
decentralized protocol to achieve full throughput and to maintain low queueing delay.
We proceed to define the throughput region and queueing delay of the communication
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system.
4.2.2 Stability and Throughput Optimality
For queueing systems that can be described by irreducible Markov chains, stabil-
ity is usually defined to be positive recurrence of the corresponding Markov chains.
In this problem, the users’ actions can generally depend on the whole history of in-
formation. When non-Markovian control policies are used, the resulting queue length
processes are not Markov in general. Even within the class of Markovian policies, the
corresponding Markov chain may not be irreducible under any Markovian policy.
To achieve higher throughput performance of the communication system, we con-
sider general non-Markovian policies of the form given by (4.2). Therefore, a stability
notion for general stochastic processes is essential for our analysis of the system. In
this chapter, we call a stochastic process {Xt, t = 0, 1 . . . } stable if for every  > 0
there exists a finite set K such that
P(Xt /∈ K) <  for all t. (4.3)
This stability concept is also used in [90–92], and it is called bounded in probability
in [93]. Note that the stability criterion (4.3) is equivalent to positive recurrence for
countable irreducible Markov chains [93, Proposition 18.3.1]. For general countable
Markov chains with a reachable state, bounded in probability is equivalent to positive
Harris recurrence, another stability concept for general Markov chains [93, Proposition
18.3.2 ].
Given the arrival rates λ = (λ1, . . . , λN) to all queues, a policy/protocol g stabilizes
the communication system if the resulting queue length process {Qn,gt , t = 0, 1, . . . }
for every user n = 1, . . . , N is stable. The arrival rate λ is said to be supportable if
there exist policies/protocols that can stabilize the communication system under λ.
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For any arrival rates λ = (λ1, . . . , λN), we use λtot :=
∑N
n=1 λ
n to denote the total
arrival rate to the communication system. Since at most one packet can be trans-
mitted through the collision channel at each time, only λ ∈ Λ could be supportable,
where
Λ =
{
λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN) : λtot < 1
}
. (4.4)
Furthermore, any λ ∈ Λ is supportable by the time sharing policy that assigns
λn portion of time slots to user n. Therefore, arrival rates λ are supportable if and
only if λ ∈ Λ. We call Λ the throughput region of the multiple access communication
system. We call a decentralized policy/protocol throughput optimal if it can stabilize
the communication system for any λ ∈ Λ.
4.2.3 Queueing Delay
LetQtott :=
∑N
n=1Q
n
t denote total queue length of the system at time t, t = 1, 2, . . . .
We define
Qavg := lim sup
t→∞
1
T
E
[
T−1∑
t=0
Qtott
]
. (4.5)
From Little’s law (see [94]), in a stable queueing system, the queueing delay of a
packet is proportional to the average total number of packets in the system. For a
throughput optimal protocol g, the queueing delay of the system is given by
Qgavg
λtot
.
4.2.4 Objective
Our objective is to find a throughput optimal protocol that results in low queueing
delay.
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4.3 The Common Information-Based Multiple Access (CIMA)
Protocol
4.3.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce common upper bounds for the queues. LetBgt := (B
1,g
t , B
2,g
t , . . . , B
N,g
t ),
where Bn,gt is the upper bound on Q
n
t at time slot t based on the transmission proto-
col g and the common information F0:t−1, received from the common feedback, up to
time slot t. That is, when F0:t−1 = f0:t−1,
bn,gt = max{qnt : ∃λ ∈ Λ s.t. Pλ,g(qnt |f0:t−1) > 0}.
Note that, Bgt is a function of the common information F0:t−1. We use B
g
t to denote
that the common upper bounds depend explicitly on the transmission policy g.
4.3.2 The CIMA Protocol
The CIMA protocol is defined as follows.
Unt =CIMA
n
t (Q
n
0:t, A
n
0:t−1, U
n
0:t−1, F0:t−1)
=
 1 if v(B
CIMA
t ) = n and Q
n
t > 0,
0 otherwise,
(4.6)
where v(·) is a function of common upper bounds BCIMAt defined as
v(bCIMAt ) = min{n : bn,CIMAt = max
m=1,2,...,N
bm,CIMAt }.
Note that v(bCIMAt ) is the user with the largest common upper bound. Since we want
to avoid collision, if there are more than one users with the largest common upper
bound, CIMA selects the user with the smallest index.
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4.4 Performance Analysis of the CIMA Protocol
We prove that the CIMA protocol is throughput optimal in 4.4.2. We provide an
upper bound on the queueing delay under the CIMA protocol in 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Preliminary Results
In order to analyze the system dynamics under the CIMA protocol, we first provide
the following result.
Lemma IV.1. Under the CIMA protocol, the queue lengths are independent condi-
tional on the common feedback given any arrival rates λ. Specifically, for any time t,
any realization f0:t−1 and any value qt = (q1t , . . . , q
N
t ) of Qt = (Q
1
t , . . . , Q
N
t ),
Pλ,CIMA(qt|f0:t−1) =
N∏
n=1
Pλ,CIMA(qnt |f0:t−1). (4.7)
Moreover, the conditional probability can be updated as follows. For n 6= v(bCIMAt )
Pλ,CIMA(qnt+1|f0:t)
=λnPλ,CIMA(Qnt = qnt+1 − 1|f0:t−1) + (1− λn)Pλ,CIMA(Qnt = qnt+1|f0:t−1). (4.8)
For n = v(bCIMAt ) and ft = 1
Pλ,CIMA(qnt+1|f0:t)
=λn
Pλ,CIMA(Qnt = qnt+1|f0:t−1)1{qnt+1>0}
Pλ,CIMA(Qnt > 0|f0:t−1)
+ (1− λn)P
λ,CIMA(Qnt = q
n
t+1 + 1|f0:t−1)
Pλ,CIMA(Qnt > 0|f0:t−1)
.
(4.9)
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For n = v(bCIMAt ) and ft = 0
Pλ,CIMA(qnt+1|f0:t) =

0 if qnt+1 ≥ 2,
λn if qnt+1 = 1,
1− λn if qnt+1 = 0.
(4.10)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Using Lemma IV.1, we can obtain the evolution of queue lengths and common
upper bounds under CIMA, as stated in the lemma below.
Lemma IV.2. Under CIMA, the queue lengths evolve as
Qn,CIMAt+1 =
 A
n
t +Q
n,CIMA
t if n 6= v(BCIMAt ),
Ant +
(
Qn,CIMAt − 1
)+
if n = v(BCIMAt ).
(4.11)
and the common upper bounds evolve according to
Bn,CIMAt+1 =

Bn,CIMAt + 1 if n 6= v(BCIMAt ),
Bn,CIMAt if n = v(B
CIMA
t ) and Ft = 1,
1 if n = v(BCIMAt ) and Ft = 0.
(4.12)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Using Lemma IV.2, the CIMA protocol can be easily implemented as described
in Fig 4.2 below.
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for k = 1 to N do
Bk ← 0
end for
while user n is active do
BMAX ← maxk(Bk)
v ← min(k : Bk = BMAX)
if n = v and Qnt > 0 then
transmit a packet (set Ut = 1)
end if
for k 6= v do
Bk ← Bk + 1
end for
if Ft = 1 then
Bv ← Bv
else
Bv ← 1
end if
end while
Figure 4.2: The CIMA protocol for user n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
4.4.2 Throughput Optimality
The main result on CIMA’s throughput is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem IV.3. The CIMA protocol is throughput optimal. That is, for any arrival
rates λ ∈ Λ (defined by (4.4)), the queue length processes under CIMA are stable.
To prove the theorem, we first show that under the CIMA protocol the queue
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lengths together with the upper bounds form a Markov chain.
Lemma IV.4. Let Y CIMAt := (Q
CIMA
t , B
CIMA
t ), where
QCIMAt =(Q
1,CIMA
t , Q
2,CIMA
t , . . . , Q
N,CIMA
t )
for every time slot t = 0, 1, . . . Then, {Y CIMAt , t = 0, 1, . . . } is a Markov chain.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Since {Y CIMAt , t = 0, 1, . . . } is a Markov chain, we can use the Foster-Lyapunov
theorem in the proof below to show that the process {Y CIMAt , t = 0, 1, . . . } is stable.
Proof of Theorem IV.3. Let  = 1−λtot. Then  > 0 because λ ∈ Λ. Let y := (q, b) =
(q1, q2, . . . , qN , b1, b2, . . . , bN). Define the Lyapunov function h(y) by
h(y) =
N∑
n=1
(qn + αbn), (4.13)
where α = 
2(N−1) . For Y
CIMA
t = y, let v = v(b) = min(n : b
n = maxk∈N (bk)). Then
from (4.11) and (4.12) in Lemma IV.2 we get
E
[
h(Y CIMAt+1 )− h(Y CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
≤− /2 if bv ≥ 1
α
+ 1. (4.14)
(see Appendix C for a detailed derivation of (4.14))
Since bv = maxk∈N (bk), bv ≥ bn and bv ≥ qn for all n = 1, 2, . . . , N . Define
C = {y = (q, b) : qn < 1
α
+ 1, bn <
1
α
+ 1 ∀n}.
Then, (4.14) holds for every y /∈ C. Since C is a finite set, the Foster-Lyapunov drift
criterion (Condition (DD2) in [95]) is satisfied. From [95, Theorem 4.5], {Y CIMAt , t =
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0, 1, . . . } is bounded in probability (satisfies the stability condition (4.3)).
Therefore, for every  > 0 there exists a finite set K such that
P(Y CIMAt /∈ K) <  for all t. (4.15)
Let Kn = {qn : there exists y = (q, b) ∈ K} be the projection of K on its nth
component. Then,
P(Qn,CIMAt /∈ Kn) ≤P(Y CIMAt /∈ K) <  for all t. (4.16)
Therefore, {Qn,CIMAt , t = 0, 1, . . . } also satisfies (4.3) and the stability of the commu-
nication system under CIMA is established.
Remark IV.5. We provide an alternative proof of Theorem IV.3.
As a result of (4.14), condition (V2) in [93, Chap. 11] is satisfied. Therefore, by
Theorem 11.3.4 in [93] the Markov chain {Y CIMAt , t = 0, 1, . . . } is positive Harris
recurrent on a countable state space. By Theorem 18.3.2 in [93] positive Harris recur-
rence implies (4.15), which in turn implies (4.16), and this establishes the assertion
of Theorem IV.3.
4.4.3 Delay Performance
Using CIMA, we have the following queueing delay performance guarantee.
Theorem IV.6. Under the CIMA protocol, for any rate λ ∈ Λ we have
QCIMAavg
λtot
≤ 2N
1− λtot . (4.17)
Theorem IV.6 says that for any fixed total arrival rate λtot, the queuing delay
under the CIMA protocol is linear in the number of users N .
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To prove Theorem IV.6, we first present a property of the CIMA protocol.
Lemma IV.7. Let U¯t =
∑N
n=1 U
n
t
∏
m 6=n(1 − Umt ). If the total number of packets at
time t is Qtot,CIMAt = q, there are at least q successful transmissions from time t to
t+ q +N − 1 using the CIMA protocol. That is
t+q+N−1∑
τ=t
U¯CIMAτ ≥ q.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Since Unt ∈ {0, 1} for each n, n = 1, 2, . . . , N , U¯t ∈ {0, 1}; U¯t = 1 (respec-
tively, U¯t = 0) denotes a successful (respectively, unsuccessful) transmission at time
t. Lemma IV.7 shows that when at a certain time slot the total queue length is q,
the CIMA protocol can successfully transmit at least q packets in the next q+N − 1
time slots.
Using Lemma IV.7, we can now prove Theorem IV.6.
Proof of Theorem IV.6. Let T1 = N , and define recursively the random variables
T2, T3, . . . by
Tk =
min t : t > Tk−1,
t−1∑
τ=Tk−1
U¯CIMAτ = Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1
 .
Then, each Tk is the time such that Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1 packets are successfully transmitted
from time Tk−1 to Tk − 1 under the CIMA protocol.
By Lemma IV.7 the CIMA protocol can successfully transmit at least Qtot,CIMATk−1
packets from time Tk−1 to Tk−1 +Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1 +N − 1. Therefore
Tk ≤ Tk−1 +Qtot,CIMATk−1 +N. (4.18)
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Consequently, from the dynamics of queues and (4.18) we obtain
E
[
Qtot,CIMATk
]
≤λtot
(
E
[
Qtot,CIMATk−1
]
+N
)
. (4.19)
(see Appendix C for a detailed derivation of (4.19))
Since T1 = N , E
[
Qtot,CIMAT1
]
≤ E
[∑N−1
t=0
∑N
n=1A
n
t
]
= λtotN . From (4.19), we can
show, recursively, that for all k
E
[
Qtot,CIMATk
]
≤λtotN + (λtot)2N + · · ·+ (λtot)kN
≤ λ
totN
1− λtot . (4.20)
Now for any time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , for any realization of arrivals there is some number
k such that Tk−1 < t ≤ Tk (T0 := 0). Using (4.20) and the dynamics of queues we get
E
[
Qtot,CIMAt
]
≤2 λ
totN
1− λtot (4.21)
(see Appendix C for a detailed derivation of (4.21))
Since (4.21) holds for any time t, we have
QCIMAavg = lim sup
t→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
[
Qtot,CIMAt
]
≤ lim sup
t→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
2λtotN
1− λtot
=
2λtotN
1− λtot . (4.22)
Remark IV.8. The result of Theorem IV.6 implies throughput optimality of the CIMA
protocol. Since the bound on delay (the right hand side of (4.17)) is finite for every
λ ∈ Λ, it can be shown that the stability requirement described by (4.3) is satisfied.
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Nevertheless, the proof of Theorem IV.3 is interesting/instructive by itself, and for
this reason we have proved throughput optimality and delay performance separately.
4.5 Simulation Results
In this section we first compare, via simulation, the queueing delay incurred by
CIMA with that of three other protocols that use the same feedback information
and no channel sensing: the basic TDMA protocol, the adaptive TDMA (ATDMA)
protocol [73] and the quadratic back-off protocol which is proved to be throughput
optimal in [75]. In the quadratic back-off protocol, each user transmits a packet with
probability (c + 1)−2 where c is the back-off counter. We also compare the delay
performance of CIMA with CSMA protocols proposed in[86, 87]; these protocols
employ channel sensing before transmission scheduling.
In the numerical experiments, we have used different values of N and λtot for each
protocol. Arrival rates are asymmetric: half of the users have arrival rate 1.4λtot/N
and the other half of the users have arrival rate 0.6λtot/N . For each N and λtot, we
run the simulation for T = 105 time steps.
The simulation results of Fig. 4.3 show that the average delay associated with
the CIMA protocol is linear in the number of users. These simulation results are
consistent with the result of Theorem IV.6.
In Fig. 4.4, we compare the delay performance of TDMA, ATDMA, quadratic
back-off and CIMA protocols for a system of 4 users. Fig. 4.4 shows that the delay
associated with the CIMA protocol is significantly smaller than that of the quadratic
back-off protocol (that is also throughput optimal) and of the TDMA protocol (note
that TDMA is unstable when λtot > 0.7 ). CIMA’s delay is also smaller than the
delay of ATDMA (note that there is no theoretical analysis for ATDMA).
In Fig. 4.5, we compare the delay performance of CIMA with two CSMA protocols:
the PGD protocol proposed in [83], and the DCSMA protocol proposed in [84]. The
104
results of [83] and [84] prove that the two CSMA protocols achieve delay that is linear
in the number of system users. That is, the delay of the CSMA protocols is of the
same order as the delay of the CIMA protocol. However, channel sensing is required
to implement the two CSMA protocols. Moreover, Fig. 4.5 shows that the delay
resulting from the CIMA protocol is significantly smaller than that of the CSMA
protocols of [83] and [84].
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4.6 Conclusion
We developed a transmission protocol that utilizes the common information of the
system’s users to achieve efficient/optimal coordination of their transmissions. The
protocol is collision free; thus, it is similar in spirit to TDMA (or adaptive TDMA),
but it differs from TDMA in the way it selects the user to transmit at each time slot.
Intuitively, we expect that the delay due to the CIMA protocol will increase linearly
with the number of users. The result of Theorem IV.6 confirms this intuition.
The problem investigated in this chapter can be viewed as a decentralized control/decision-
making problem with non-classical information structure [70]. Decentralized stochas-
tic control problems with non-classical information structure are signaling problems
[3]. In our setup signaling occurs through the feedback provided by the collision chan-
nel. Signaling leads to adjustments of each user’s upper bounds on their queue lengths
(in the manner described by CIMA) and results in efficient coordination among the
users. Signaling also occurs in CSMA protocols and in adaptive TDMA, but it is
distinctly different from that of the CIMA protocol.
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CHAPTER V
Dynamic Stochastic Games with Asymmetric
Information
5.1 Introduction
Background and Motivation
Stochastic dynamic games arise in many socio-technological systems such as cyber-
security systems, electronic commerce platforms, communication networks, etc. In all
these systems, there are many strategic decision makers (agents). In dynamic games
with symmetric information all the agents share the same information and each agent
makes decisions anticipating other agents’ strategies. This class of dynamic games
has been extensively studied in the literature (see [5–9] and references therein). An
appropriate solution concept for this class of games is sub-game perfect equilibrium
(SPE), which consists of a strategy profile of agents that must satisfy sequential
rationality [5, 6]. When the system state is
The common history in dynamic games with symmetric information can be utilized
to provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. The common history (or
a function of it) serves as an information state and SPE can be computed through
backward induction.
Many instances of stochastic dynamic games involve asymmetric information, that
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is, agents have different information over time (such games are also called dynamic
games of incomplete information in the game and economic theory literature). In
communication networks, different nodes have access to different local observations
of the network. In electronic commerce systems, each seller has private information
about the quality of his product. In cyber-security systems, a defender cannot directly
detect the attacker’s activities. In this situation, if an agent wants to assess the
performance of any particular strategy, he needs to form beliefs (over time) about
the other agents’ private information that is relevant to his objective. Therefore,
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is an appropriate solution concept for this class
of games. PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile and belief system for all agents
that jointly must satisfy sequential rationality and consistency [5, 6]. In games with
asymmetric information a decomposition similar to that of games with symmetric
information is not possible in general. This is because the evaluation of an agent’s
strategy depends, in general, on the agent’s beliefs about all other agents’ private
information over time. Since private information increases with time, the space of
beliefs on the agents’ private information grows with time. As a result, sequential
computation of equilibria for stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information
is available only for special instances (see [14, 17–26] and references therein).
In this chapter, we consider a general model of a dynamic game with a finite
number of agents/players in a system with asymmetric information. The informa-
tion available to an agent at any time can be decomposed into common information
and private information. Common information refers to the part of an agent’s in-
formation that is known by all agents; private information includes the part of an
agent’s information that is known only by that agent. We define a class of PBE and
provide a sequential decomposition of the game through an appropriate choice of in-
formation state using ideas from the common information approach for decentralized
decision-making, developed in [13]. The proposed equilibrium and the associated de-
109
composition resemble Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), defined in [16] for dynamic
games with symmetric information.
Games with asymmetric information have been investigated in the economic lit-
erature within the context of repeated games of incomplete information (see [17–20]
and references therein). A key feature of these games is the absence of dynamics.
The problems investigated in [14, 21–26] are the most closely related to our problem.
The authors of [21–25] analyze zero-sum games with asymmetric information. The
authors of [14, 26] used a common information based methodology, inspired by [13],
to establish the concept of common information based Markov perfect equilibria, and
to achieve a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game that leads to a backward
induction algorithm that determines such equilibria. Our problem is different from
those investigated in [14, 21–26] for the following reasons. It is a nonzero-sum game,
thus, it is different from the problems analyzed in [21–25]. Our approach to analyzing
dynamic games with asymmetric information is similar to that of [14, 26]; the key
difference between our problem and those in [14, 26] is in the information structure.
The information structure in [14, 26] is such that the agents’ common information
based (CIB) beliefs are strategy-independent, therefore there is no signaling effect.
This naturally leads to the concept of common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium. In our problem the information structure is such that the CIB beliefs
are strategy-dependent, thus signaling is present. In such a case, the specification of a
belief system along with a strategy profile is necessary to analyze the dynamic game.
Signaling is a key phenomenon present in stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric
information. Since it plays a fundamental role in the class of games we investigate in
this chapter, we discuss its nature and its role below. The discussion will allow us to
clarify the nature of our problem, after we formulate it, and to contrast it with the
existing literature, in particular [14, 26].
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Signaling
In a dynamic game with asymmetric information, an agent’s private informa-
tion is not observed directly by other agents. Nevertheless, when an agent’s strat-
egy depends on his private information, part of this private information may be
revealed/transmitted through his actions. We call such a strategy a private strat-
egy. When the revealed information from an agent’s private strategy is “relevant” to
other agents, the other agents utilize this information to make future decisions. This
phenomenon is referred to as signaling in games [4] and in decentralized control [3].
When signaling occurs, agents’ beliefs about the system’s private information (which
is defined to be the union of all agents’ private information) depend on the agents’
strategies (see [4]). Signaling may occur in games with asymmetric information de-
pending on the system dynamics, the agents’ utilities and the information structure
of the game. Below we identify game environments where signaling occurs, as well as
environments where signaling does not occur.
To identify game environments where signaling occurs we need to precisely define
what we mean by the statement: an agent’s private information is “relevant” to other
agents. For that matter we define the concepts of payoff relevant and payoff irrelevant
information.
We call a variable (e.g. the system state, an observation, or an action) payoff
relevant (respectively, payoff irrelevant) to an agent at time t if the agent’s expected
continuation utility at t directly depends on (respectively, does not depend on) this
variable given any fixed realization of all other variables1. For instance, in a dynamic
game with Markov dynamics where agents’ utilities at each time only depend on the
current states, the current states are payoff relevant and the history of previous states
is payoff irrelevant.
1Decomposition of agents’ types to payoff-relevant type and payoff-irrelevant type is a standard
decomposition in the economic literature. Here, we use term ’variable’ instead of ’type’ to match
with the existing literature in control theory. For a more rigorous definition consult with [96, ch.9].
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There are four types of game environments depending on the payoff revelance of
an agent’s private information.
(a) Agent n’s private information at t is payoff relevant to him at t and from t + 1
on, but payoff irrelevant to other agents from t+ 1 on.
In this game environment, agent n may use a private strategy at t because his
private information is payoff relevant to him at t. Then, other agents can infer
part of agent n’s privation information at t based on agent n’s action. Although
this revealed private information is payoff irrelevant to other agents, they can use
it to anticipate agent n’s future actions since this information is payoff relevant
to agent n’s future utility. In this game environment, signaling from agent n to
other agents occurs.
(b) Agent n’s private information at t is payoff irrelevant to him at t, and is payoff
relevant to other agents from t + 1 on. This class of games includes the classic
cheap-talk game [97]. In this game environment, other agents form beliefs about
agent n’s private information at t because it is payoff relevant to them. By
using a private strategy, agent n can affect other agents’ beliefs about his private
information, hence, affect other agents’ future decisions. Signaling may occur in
this situation if agent n can improve his future utility when he signals part of
his private information through his actions (e.g. perfectly informative/separating
equilibria in the cheap-talk game). There may be no signaling if by revealing
part of his private information agent n does not increase his future utility (e.g.
uninformative/pooling equilibria in the cheap-talk game).
(c) Agent n’s private information at t is payoff relevant to him at t, and payoff relevant
to other agents from t+1 on. This game environment has both effects discussed in
the previous two environments. As a result, we may have signaling or no signaling
from agent n, depending on whether or not he can improve his future utility
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by using a private strategy. Decentralized team problems are examples where
signaling occurs, because signaling strategies can help the collaborating agents
to achieve higher utilities (see [98–101] for examples of signaling strategies in
decentralized team problems). Pooling equilibria in the classic two-step signaling
game [4] is an example of no signaling.
(d) Agent n’s private information at t is payoff irrelevant to all agents, including
himself, from t + 1 on. In this game environment no signaling occurs. Even
if agent n uses a private strategy at t, since his private information is payoff
irrelevant from t+ 1 on to all agents, no agent will incorporate it in their future
decisions 2. The model in [14, 26] are examples of this situation where signaling
of information does not occur.
When signaling occurs in a game, all agents’ beliefs on the system’s private infor-
mation are strategy dependent. Furthermore, each agent’s choice of (private) strategy
is based on the above mentioned beliefs, as they allow him to evaluate the strategy’s
performance. This circular dependence between strategies and beliefs makes the com-
putation of equilibria for dynamic games a challenging problem when signaling occurs.
This is not the case for games with no signaling effects. In these games, the agents’
beliefs are strategy-independent and the circular dependence between strategies and
belief breaks. Then, one can directly determine the agents’ beliefs first, and then,
compute the equilibrium strategies via backward induction [14, 26].
2If one of the agents incorporates the belief on this private information in his strategy from t+ 1
on, all other agents may also incorporate it. The argument is similar to situation (b) since all other
agents will anticipate about how this agent will act. We note that, agents can use such payoff
irrelevant information as a coordination instrument, and therefore, expand their strategy space
thereby resulting in additional equilibria. As an example, consider a repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game with imperfect public monitoring of actions [20, ch. 7]. The agents can form a punishment
mechanism that results in new equilibria in addition to the repetition of the stage-game equilibrium.
In general, the idea of such a punishment mechanism is used to proof different versions of folk
theorem for different setups [20]. However, we do not call this kind of cases signaling because the
signals or actions of an agent serves only as a coordination instrument instead of transmitting private
information form one agent to other agents.
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Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the model of dynamic games in
Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we define the solution concept for our model and compare
it with that for the standard extensive game form. In Section 5.4, we introduce
the concept of CIB-PBE and provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic
game. In Section 5.5, we provide an example of a multiple access broadcast game
that illustrates the results of Section 5.4. We prove the existence of CIB-PBE for a
subclass of dynamic games in Section 5.6. We conclude in Section 5.7. The proofs of
all of our technical results appear in Appendix D.
5.2 System Model
Consider a dynamic game amongN strategic agents, indexed byN := {1, 2, . . . , N},
in a system over time horizon T := {1, 2, · · · , T}. Each agent n ∈ N is affiliated with
a subsystem n. At every time t ∈ T , the state of the system (Ct, Xt) has two com-
ponents: Ct ∈ Ct denotes the public state, and Xt := (X1t , X2t , . . . , XNt ) ∈ Xt :=
X 1t × X 2t × · · · × XNt , where Xnt denotes the local state of subsystem n, n ∈ N .
The public state Ct is commonly observed by every agent, and the local state X
n
t is
privately observed by agent n, n ∈ N .
At time t, each agent n simultaneously selects an action Ant ∈ Ant . Given the
control actions At := (A
1
t , A
2
t , . . . , A
N
t ), the public state and local states evolve as
Ct+1 = f
c
t (Ct, At,W
C
t ), (5.1)
Xnt+1 = f
n
t (X
n
t , At,W
n,X
t ), n ∈ N , (5.2)
where random variables WCt and W
n,X
t capture the randomness in the evolution of
the system, and C1, X
1
1 , X
2
1 , . . . , X
N
1 are primitive random variables.
At the end of time t, after the actions are taken, each agent n ∈ N observes
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Yt := (Y
1
t , Y
2
t , . . . , Y
N
t ), where
Y nt = h
n
t (X
n
t , At,W
n,Y
t ) ∈ Ynt , (5.3)
and W n,Yt denotes the observation noise. From the system dynamics (5.2) and
the observations model (5.3), we define, for any n ∈ N , t ∈ T , the probabilities
pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at) and q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at) such that for all x
n
t+1, x
n
t ∈ X nt , ynt ∈ Ynt and
at ∈ At := A1t × · · · × ANt
pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at) := P(fnt (xnt , at,W
n,X
t ) = x
n
t+1), (5.4)
qnt (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at) := P(hnt (xnt , at,W
n,Y
t ) = y
n
t ). (5.5)
We assume that Ct,X nt ,Ant and Ynt are finite sets for all n ∈ N , for all t ∈ T .3
We also assume that the primitive random variables {C1, Xn1 ,WCt ,W n,Xt ,W n,Yt , t ∈
T , n ∈ N} are mutually independent.
The actions At and the observations Yt := (Y
1
t , Y
2
t , . . . , Y
N
t ) are commonly ob-
served by every agent. Therefore, at time t, all agents have access to the common
history Hct defined to be
Hct := {C1:t, A1:t−1, Y1:t−1}. (5.6)
Including private information, the history Hnt of agent n’s information, n ∈ N , at
t is given by
Hnt := {Xn1:t, Hct } = {Xn1:t, C1:t, A1:t−1, Y1:t−1}. (5.7)
3The results developed in Section 5.2-5.4 for finite Ct,Xnt ,Ant and Ynt still hold when they are
continuous sets under some technical assumptions. The results of Section 5.6 require Ant to be finite
for all n ∈ N , t ∈ T .
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Let Hct denote the set of all possible common histories at time t ∈ T , and Hnt
denote the set of all possible information histories for agent n ∈ N at time t ∈ T .
Define Ht := ∪n∈NHnt = {X1:t, Hct } to be the history of states and observations
of the whole system up to time t. The hirtory Ht captures the system evolution up
to time t.
A behavioral strategy of agent n, n ∈ N , is defined as a map gnt : Hnt 7→ ∆(Ant )
where
Pgnt (Ant = ant |hnt ) := gnt (hnt )(ant ) for all ant ∈ Ant . (5.8)
Let Gnt denote the set of all possible behavioral strategies 4 gnt of user n ∈ N at
time t ∈ T .
At each time t ∈ T , agent n, n ∈ N , has a utility
Unt = φ
n
t (Ct, Xt, At) (5.9)
that depends on the state of the system at t, including the public state and all local
states, and the actions taken at t by all agents.
Let g = (g1, g2, . . . , gN) denote the strategy profile of all agents, where gn =
(gn1 , g
n
2 , . . . , g
n
T ). Then, the total expected utility of agent n is given by
Un(g) = Eg
[
T∑
t=1
Unt
]
= Eg
[
T∑
t=1
φnt (Ct, Xt, At)
]
. (5.10)
Each agent wishes to maximize his total expected utility.
The problem defined above is a stochastic dynamic game with asymmetric infor-
mation.
4The results developed in this chapter also holds when agent n’s set of admissible actions depends
on his current private state. That is, Ant ∈ Ant (xnt ) ⊆ Ant and gnt (hnt ) ∈ ∆(Ant (xnt )) when hnt =
(xn1:t, h
c
t).
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As discussed above, signaling may occur in games of asymmetric information. The
game instances that can be captured by our model could belong to any of the four
game environments (a)-(d) described in Section 5.1.
5.3 Solution Concept
For non-cooperative static games with complete information (resp. incomplete
information), one can use Nash equilibrium (resp. Bayesian Nash equilibrium) as a
solution concept. A strategy profile g=(g1, · · · , gN) is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium,
if there in no agent n that can unilaterally deviate to another strategy g′n and get a
higher expected utility. One can use (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium to analyze dynamic
stochastic games. However, the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium solution concept ignores
the dynamic nature of the system and only requires optimality with respect to any
unilateral deviation from the equilibrium g at the beginning of the game (time 1).
Requiring optimality only against unilateral deviation at time 1 could lead to irra-
tional situations such as non-credible threats [5, 6]. In dynamic games, a desirable
equilibrium g should guarantee that there is no profitable unilateral deviation for any
agent at any stage of the game. That is, for any t ∈ T , for any realization ht ∈ Ht
of the system evolution, the strategy gt:T = (g
1
t:T , g
2
t:T · · · , gNt:T ) must be a (Bayesian)
Nash equilibrium of the continuation game that follows ht. This requirement is called
sequential rationality [5, 6].
In this chapter we study dynamic stochastic games of incomplete asymmetric
information. At time t, the system evolution Ht is not completely known to all agents;
each agent n ∈ N only observes Hnt and has to form a belief about the complete
system evolution Ht up to time t. The belief that agent n forms about Ht depends
in general on both Hnt and g
−n
1:t . Knowing the strategy of the other agents, agent n
can make inference about other agents’ private information X−n1:t from observing their
actions. As pointed out in Section 5.1, this phenomenon is called signaling in games
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with asymmetric information. Signaling results in agents’ beliefs that depend on the
strategy profile g (see the discussion in Section 5.1). Therefore, at an equilibrium such
beliefs must be consistent with the equilibrium strategies via Bayes’ rule. Moreover,
the sequential rationality requirement must be satisfied with respect to the agents’
beliefs. We call the collection of all agents’ beliefs at all times a belief system. A
pair of strategy profile and belief system that are mutually sequentially rational and
consistent form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We use PBE as the solution
concept in this chapter to study the dynamic game defined in Sectin 5.2.
We note that the system model we use in this chapter is different from the standard
model of extensive game form used in the game theory literatures [5, 6]. Specifically,
the model of Section 5.2 is a state space model (that describes the stochastic dy-
namics of the system), while the extensive game form is based on the intrinsic model
[102] whose components are nature’s moves and users’ actions. The two models are
equivalent within the context of sequential dynamic teams [103]. In order to analyze
the dynamic game of the state space model of Section 5.2, we need to provide the
formal definition of PBE for our model in the following.
5.3.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
To provide a formal definition of PBE for our state space model defined in Section
5.2, we first define histories of states, beliefs and signaling-free beliefs on histories of
states.
Definition V.1 (History of States). The history of states at each time t is defined
to be X1:t.
Note that the history of states contains the trajectory of local state Xn1:t that is
private information of agent n, n ∈ N .
Definition V.2 (Belief System). Let µnt : Hnt 7→ ∆(X1:t). For every history hnt ∈ Hnt ,
the map µnt defines a belief for agent n ∈ N at time t ∈ T which is a probability
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distribution on the histories of states X1:t. The collection of maps µ := {µnt , n ∈
N , t ∈ T } is called a belief system on histories of states.
That is, given a belief system µ, agent n ∈ N assigns the probability distribution
µnt (h
n
t ) on X1:t conditioning on the realized history of observations hnt ∈ Hnt at t ∈ T ,
by
Pµ(x1:t|hnt ) := µnt (hnt )(x1:t). (5.11)
Then, given the beliefs µnt (h
n
t ) for agent n ∈ N at hnt = (xn1:t, hct) ∈ Hnt and a
strategy gt at t ∈ T , when agent n takes an action ant ∈ Ant , his belief about the sys-
tem following (hnt , a
n
t ) is given by Pgtµ (x1:t+1, yt, at|hnt , ant ) for any x1:t+1 ∈ X1:t+1, yt ∈
Yt, at ∈ At, where
Pgtµ (x1:t+1, yt, at|hnt , ant )
:=µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t)
∏
k∈N
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)q
k
t (y
k
t ;x
k
t , at)
∏
k 6=n
gkt (x
k
1:t, h
c
t)(a
k
t ). (5.12)
Definition V.3 (Signaling-Free Beliefs). The signaling-free belief system µˆ := {µˆnt :
Hnt 7→ ∆(X1:t), n ∈ N , t ∈ T } is defined on histories of states such that for each
n ∈ N , t ∈ T , and hnt := (xn1:t, c1:t, a1:t−1, y1:t−1) ∈ Hnt
µˆnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) :=P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)(x1:t|y1:t−1, xn1:t)
for any x1:t ∈ X1:t. (5.13)
The right hand side of (5.13) gives the conditional probability of {X1:t = x1:t} given
{Y1:t−1 = y1:t−1, Xn1:t = xn1:t} when A1:t−1 = a1:t−15. This conditional probability is
computed using the realization hnt of agent n’s information, the subsystem dynamics
5We can formally define the signaling-free belief by using open loop strategies. Let’s denote
ga1:t−1 to be the open loop strategies where ga1:t−1(hnτ )(a
n
τ ) = 1 for any n and any τ ≤ t− 1. Then
the signaling free belief is defined by µˆnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) := Pg
a1:t−1
(x1:t|hnt ).
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(5.2), and the observation model (5.3).
Note that the signaling-free belief µˆnt (h
n
t ) is strategy-independent. One can think
µˆnt (h
n
t ) as the belief generated by the open-loop strategy (a1, a2, · · · , at−1), so there
is no signaling and strategy-dependent inference present in the belief system. The
role of signaling-free belief will become evident when we talk about consistency in the
definition of PBE for the state space model described in Section 5.2.
The beliefs defined above are used by the agents to evaluate the performance of
their strategies. Sequential rationality requires that at any time instant, each agent’s
strategy is his best response under his belief about the system states.
This relation between a strategy profile g and a belief system µ is formally defined
as follows.
Definition V.4 (Sequential Rationality). A pair (g, µ) satisfies sequential rationality
if for every n ∈ N , gnt:T is a solution to
sup
g′nt:T∈Gnt:T
Eg
′n
t:T ,g
−n
µ
[
T∑
τ=t
φnτ (Cτ , Xτ , Aτ )|hnt
]
(5.14)
for every t ∈ T and every history hnt ∈ Hnt , where Eg
′n
t:T ,g
−n
µ [·|hnt ] is computed using
the probability measure generated from (5.11)-(5.12) using the belief system µ and
the strategy profile (g′nt:T , g
−n) given the realization hnt .
The above definition of sequential rationality does not place any restriction on
the belief system. However, rational agents should form their beliefs based on the
strategies used by other agents. This consistency requirement is defined as follows.
Definition V.5 (Consistency). A pair (g, µ) satisfies consistency if µ can be com-
puted by Bayes’ rule whenever possible. That is, for n ∈ N , t ∈ T , such that
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Pgtµ (yt, at|hnt , ant ) > 0,
µnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1) =1{xnt+1}(h
n
t+1)
Pgtµ (x1:t+1, yt, at|hnt , ant )
Pgtµ (xnt+1, yt, at|hnt , ant )
for any x1:t+1 ∈ X1:t+1 (5.15)
where Pgtµ (·|hnt , ant ) is the probability measure given by (5.12). Furthermore, when
Pgµ(yt, at|hnt , ant ) = 0, µnt+1(hnt+1) is a probability distribution in ∆(X1:t+1) such that
µnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1) = 0 if µˆ
n
t+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1) = 0. (5.16)
Note that the signaling-free belief system µˆ is used in (5.16) of the definition for
consistency. We will explain in the discussion below the importance of signaling-free
beliefs on agents’ rational behavior.
Using the above definitions, we define PBE for the stochastic dynamic game with
asymmetric information described by the model of Section 5.2.
Definition V.6 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). A pair (g, µ) is called a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if it satisfies sequential rationality and consistency.
5.3.2 Discussion
As we mentioned earlier, the state space model and the extensive game form are
different but equivalent representations of sequential dynamic teams. We discuss the
connection between these two models for dynamic games. The table below summa-
rizes the key components of our state space model and the extensive game form (see
[5, 6]).
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State Space Model Extensive Game Form
State Xt No State
History Ht History of Actions
History Hnt Information Sets
Belief µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) Belief on an Information Set
Support of µˆnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) Nodes in an Information Set
PBE PBE
The state variable Xt in the state space model allows us to easily describe the
system dynamics by (5.2). Without an explicit state variable in the extensive form,
it may be complex to describe and analyze the system dynamics. In the state space
model, the system’s evolution is captured by the history of states and observations Ht.
This is the analogue of the history of (agents’ and nature’s) actions in the extensive
game form that captures the game’s evolution trajectory. The history of information
Hnt defined in the state space model includes all information available to agent n at
time t. This history determines what agent n knows about the system, and is the
analogue of an information set in the extensive game form. Similarly, agent n’s belief
on histories of states (conditional on Hnt ) in the state space model is the analogue of
agent n’s belief over an information set in the extensive game form.
Generally, a belief µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) can have a fixed support that includes the entire
state space X1:t. However, a belief on an information set has a variable support that
includes nodes in that particular information set. Given a strategy profile, one can
determine the belief using the Bayes’ rule, given by (5.15), whenever possible for our
state space model and (similarly) for the extensive game form model. However, when
the denominator is zero in (5.15), or we reach an information set of measure zero in the
extensive game form, one needs to assign values for the belief on X1:t and on the nodes
of the information set. In the extensive game form, the consistency condition allows
for any arbitrary probability distribution over the nodes of the (reached) information
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set of measure zero. However, in our state space model we need to make sure that the
belief assigned is consistent with the dynamics of the system. As a result, the belief
does not necessarily assign a positive probability to a history of states and must be
more carefully defined. This is where signaling-free beliefs play an important role.
To establish the equivalence between the belief µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) in our state space
model and the belief on the information set of the corresponding extensive game form,
we introduce the signaling-free beliefs. The signaling-free belief µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) defined
by (5.13) for hnt = (x
n
1:t, c1:t, a1:t−1, y1:t−1) is constructed by actions A1:t−1 = a1:t−1
conditioned on the history of observations y1:t−1, xn1:t using the system dynamics. In
forming a signaling-free belief no underlying strategy profile is assumed, and we do not
make any further inference by tracing back how the observed actions are generated
(i.e. the observed actions are generated by an open loop strategy). Therefore, if a
history of states x1:t does not belong to the support of the signaling-free belief (i.e.
µˆnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) = 0), this history of states x1:t can not happen under any possible strategy
profile. A rational agent should not assign positive probability on any history of states
that is outside the support of the signaling-free belief. This leads to the second part of
the consistency requirement (5.16). With this additional requirement, the definition
of consistency in our state space model is the analogue of the consistency in the
extensive game form, and the definitions of PBE in the two models become identical.
We note that the signaling-free beliefs are strategy-independent. In systems where
any agent’s belief on system’s states is strategy-independent (e.g. the finite games
considered in [14] and linear-Gaussian systems [26]), one can show that for any strat-
egy profile g, the only consistent belief system is the signaling-free belief system µˆ.
In this type of systems, consistency is trivially satisfied using the signaling-free belief
system µˆ. As a result, it is sufficient to verify sequential rationality to establish a
PBE for systems with strategy-independent beliefs.
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5.4 Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
and Sequential Decomposition
In this section, we introduce the common information based (CIB) belief system
and CIB beliefs. The CIB beliefs generally depend on the agents’ strategies because
of the presence of signaling in dynamic games with asymmetric information. We
use CIB beliefs to construct CIB strategy profiles for the agents. Using the concept
of CIB belief system and CIB strategy profile, we define a subclass of PBE called
common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE). The main result
of this section provides a sequential decomposition for the dynamic game model in
Section 5.2; this decomposition leads to a backward induction algorithm to compute
CIB-PBE.
5.4.1 Preliminaries
Based on common histories, we first define CIB signaling-free belief system
Definition V.7 (CIB Signaling-Free Belief System). The CIB signaling-free be-
lief system is γˆ := {γˆt : Hct 7→ ∆(Xt), t ∈ T } where for each t ∈ T and hct =
(c1:t, a1:t−1, y1:t−1) ∈ Hct , γˆt(hct) is a belief on states Xt, with
γˆt(h
c
t)(xt) :=P{A1:t−1=a1:t−1}(xt|y1:t−1) for xt ∈ Xt. (5.17)
The right hand side of (5.17) is interpreted in the same way as the right hand
side of (5.13)6. Note that, γˆt(h
c
t)(x
−n
t ) = µˆ
n
t (h
n
t )(x
−n
t ) from its definition, when
hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) for any n ∈ N . We use
Πˆt := γˆt(H
c
t ) (5.18)
6Similar to (5.13), we can formally define the CIB signaling-free belief by γˆnt (h
c
t)(xt) :=
Pg
a1:t−1
(xt|hct), where ga1:t−1 denotes the open loop strategies.
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to denote the CIB signaling-free belief at time t. Similar to signaling-free beliefs on
histories of states defined in (5.13), the CIB signaling-free belief Πˆt depends only on
the system dynamics and the observation model.
The CIB signaling-free beliefs have the following dynamics.
Lemma V.8 (Evolution of CIB Signaling-Free Beliefs). The CIB signaling-free beliefs
{Πˆt, t ∈ T } can be updated by
Πˆt+1 =
N∏
n=1
Πˆnt+1, where (5.19)
Πˆnt+1 = ψˆ
n
t (Y
n
t , At, Πˆ
n
t ), (5.20)
ψˆnt (y
n
t , at, pˆi
n
t )(x
n
t+1)
:=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
′n
t )
. (5.21)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Similar to the belief system defined in Section 5.2, we need a belief system to form
an equilibrium. We define CIB belief systems based on the agents’ common histories
together with CIB update rules.
Definition V.9 (CIB Belief System and CIB Update Rule). A collection of maps
γ := {γt : Hct 7→ ∆(Xt), t ∈ T } is called a CIB belief system. A set of belief update
functions ψ = {ψnt : Ynt ×At×Ct×∆(Xt)×∆(Xt) 7→ ∆(X nt ), n ∈ N , t ∈ T } is called
a CIB update rule.
From any CIB update rule ψ, we can construct a CIB belief system γψ by the
following inductive construction:
1. γψ,1(h
c
1)(x1) := P(x1) =
∏
n∈N P(xn1 ) ∀x1 ∈ X1.
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2. At time t+ 1, after γψ,t(h
c
t) is defined, set
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
n
t+1)
:=ψnt (y
n
t , at, ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))(x
n
t+1), (5.22)
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(xt+1) :=
N∏
n=1
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
n
t+1), (5.23)
for every history hct+1 = (h
c
t , ct+1, at, yt) ∈ Hct+1 and for all xt+1 ∈ Xt+1.
For a CIB belief system γψ, we use Π
γψ
t to denote the belief, under γψ, on Xt condi-
tional on Hct ; that is,
Π
γψ
t := γψ,t(H
c
t ) ∈ ∆(Xt). (5.24)
We also define the marginal beliefs on Xnt at time t as
Π
n,γψ
t (x
n
t ) := γψ,t(H
c
t )(x
n
t ) ∀xnt ∈ X nt . (5.25)
Since the CIB beliefs {Πγψt , t ∈ T } are common information to all agents, all
agents can use Π
γψ
t to evaluate the performance of their strategies. Furthermore, if a
CIB update rule ψ is properly chosen, the CIB signaling-free belief Πˆt and the CIB
belief Π
γψ
t together can summarize the agents’ common knowledge about the current
system states Xt from all previous actions A1:t−1 and observations Y1:t−1 available to
all of them at time t. This motivates the concept of CIB strategies defined below.
Definition V.10 (CIB Strategy Profile). We call a set of functions λ = {λnt : X nt ×
Ct ×∆(Xt)×∆(Xt) 7→ ∆(Ant ), n ∈ N , t ∈ T } a CIB strategy profile.
126
For notational simplicity, let Bt := Ct ×∆(Xt)×∆(Xt) and
bt = (ct, pit, pˆit) ∈ Bt (5.26)
denote the realization of the part of common information used in a CIB strategy.
If agent n uses a CIB strategy λnt , then any action a
n
t ∈ Ant is taken by agent n at
time t with probability λnt (x
n
t , bt)(a
n
t ) when X
n
t = x
n
t ∈ X nt (Ct,Πγψt , Πˆγψt ) = bt ∈ Bt.
Note that the domain X nt ×Bt of a CIB strategy λnt is different from the domain Hnt of
a behavioral strategy gnt . However, given a CIB strategy profile λ and a CIB update
rule ψ, we can construct a behavioral strategy profile g ∈ G by
gnt (h
n
t ) := λ
n
t (x
n
t , ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t)). (5.27)
In the following we provide a definition of a CIB belief system consistent with a
CIB strategy profile.
Definition V.11 (Consistency). For a given CIB strategy λnt of user n ∈ N at t ∈ T ,
we call a belief update function ψnt consistent with λ
n
t if (5.28) below is satisfied when
the denominator of (5.28) is non-zero;
ψnt (y
n
t , at, bt)(x
n
t+1)
=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)η
n
t (x
n
t , y
n
t , at, bt)pi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt η
n
t (x
′n
t , y
n
t , at, bt)pi
n
t (x
′n
t )
, (5.28)
where
ηnt (x
n
t , y
n
t , at, bt) :=q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)λ
n
t (x
n
t , bt)(a
n
t ). (5.29)
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When the denominator of (5.28) is zero,
ψnt (bt, at, y
n
t )(x
n
t+1) = 0 if ψˆ
n
t (pˆit, at, y
n
t )(x
n
t+1) = 0. (5.30)
For any t ∈ T , if ψnt is consistent with λnt for all n ∈ N , we call ψt consistent with λt.
If ψt is consistent with λt for all t ∈ T , we call the CIB update rule ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψT )
consistent with the CIB strategy profile λ = (λ1, . . . , λT ).
Remark V.12. Note that when the denominator of (5.28) is zero, ψnt (bt, at, y
n
t ) can
be arbitrarily defined as a probability distribution in ∆(Xt+1) satisfying (5.30) and
consistency still holds. One simple choice is to set ψnt (y
n
t , at, bt) = ψˆ
n
t (y
n
t , at, pˆit) when
the denominator of (5.28) is zero; this choice trivially satisfies (5.30). Thus, for any
CIB strategy profile λ, there always exists at least a CIB update rule that is consistent
with λ.
The following lemma establishes the relation between the consistency conditions
given by Definition V.5 and V.11.
Lemma V.13. If λ is a CIB strategy profile along with its consistent CIB update
rule ψ, there exists a pair, denoted by (g, µ) = f(λ, ψ), such that g is the strategy
profile constructed by (5.27) from (λ, ψ), and µ is a belief system consistent with the
strategy profile g. Furthermore, for all hnt ∈ Hnt , x1:t ∈ X1:t
µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) = 1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) (5.31)
where µct : Hct 7→ ∆(X1:t) satisfies the relation
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
t ) =
∑
x−k1:t ∈X−k1:t ,xk1:t−1∈Xk1:t−1
µct(h
c
t)(x1:t) = γψ,t(h
c
t)(x
k
t ) (5.32)
for all hct ∈ Hct , k ∈ N and xkt ∈ X kt .
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Proof. See Appendix D.
Lemma V.13 implies that using a CIB strategy profile λ along with its consistent
update rule ψ we can construct a behavioral strategy profile g along with its consistent
belief system µ.
Note that, equation (5.31) in Lemma V.13 implies that for any agent n, his local
states Xn1:t are independent of X
−n
1:t under µ conditional on any history h
n
t ∈ Hnt .
Furthermore, the conditional independence described by (5.31) still holds even when
agent n uses another strategy since the right hand side of (5.31) depends only on the
CIB update rule ψ. This fact is made precise in the following lemma.
Lemma V.14 (Conditional Independence). Suppose λ is a CIB strategy profile and
ψ is a CIB update rule consistent with λ. Let (g, µ) = f(λ, ψ). If every agent k 6= n
uses the strategy gk along with the belief system µ, then under any policy g′n of agent
n, agent n’s belief about the states X1:t for h
n
t ∈ Hnt is given by
Pg′n,g−n(x1:t|hnt ) = µnt (hnt )(x1:t)
=1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) for all x1:t ∈ X1:t. (5.33)
Proof. See Appendix D.
According to Lemma V.14, for any (g, µ) = f(λ, ψ) generated from Lemma V.13,
we use
Pµ(x−n1:t |hct) := µnt (hnt )(x−n1:t ) = µct(hct)(x−n1:t ) (5.34)
to indicate that µnt (h
n
t )(x
−n
1:t ) depends only on h
c
t and µ.
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5.4.2 Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
Based on the concept of CIB beliefs and CIB strategies, we focus on CIB-PBE
defined below.
Definition V.15 (CIB-PBE). A pair (λ∗, ψ∗) of a CIB strategy profile λ∗ and a CIB
update rule ψ∗ is called a Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(CIB-PBE) if ψ∗ is consistent with λ∗ and the pair (g∗, µ∗) = f(λ∗, ψ∗) defined in
Lemma V.13 forms a PBE.
The following lemma plays a crucial role in establishing the main results of this
chapter.
Lemma V.16 (Closeness of CIB Strategies). Suppose λ is a CIB strategy profile and
ψ is a CIB update rule consistent with λ. If every agent k 6= n uses the CIB strategy
λk along with the belief generated by ψ, then, there exists a CIB strategy λ′n that is
a best response for agent n under the belief generated by ψ at every history hnt ∈ Hnt
for all t ∈ T .
Proof. See Appendix D.
Lemma V.16 says that the set of CIB strategies is closed under the best response
mapping. Since sequential rationality (Definition V.4) requires a strategy profile to
be a fixed point under the best response mapping (see (5.14)), Lemma V.16 allows
us to restrict attention to the set of CIB strategies to find a fixed point and to search
for CIB-PBE.
Below we provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game of Section 5.2
that enables us to sequentially compute CIB-PBE via dynamic programming.
In order to sequentially compute CIB-PBE, we define a stage game for each time
t ∈ T as follows.
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Definition V.17. (Stage Game Gt) Given a set of functions Vt+1 = {V nt+1 : X nt ×Bt 7→
R, n ∈ N} and a belief update function ψt, for any realization bt = (ct, pit, pˆit) ∈ Bt
we define the following Bayesian game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt).
Stage Game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt)
• There are N players indexed by N .
• Each player n ∈ N observes private information Xnt ∈ X nt ; bt = (ct, pit, pˆit) are
common information.
• Xt = (X1t , . . . , XNt ) has a prior distribution pit.
• Each player n ∈ N selects an action Ant ∈ Ant .
• Each player n ∈ N has utility
UnGt(Vt+1,ψt,bt)
:=φnt (ct, Xt, At) + V
n
t+1(X
n
t+1, Bt+1), where (5.35)
Bt+1 := (Ct+1, ψt(Yt, At, bt), ψˆt(Yt, At, pˆit)). (5.36)
If for each t ∈ T , the functions Vt+1 are associated with the agents’ future utilities,
the Bayesian game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt) becomes a stage game at t of the original game
defined in Section 5.2. Therefore, we consider Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of
the game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt). For all Vt+1 and ψt, we define, the BNE correspondence as
follows
Definition V.18. (BNE Correspondence)
BNEt(Vt+1, ψt) :=
{λt : ∀bt ∈ Bt, λt|bt is a BNE of Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt),
where λnt |bt(xnt ) := λnt (xnt , bt)∀n ∈ N , xnt ∈ X nt }. (5.37)
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If λt|bt is a BNE of Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt), then for all n ∈ N and any realization xnt ∈ X nt ,
any ant ∈ Ant such that λnt |bt(xnt )(ant ) > 0 should satisfy
ant ∈ arg max
a′nt ∈Ant
{
Eλ
−n
t
pit
[
UnGt(Vt+1,ψt,bt)|xnt , a′nt
]}
. (5.38)
Similar to the dynamic program in stochastic control, for each time t ∈ T we
define the value update function Dnt (Vt+1, λt, ψt) for each n ∈ N .
Definition V.19. (Value Update Function)
Dnt (Vt+1, λt, ψt)(x
n
t , bt) := Eλtpit
[
UnGt(Vt+1,ψt,bt)|xnt
]
. (5.39)
If V nt = D
n
t (Vt+1, λt, ψt), for any realization x
n
t ∈ X nt and bt ∈ Bt, the value
V nt (x
n
t , bt) denotes player n’s expected utility under the strategy profile λt|bt in game
Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt).
Using the concept of stage games and value update functions, we provide a dy-
namic programming method to sequentially compute CIB-PBE in the following the-
orem.
Theorem V.20. (Sequential Decomposition) A pair (λ∗, ψ∗) of a CIB strategy profile
λ∗ and a CIB update rule ψ∗ is a CIB-PBE if (λ∗, ψ∗) solves the dynamic program
for the value functions V nt (·), n ∈ N , t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1} defined by (5.40)-(5.43) below.
V nT+1(·) := 0 ∀n ∈ N ; (5.40)
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for all t ∈ T
λ∗t ∈ BNEt(Vt+1, ψ∗t ), (5.41)
ψ∗t is consistent with λ
∗
t , (5.42)
V nt = D
n
t (Vt+1, λ
∗
t , ψ
∗
t ) ∀n ∈ N . (5.43)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note that, from the dynamic program, the value function V n1 (x
n
1 , (c1, pi1, pi1)) at
time t = 1 gives agent n’s expected utility corresponding to the CIB-PBE (λ∗, ψ∗)
conditional on his private information Xn1 = x
n
1 and public state C1 = c1 when the
prior distribution of X1 is pi1.
Using Theorem V.20, we can compute CIB-PBE of the dynamic game. The fol-
lowing algorithm uses backward induction to compute CIB-PBE based on Theorem
V.20.
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1: VT+1 ← 0, λ∗ ← ∅, ψ∗ ← ∅
2: for t = T to 1 do
3: for every bt ∈ Bt do
4: Construct the stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt)
5: Compute (λ∗t |bt , ψ∗t |bt) such that ψ∗t |bt is consistent with λ∗t |bt , and λ∗t |bt is a
BNE of Gt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t |bt , bt)
6: for every n ∈ N do
7: λ∗nt (x
n
t , bt)← λ∗t |bt(xnt ), xnt ∈ X nt
8: ψ∗nt (yt, at, bt)← ψ∗t |bt(yt, at), (yt, at) ∈ Yt ×At
9: V nt (x
n
t , bt)←Dnt (Vt+1, λ∗t , ψ∗t )(xnt , bt), xnt ∈ X nt
10: end for
11: end for
12: λ∗ ← (λ∗t , λ∗), ψ∗ ← (ψ∗t , ψ∗)
13: end for
Figure 5.1: Backward Induction for Computing CIB-PBE.
Note that in line 5, for different (λ∗t |bt , ψ∗t |bt) the algorithm will produce different
CIB-PBE. Finding the pair (λ∗t |bt , ψ∗t |bt) in line 5 of Fig. 5.1 requires solving a fixed
point problem to get a BNE along with a consistent belief system. The complexity
for this step is the same as the complexity of finding a PBE for a two-stage dynamic
game.
5.5 Example: Multiple Access Broadcast Game
In this section, we illustrate the sequential decomposition developed in Section
5.4 with an example of a two-agent multiple access broadcast system.
134
Consider a multiple access broadcast game where two agents, indexed by N =
{1, 2}, share a common collision channel over time horizon T . At time t, W nt ∈ {0, 1}
packets arrive at each agent n ∈ N according to independent Bernoulli processes with
P(W 1t = 1) = P(W 2t = 1) = p = 0.5. Each agent can only store one packet in his local
buffer/queue. Let Xnt ∈ X nt = {0, 1} denote the queue length (number of packets) of
agent n at the beginning of t. If a packet arrives at agent n when his queue is empty,
the packet is stored in agent n’s buffer; otherwise, the packet is dropped, and agent
n incurs a dropping cost of c = 2 units.
At each time t, agent n can transmit Ant ∈ Ant = {0, 1} packets through the shared
channel. If only one agent transmits, the transmission is successful and the trans-
mitted packet is removed from the queue. If both agents transmit simultaneously, a
collision occurs and both collided packets remain in their queues. We assume that
any packet arriving at time t, t ∈ T , can be transmitted after t. Then, the queue
length processes have the following dynamics. For n = 1, 2
Xnt+1 = min
{
Xnt − Ant (1− A−nt ) +W nt , 1
}
. (5.44)
Assume that agents’ transmission results at t are broadcast at the end of time
t. Then agent n’s transmission decision Ant at time t is made based on his history
of observation Hnt = (X
n
1:t, A1:t−1) that consists of his local queue lengths and all
previous transmissions from both agents.
Suppose each agent gets a unit reward at t if there is a successful transmission at
t. Then, agent n’s utility at time t is the reward minus the (expected) dropping cost
given by
Unt = φ
n
t (Xt, At) =
Ant⊕ A−nt − cP(Xnt− Ant (1− A−nt ) +W nt > 1|Xt, At) (5.45)
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where x⊕ y denotes the binary XOR operator, and n ∈ N .
The multiple access broadcast game described above is an instance of the general
dynamic model described in Section 5.2. In the following, we use Algorithm 5.1
developed in Section 5.4 to compute a CIB-PBE of this multiple access broadcast
game for two time periods, i.e. T = {1, 2}.
Before applying Algorithm 5.1, we note some special features of this multiple
access broadcast game. First, there is no Ct, Yt in this multiple access broadcast
game. Second, since the private state Xnt can take only values in X nt = {0, 1}, any
CIB belief in ∆(X nt ) can be described by a number pint ∈ [0, 1] for all n = 1, 2, t = 1, 2.
Furthermore, given any realization bt = (pit, pˆit) ∈ Bt, any CIB strategy λnt (xnt , bt), xnt ∈
{0, 1}, of agent n can be characterized by a number βnt ∈ [0, 1] where
βnt := λ
n
t (1, bt)(1). (5.46)
This is because Ant is binary, and λ
n
t (0, bt)(1) = 0 because no packet can be transmit-
ted from an empty queue.
We now use Algorithm 5.1 to sequentially compute a CIB-PBE of the multiple
access broadcast game.
Construction of the stage game at t = 2
At t = 2, for any b2 = (pi2, pˆi2) ∈ B2, we construct the stage game G2(b2) which
is a Bayesian finite game (no need to consider a CIB update function because this is
the last stage).
Computation of BNE at t = 2
Using standard techniques for static games, we obtain a BNE of G2(b2) that is
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characterized by β∗2(b2) = (β
∗1
2 (b2), β
∗2
2 (b2)), and β
∗
2(b2) is given by
β∗2(b2) =

(1, 1) if pi12, pi
2
2 < c
∗,
(0, 1) if pi12 < c
∗, pi22 ≥ c∗,
(1, 0) if pi12 ≥ c∗, pi22 < c∗,
( c
∗
pi12
, c
∗
pi22
) if pi12, pi
2
2 ≥ c∗,
(5.47)
where c∗ := 1+cp
2+cp
. Then we obtain a CIB strategy λ∗n2 (1, b2)(1) = β
∗n
2 (b2) for n = 1, 2
at time t = 2.
Value functions’ update at t = 2
V n2 (x
n
2 , b2) = D
n
2 (λ
∗
2)(x
n
2 , b2), n = 1, 2, are given by
V n2 (1, b2)=

1−pi−n2 (1 + cp) if pi12, pi22 < c∗,
pi−n2 − cp if pin2 < c∗, pi−n2 ≥ c∗,
1 if pin2 ≥ c∗, pi−n2 < c∗,
c∗ − cp if pi12, pi22 ≥ c∗.
(5.48)
V n2 (0, b2) =

pi−n2 if pi
1
2, pi
2
2 < c
∗,
pi−n2 if pi
n
2 < c
∗, pi−n2 ≥ c∗,
0 if pin2 ≥ c∗, pi−n2 < c∗,
c∗ if pi12, pi
2
2 ≥ c∗.
(5.49)
Construction of the stage game at t = 1
At t = 1, for any b1 = (pi1, pˆi1) ∈ B1 and a CIB update function ψ1, we construct
the stage game G1(V2, ψ1, b1) such that each player n, n = 1, 2, has utility
UnG1(V2,ψ1,b1)
=φn1 (X1, A1) + V
n
2 (X
n
2 , (ψ1(A1, b1)), ψˆ1(A1, pˆi1))). (5.50)
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Then, when the players use CIB strategies λ1 characterized by β1 = (β
1
t , β
2
1),
from the system dynamics (5.44) and the agents’ utilities (5.45), player 1’s expected
utilities conditional on Xnt = 0, 1, are given by
Eλ1pi1 [U
1
G1(V2,ψ1,b1)
|X1t = 1]
=pi21β
2
1 − cp+ β11(1 + cp− pi21β21(2 + cp))
+ β11pi
2
1β
2
1 V
n
2 (1, ψ1((1, 1), b1), ψˆ1((1, 1)), pˆi1)
+ β11(1− pi21β21)[p V n2 (1, ψ1((1, 0), bt), ψˆ1((1, 0), pˆi1))
+ (1− p)V n2 (0, ψ1((1, 0), bt), ψˆ1((1, 0), pˆi1))]
+ (1− β11)pi21β21 V n2 (1, ψ1((0, 1), bt), ψˆ1(pˆi1, (0, 1)))
+ (1− β11)(1− pi21β21)V n2 (1, ψ1((0, 0), bt), ψˆ1(pˆi1, (0, 0))), (5.51)
Eλ1pi1 [U
1
G1(V2,ψ1,bt)
|X1t = 0]
=pi21β
2
1 + pi
2
1β
2
1 [p V
n
2 (1, ψ1((0, 1), bt), ψˆ1((0, 1), pˆi1))
+ (1− p)V n2 (0, ψ1((0, 1), bt), ψˆ1((0, 1), pˆi1))]
+ (1− pi21β21)[p V n2 (1, ψ1((0, 0), bt), ψˆ1((0, 0), pˆi1))
+ (1− p)V n2 (0, ψ1((0, 0), bt), ψˆ1((0, 0), pˆi1))]. (5.52)
Player 2’s expected utilities are given by similar equations.
Computation of BNE and belief update function at t = 1
When the players use CIB strategies λ1 characterized by β1 = (β
1
t , β
2
1), from (5.28)
and (5.30), we obtain a CIB update function ψ1, given below, that is consistent with
λ1 (we select ψ
n
1 (a1, b1)= ψˆ
n
1 (a1, pˆi1) when the denominator of (5.28) is zero).
ψn1 (a1, b1) =

1 if an1 = 1, a
−n
1 = 1,
p if an1 = 1, a
−n
1 = 0,
p+pin1 (1−p−βn1 )
1−pin1 βn1 if a
n
1 = 0.
(5.53)
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Substituting (5.53) into (5.51) and (5.52), we have the utilities of the two players in
game G1(V2, ψ1, b1). We numerically compute a BNE of G1(V2, ψ
∗
1, b1), characterized
by β∗1(b1) = (β
∗1
1 (pi1), β
∗2
1 (pi1)) such that ψ
∗
1 satisfies (5.53) when β1 = β
∗
1 . The values
of β∗11 (pi1) and β
∗2
1 (pi1) are shown in Fig. 5.2 for different pi1 ∈ ∆(Xt) = [0, 1]× [0, 1].
0
0.5
1 0
0.5
1
0
0.5
1
pi21
β∗11 (pi1)
pi11 0
0.5
1 0
0.5
1
0
0.5
1
pi2t
β∗21 (pi1)
pi1t
Figure 5.2: Strategies β∗11 (pi1) and β
∗2
1 (pi1) in the stage game at time t = 1.
Then, we obtain a CIB strategy λ∗n1 (1, b1)(1) = β
∗n
1 (pi1) for n = 1, 2 at time t = 1.
CIB-PBE and agents’ expected utilities
From the above computation at t = 1, 2, we obtain a CIB-PBE (λ∗, ψ∗), where
λ∗ = (λ∗1, λ
∗
2) and ψ
∗ = (ψ∗1,−).
Using (5.51) and (5.52), we numerically compute the value functions V 11 (x
1
1, b1) =
V 11 (x
1
1, pi1) = D
1
1(V2, λ
∗
1, ψ
∗
1)(x
1
1, b1) for x
1
t = 0, 1, for agent 1. The results are shown in
Fig. 5.3. These value functions give agent 1’s (conditional) expected utilities in the
CIB-PBE (λ∗, ψ∗). Agent 2’s expected utilities can be computed in a similar way.
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Figure 5.3: Agent 1’s expected utility V n1 (x
n
1 , pi1) in the CIB-PBE (λ
∗, ψ∗).
Remark V.21. The results show that agents’ beliefs depend on their strategies (see
(5.53)). Therefore, there is signaling in this multiple access broadcast game. More-
over, the value functions are discontinuous in the agents’ beliefs (see (5.48) and (5.49)
for time t = 2, and Fig. 5.3 for time t = 1). The presence of signaling together with
the discontinuity of value functions make the agents’ utilities discontinuous in their
(behavioral) strategies.
5.6 Existence of Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria
We prove the existence of a CIB-PBE for a subclass of the dynamic games de-
scribed in section 5.2. This subclass includes dynamic games with uncontrolled dy-
namics and no private values. No private values simply means that each agent’s
private information Xnt is payoff irrelevant to himself, but possibly payoff relevant to
the other agents. The classic cheap-talk game [5] and the problem considered in [104]
are examples of this subclass. We conjecture that there always exists a CIB-PBE for
the general model described in Section 5.2. We discuss this conjecture and elabo-
rate more on the difficulty of establishing an existence proof for the general model of
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Section 5.2 at the end of this section.
To proceed formally, let Game M denote a dynamic game with uncontrolled
dynamics, no private values, finite action spaces Ant , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , and (possibly)
sequential moves. Let T := {t1, t2, · · · , tK} ⊂ T denote the set of time instants in
which the system evolves according to the following uncontrolled dynamics
Xnt+1=
X
n
t if t 6= tk for all tk ∈ T ,
fntk(X
n
tk
,W n,Xtk ) if t = tk for tk ∈ T .
(5.54)
At tk < t ≤ tk+1 agents make decisions sequentially in tk+1 − tk epochs. We assume
that the order according to which the agents take decisions is known a priori. Fur-
thermore, agents observe the other agents’ decisions in previous epochs; this fact is
captured by including/appending previous actions in the common state Ct as follows
Ct+1=
(Ct, At) if t 6= tk for all tk ∈ T ,f ctk(Ctk−1+1,WCtk ) if t = tk for tk ∈ T . (5.55)
The agents have a common observation Ytk at each time tk ∈ T when the system
evolves. The observations Y nt , n ∈ N , t ∈ T are described by
Y nt =
 empty if t 6= tk for all tk ∈ T ,hntk(Xntk ,W n,Ytk ) if t = tk for tk ∈ T . (5.56)
Agent n, n ∈ N has instantaneous utility
Unt = φ
n
t (Ct, X
−n
t , At). (5.57)
for time t, t ∈ T . Thus, each agent n ∈ N has no private values, hence his private
information Xnt is payoff irrelevant.
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From the above description, it is evident that Game M is indeed a subclass of the
class of dynamic games described by the model of Section 5.2. The dynamic oligopoly
game presented in [104] is an instance of Game M.
The main result of this section is stated in the theorem below and asserts the
existence of a CIB-PBE in Game M.
Theorem V.22. Game M described in this section has a CIB-PBE which is a
solution to the dynamic program defined by (5.40)-(5.43) in Theorem V.20.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The proof of Theorem V.22 is constructive. We construct an equilibrium for
Game M in which agents use non-private strategies and have signaling-free beliefs
which are consistent with the non-private strategy profile.
There are three reasons why Game M has a CIB-PBE with non-private strategies.
First, the instantaneous utility Unt = φ
n
t (Ct, X
−n
t , At) of agent n, n ∈ N does not
depend on his private information. Therefore, the agent’s best response is the same
for all realizations of his private information, and a private strategy doest not provide
any advantage in terms of higher instantaneous utility. Second, the system dynamics
are strategy independent. Therefore, an agent cannot affect the evolution of the
system by using a strategy that depends on his private information about the state of
the system. Third, any private strategy does not provide any advantage to an agent
in terms of his utility if it can not affect other agents’ decisions, and this is the case
when all agents use the signaling-free beliefs.
As we showed before, the CIB-PBE introduced in this chapter are PBE. It is
known that for finite dynamic games there always exists one sequential equilibrium,
and therefore one PBE [5, 6]. The proof of existence of sequential equilibria is indirect;
it is done by showing the existence of a trembling hand equilibrium [5, 6] which is
also a sequential equilibrium. The proof of existence of trembling hand equilibrium
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follows the standard argument in game theory. It uses a suitable fixed point theorem
to show the existence of a trembling equilibrium in an equivalent agent-based model
representation [5, 6].
There are some technical difficulties in establishing the existence of a CIB-PBE
for the general game model considered in this chapter. The standard argument in
using fixed point theorems is applicable to finite games where the expected utilities are
continuous in the agent’s mixed strategies. In each stage game arising in the sequential
decomposition, say the game at stage t, agent n’s expected utility (see (5.35)) depends
on the functions {V nt+1, n ∈ N}. However, the function V nt+1 is not always continuous
in the strategies of agent n. (see Remark V.21 for the multiple access broadcast
game in Section 5.5 and the example in [104]). Therefore, the standard argument for
establishing the existence of an equilibrium fails for our general model. Even though
we can not prove the existence of a CIB-PBE equilibrium, we conjecture that there
always exists a CIB-PBE for the general dynamic game described in this chapter.
We note that for the problem formulated in Section 5.2, {X tt , Ct,Πt, Πˆt}, t ∈ T ,
are sufficient statistics from the decision making point of view (i.e. control theory).
This makes a CIB strategy a more natural strategy choice for an agent, and conse-
quently, a CIB-PBE is a more plausible equilibrium to arise in practice. However, this
does not imply that from the game theory point of view, at all equilibria agents’ best
responses can be generated using only {X tt , Ct,Πt, Πˆt}. In a game problem, agents
can incorporate a payoff irrelevant information in their strategy choice as a coordina-
tion instrument. For example, consider the classic repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.
In this game, agents can use previous outcomes of the game, that are payoff irrele-
vant, to sustain a punishment mechanism that results in additional equilibria beyond
the repetition of the stage-game equilibrium [20]. The indirect proof for existence
of sequential equilibria and PBE (described above) allows for this type of equilibria
that depend on payoff irrelevant information for coordination. Nevertheless, we con-
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jecture that there always exists an equilibrium for the game described in Section 5.2
that depends only on {X tt , Ct,Πt, Πˆt}. The example of the dynamic multiple access
broadcast game in Section 5.5 is an instance of a dynamic game that does not belong
to the subclass of Game M, but has a CIB-PBE. To make our conjecture more
precise, we provide below a sufficient condition for the existence of a CIB-PBE.
Let (g∗, µ∗) be a strategy profile that is a PBE. Consider the following condition.
Condition C: For all hct , h
′c
t ∈ Hct such that
Pµ∗(xt|hct) = Pµ∗(xt|h
′c
t ),∀xt ∈ Xt,∀n ∈ N ,∀t ∈ T , (5.58)
we have
gn∗t (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) = g
n∗
t (x
n
1:t, h
c′
t ), (5.59)
for all xn1:t ∈ X n1:t.
If Condition C is satisfied for a PBE (g∗, µ∗), then a CIB-PBE exists. We
conjecture that Condition C is satisfied for at least a PBE in the dynamic games
considered in this chapter.
5.7 Conclusion
We studied a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric informa-
tion. We identified game environments that can lead to signaling in dynamic games.
We considered a state space model to analyze dynamic games with private states
and controlled Markovian dynamics. We provided a comparison between our state
space model and classic extensive game form model. We showed that the two models
are equivalent as long as one ensures that the belief system associated with the state
space model is compatible with the system dynamics. To ensure the compatibility, we
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introduced the signaling-free belief system. Using the signaling-free belief system, we
provided a formal definition of PBE in our state space model. We used the common
information among agents to define a subset of PBE called CIB-PBE that consist of
a pair of CIB strategy profile and CIB update rule. We obtained a sequential de-
composition for dynamic games that leads to a backward induction algorithm for the
computation of CIB-PBE even when signaling occurs. We illustrated our results with
an example of multiple access broadcast game. We proved the existence of CIB-PBE
for a subclass of dynamic games and provided a sufficient condition for the existence
of CIB-PBE for the general class of dynamic games considered in this chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion and Future Directions
6.1 Summary
Information interacts with decisions dynamically in modern networked systems.
Understanding the interaction between information and decisions is crucial to the
analysis of system operations and to the design of efficient decision-making strategies.
In this thesis, we study the information-decision interaction in dynamic networked
systems under different information structures and different models on DMs’ behav-
ior. In all these dynamic systems, the space of available information increases with
time since each DM dynamically collects information over time. The analysis of the
interaction between information and decisions is a complicated problem due to the
increasing space of information, and the fact that each DM’s strategy is a mapping
from his available information to possible actions. We resolve the difficulty associated
with the increasing space of information by identifying information states with fixed
domain for the DMs. The nature of information states suggests decision strategies
with a corresponding structure. We summarize below the information states consid-
ered in this thesis within the context of centralized stochastic control, decentralized
stochastic control, and dynamic stochastic games with asymmetric information.
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Channel Ordering and PMF Approximation
For centralized stochastic control, we investigated a channel sensing problem in
Chapter II, and identified two information states for the problem: the channel order-
ing and the probability mass functions (PMF) approximation. The channel ordering
is an information state that requires an ordering of the channels. We discovered con-
ditions under which the channels can always be ordered. Then the channel ordering
allowed us to focus on ordering based policies, and to show the optimality of the
myopic policy for the channel sensing problem. The PMF approximation is another
information state for channel sensing. We used the PMF approximation to develop an
approximation scheme for channel sensing and constructed a near optimal policy. The
two information states are complementary. It is more restrictive to use channel or-
dering as compared to the PMF approximation, but the channel ordering guarantees
optimality while the PMF approximation only provides near-optimal results.
Common Belief’s Support
For decentralized stochastic control, we investigated the signaling effect between
information and decisions in decentralized routing (Chapter III) as well as in multiple
access communication (Chapter IV). In both problems, the DMs form common beliefs
about the current system states based on their common information. Instead of
using the entire complex common beliefs, we focused on their supports and used
them as information states for decentralized decision-making. These supports take
integer values and have relatively simpler evolution. We designed explicit signaling
strategies for the DMs to transmit/signal information through their common beliefs’
supports. In both problems, signaling through the common supports allows the DMs
to coordinate their decisions and efficiently control the dynamic networked systems.
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Common Information Based (CIB) Belief
For dynamic stochastic games with asymmetric information, in Chapter V we
introduced a subclass of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) called common information
based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE). A CIB-PBE consists of a CIB strategy
profile and a CIB update rule. Using the CIB update rule, the DMs construct CIB
beliefs that are consistent with their CIB strategy profile. The CIB beliefs serve as
information states for the DMs in the dynamic game; all signaling possibilities among
the DMs are captured by the evolution of the CIB beliefs through the CIB update rule.
Using the above property of CIB beliefs, we developed a sequential decomposition for
dynamic games with signaling. The decomposition leads to a backward induction
algorithm to compute CIB-PBE.
6.2 Future Directions
As mentioned earlier, using appropriate information states one can reduce the
complexity of the interaction between information and decisions in dynamic networked
systems. This thesis provides some useful information states for specific problems
within the context of centralized stochastic control, decentralized stochastic control,
and dynamic stochastic games with asymmetric information. However, the deter-
mination/identification of appropriate information states for systems with general
information structure and strategic or non-strategic DMs remains an open problem.
We present some thoughts on the possible future directions that may deepen our un-
derstanding of the information-decision interaction and enhance our ability to identify
appropriate information states and to design systems that operate efficiently.
For dynamic networked systems with non-strategic DMs, our goal is to design
strategies that are optimal with respect to some pre-specified performance metric.
From the common information approach, we know that the common belief on the
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system state and all private information is an information state sufficient for perfor-
mance evaluation. Therefore, strategies using the entire belief can achieve optimal
performance. But searching over the space of all possible beliefs is a high complex-
ity problem. One direction to reduce the complexity is to discover properties for
reachable beliefs. When the set of reachable beliefs has certain properties, we can
reduce the complexity of the optimization problem by searching over strategies that
are based only on reachable beliefs. The channel sensing problem studied in Chapter
III is an example where any reachable belief satisfies the property that channels can
be ordered. Similar ordering properties may hold in other networked systems with im-
perfectly observed Markovian dynamics. Considering stability instead of optimality
as the performance metric may lead to problems with tractable solution. The results
of Chapter III and Chapter IV show that signaling strategies based on the common
beliefs’ supports can efficiently control the systems under consideration. These results
suggest that we may be able to stabilize a general class of decentralized systems with
bounded uncertainties by proper design of singling based on the supports of common
beliefs.
Dynamic networked systems with strategic behavior can only operate according
to equilibrium strategies. Proving the existence of appropriate equilibrium strategies
and computing these strategies are challenging problems. The results of Chapter V
provide an algorithm to compute CIB-PBE for a general class of dynamic games.
However, the computational complexity of the algorithm is still high due to the con-
tinuous space of CIB beliefs. Thus, we need to develop computational methods to
resolve the complexity issue. Sampling or simulation based approaches are potential
candidates to approximate CIB beliefs and to compute CIB-PBE. In addition to com-
puting one equilibrium, it is more desirable to compute a Pareto efficient equilibrium.
Generally, CIB-PBE is a proper subclass of PBE, and a CIB-PBE may not be Pareto
efficient. This is due to the fact that an efficient equilibrium may require informa-
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tion in addition to CIB beliefs to coordinate the DMs. In order to achieve Pareto
efficiency, we may need to consider information states that include the CIB beliefs
and additional information that could be used for efficient coordination. We should
be able to compute Pareto efficient equilibria if the additional information needed
for efficient coordination has a fixed domain. Identifying such information states is a
difficult open problem.
We hope the above thoughts can provide useful starting points for future research
that could significantly extend the solution methods and results presented in this
thesis.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix for Multi-State Channel Sensing
Proof of Property II.3 .
xP − yP =
K∑
i=2
[(
K∑
j=i
(x(j)− y(j))
)
(Pi − Pi−1)
]
. (A.1)
Note that
∑K
j=i(x(j)−y(j)) ≥ 0 since x ≥st y. Then, by assumption (A1) Pi ≥st Pi−1
we get
(
K∑
j=i
(x(j)− y(j))
)
(Pi − Pi−1) ≥st 0. (A.2)
Proof of Property II.4 . From Property II.3, (A1) and (A3) we obtain
PiP ≤st PKP ≤st PL, (A.3)
PiP ≥st P1P ≥st PL−1. (A.4)
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Therefore, (A.3) and (A.4) give
PL−1 ≤st
K∑
i=1
x(i)PiP = xP
2 ≤st PL. (A.5)
Proof of Property II.5 . We prove this Property by induction. The Property is true
at t = 0 by (A2).
Assume the Property is true at t. If n,m are not selected at t, pint+1 = pi
n
t P , pi
m
t+1 =
pimt P .
By the induction hypothesis we have pint ≤st pimt or pimt ≤st pint . Then from Property
II.3 we obtain pint+1 ≤st pimt+1 or pimt+1 ≤st pint+1.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that channel n is selected at t. Since channel m
is not selected at t, pimt+1 = pi
m
t P ∈ ∆(S)P 2. Then from Property II.4 we have either
pint+1 ≤st pimt+1 or pimt+1 ≤st pint+1.
Proof of Property II.6. (i) Since x ≥st y and vi ≥ vi−1, i = 2, 3, . . . , K − 1, by
summation by parts we have
(x− y)v
=
K∑
i=2
[(
K∑
j=i
(x(j)− y(j))
)
(vi − vi−1)
]
≥ 0. (A.6)
(ii) From the definition of U we have:
For i < L, Ui − Ui−1 =Ri −Ri−1. (A.7)
For i ≥ L,Ui − Ui−1 =Ri −Ri−1 + β(Pi − Pi−1)U
≥Ri −Ri−1. (A.8)
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Then, for all i, from the definition of M we obtain
Mi −Mi−1 ≥ Ui − Ui−1 ≥ Ri −Ri−1 ≥ 0. (A.9)
Since x ≥st y, from (A.9) and the result of part (i) we have
(x− y)M ≥ (x− y)U ≥ (x− y)R ≥ 0. (A.10)
(iii) Because of Assumption (A4) and the result of part (ii) we have:
For i < L, Ui − Ui−1 =Ri −Ri−1
≥β(Pi − Pi−1)M
≥β(Pi − Pi−1)U. (A.11)
For i ≥ L,Ui − Ui−1 =Ri −Ri−1 + β(Pi − Pi−1)U
≥β(Pi − Pi−1)U. (A.12)
Then, (A.11) and (A.12) imply that U−βPU is in increasing order, consequently,
(x− y)U ≥ β(x− y)PU. (A.13)
Since M = U + β
∑
i≥L pKiPU ,
(x− y)M ≥β(x− y)PU + β
∑
i≥L
pKiβ(xP − yP )PU
=β(x− y)PM. (A.14)
(iv) If x(i) = y(i) for all i ≥ L, then x(i)− y(i) = 0 for i ≥ L.
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Define v := (v1, v2, . . . , vK) such that
vi = Ri − βPiM, for i = 1, 2, . . . , L− 1, (A.15)
vi = vL−1, for i ≥ L. (A.16)
From assumption (2.26) in (A4) we know that vi − vi−1 = Ri − Ri−1 − β(Pi −
Pi−1)M ≥ 0 for i ≤ L− 1 and vi − vi−1 = 0 for i ≥ L. Then from the result of
part (i) we obtain
(x− y)(R− βPM) =(x− y)v ≥ 0. (A.17)
The case where x(i) = y(i) for all i < L can be proved in the same way.
Proof of Property II.7. We want to show that under gO00:T , at any time t the ordering
Ot has the property that
pi
Ot(1)
t ≤st piOt(2)t ≤st · · · ≤st piOt(N)t .
At t = 0, by the statement of Property II.7, the initial ordering O0 is such that
pi
O0(1)
0 ≤st piO0(2)0 ≤st · · · ≤st piO0(N)0 .
Suppose at time t, the ordering Ot is such that pi
Ot(1)
t ≤st piOt(2)t ≤st · · · ≤st piOt(N)t .
If the observation is Yt ≥ L, the new ordering is Ot+1 = mˆ(Ot, Yt) = Ot and the
PMFs of the channels evolves to
pint+1 = pi
n
t P, for n 6= Ot(N), (A.18)
pi
Ot(N)
t+1 = PYt ≥st PL. (A.19)
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From Properties II.3 and II.4 we know that
pi
Ot(1)
t P ≤st piOt(2)t P ≤st · · · ≤st piOt(N−1)t P
≤st PL ≤st PYt . (A.20)
On the other hand, if the observation is Yt < L, the new ordering is Ot+1 =
mˆ(Ot, Yt) = SOt and the PMFs of the channels become
pint+1 = pi
n
t P, for n 6= Ot(N), (A.21)
pi
Ot(N)
t+1 = PYt ≤st PL−1. (A.22)
Again, from Properties II.3 and II.4 we get
PYt ≤st PL−1 ≤st piOt(1)t P ≤st piOt(2)t P ≤st · · · ≤st piOt(N−1)t P. (A.23)
Thus, the ordering-based policy gO00:T selects at any time t the channel Ot(N) from the
ordering Ot with pi
Ot(1)
t ≤st piOt(2)t ≤st · · · ≤st piOt(N)t . This ordering-based policy is
exactly the same as the myopic policy gm.
We first establish a lemma that is needed for the proof of Properties II.8-II.11.
Lemma A.1. The functions Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ), t = 1, 2, . . . , T (defined by eq.
(2.56)), are linear in every component pint , n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
That is, for all n = 1, 2, . . . , N
Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) =
K∑
i=1
pin(i)Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , . . . , pi
n−1
t , ei, pi
n+1
t , . . . , pi
N
t ), (A.24)
where ei is the vector with 1 in the ith position and 0 otherwise, i.e.
ei = [0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0].
↑ ith position
.
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Furthermore, Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) satisfies for n = 2, 3, . . . , N
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) =
K∑
i=1
pin(i)Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , . . . , pi
n−1
t , ei, pi
n+1
t , . . . , pi
N
t ),
(A.25)
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) =
K∑
i=1
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))Vt(Ot, ei, pi2t , . . . , piNt ). (A.26)
Proof. From the definition of Vt (eq. (2.56)) we have
Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t )
=
K∑
i=1
pint (i)Eg
Ot
t:T
[
T∑
s=t
βs−tR(s)|pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt , Xnt = i
]
=
K∑
i=1
pint (i)Eg
Ot
t:T
[
T∑
s=t
βs−tR(s)|pi1t , . . . , pin−1t , pin+1t , . . . , piNt , pint = ei
]
=
K∑
i=1
pint (i)Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , . . . , pi
n−1
t , ei, pi
n+1
t , . . . , pi
N
t ). (A.27)
The third equality in (A.27) follows from the specification of the ordering-based policy
gOtt:T and the fact that conditional on {Xnt = i, pint } the evolution of channel n is the
same as that conditional on {pint = ei}.
Furthermore, Lt is the difference of two Vt’s, so the linearity of Vt leads directly to
equations (A.25) and (A.26).
We proceed now with the proof of Properties II.8-II.11. In the following proof, we
use the notation
pik1:k2t := (pi
k1
t , pi
k1+1
t , . . . , pi
k2
t ), (A.28)
pik1:k2t P := (pi
k1
t P, pi
k1+1
t P, . . . , pi
k2
t P ). (A.29)
Proof of Properties II.8-II.11. First note that Property II.10 is a special case of Prop-
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erty II.9. This can be seen as follows.
Without loss of generality, let Ot(n) = 1, Ot(m) = 2, and pi
1
t ≥st pi2t . Note that
Vt(Ot, pi
2
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ) = Vt(WnmOt, pi
2
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t ). (A.30)
Applying Property II.9 at time t, we have
Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t )− Vt(WnmOt, pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt )
=Vt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t )− Vt(Ot, pi2t , pi2t , . . . , piNt )
+ Vt(WnmOt, pi
2
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t )− Vt(WnmOt, pi1t , pi2t , . . . , piNt )
=Lt(Ot, pi
1
t , pi
2
t , pi
2
t , . . . , pi
N
t )− Lt(WnmOt, pi1t , pi2t , pi2t , . . . , piNt ) ≥ 0. (A.31)
Therefore, Property II.10 is true at time t once Property II.9 is true at time t.
We prove all three Properties II.8, II.9 and II.11 simultaneously by induction.
For both the basis of induction and the induction we consider two cases.
(i) When channel 1 is not the right-most channel in Ot (i.e. n 6= N and Ot(N) 6= 1).
(ii) When channel 1 is the right-most channel in Ot (i.e. n = N and Ot(N) = 1).
Basis of induction
It can be verified that Properties II.8, II.9 and II.11 are true at time t = T .
Induction hypothesis
Assume that the assertions of Properties II.8, II.9 and II.11 are true for time t+1, t+
2, . . . , T .
Induction step
We prove here Properties II.8, II.9 and II.11 for t.
We first develop five expressions (A.36),(A.38),(A.39), (A.40) and (A.43) for Lt and
Lt+1, defined by eq. (2.60), that will be useful in the sequel.
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For any PMF pi ∈ ∆(S) we define
pi := (pi(1), pi(2), . . . , pi(L− 2),
K∑
i=L−1
pi(i), 0, . . . , 0), (A.32)
p¯i := (0, . . . , 0,
L∑
i=1
pi(i), pi(L+ 1), . . . , pi(K)). (A.33)
Then, pi, p¯i ∈ ∆(S), and
pi = pi + p¯i − eL +
K∑
i=L
pi(i)(eL − eL−1). (A.34)
Furthermore, if pˆi ≥st pi, it follows that
pˆi ≥st pi, ¯ˆpi ≥st p¯i. (A.35)
Consider any arbitrary ordering O ∈ O. When O(N) 6= 1, assume O(N) = 2 without
any loss of generality. Then,
Lt(O, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2:N
t )
=(pi2tR− pi2tR) + β
∑
i<L
pi2t (i)(Vt+1(SO, pˆi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )− Vt+1(SO, pi1tP, Pi, pi3:Nt P ))
+ β
∑
i≥L
pi2t (i)(Vt+1(O, pˆi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )− Vt+1(O, pi1tP, Pi, pi3:Nt P ))
=β
∑
i<L
pi2t (i)Lt+1(SO, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P ) + β
∑
i≥L
pi2t (i)Lt+1(O, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P ).
(A.36)
Furthermore, by the induction hypothesis for Property II.8, we get, for all i =
1, 2, . . . , K,
Lt+1(SO, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P ) ≥ Lt+1(O, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, Pi, pi3:Nt P ). (A.37)
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Therefore,
βLt+1(SO, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1:N
t P ) =β
L∑
i=1
pi2t (i)Lt+1(SO, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )
≥Lt(O, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt ). (A.38)
Lt(O, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t ) ≥β
L∑
i=1
pi2t (i)Lt+1(O, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )
=βLt+1(O, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1:N
t P ). (A.39)
When O(N) = 1,
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )
:=Vt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
2:N
t )− Vt(Ot, pi1t , pi2:Nt )
=(pˆi1tR− pi1tR) + β
∑
i<L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))Vt+1(SOt, Pi, pi2:Nt P )
+ β
∑
i≥L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))Vt+1(Ot, Pi, pi2:Nt P )
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + βLt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P ) + βLt+1(Ot, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i1tP, pi2:Nt P )
+β
[
Vt+1(Ot, PL, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
] [ K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))
]
. (A.40)
The last equality in (A.40) follows from the linearity of Lt (Lemma A.1) and the
definition of pi, p¯i given by (A.32)-(A.33).
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Furthermore, using (A.40) we get
Lt(O, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )− βLt+1(SO, pˆi1tP, pi1:Nt P )
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + βLt+1(SO, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P ) + βLt+1(O, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i1tP, pi2:Nt P )
+ β
[
Vt+1(O,PL, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SO, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
] [ K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))
]
− βLt+1(SO, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + βLt+1(O, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i1tP, pi2:Nt P )− βLt+1(SO, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i1tP, pi2:Nt P )
+ β
[
Vt+1(O,PL, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SO, PL, pi2:Nt P )
] [ K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))
]
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + β(¯ˆpi1t − p¯i1t )PU
+ β
[
Vt+1(O,PL, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SO, PL, pi2:Nt P )
] [ K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))
]
. (A.41)
The second equality in (A.41) follows from (A.34) and the linearity of Lt (Lemma
A.1). The inequality in (A.41) follows from the induction hypothesis for the upper
bound of Property II.8 at t+ 1 and the fact that ¯ˆpi1tP ≥st p¯i1tP .
For the last term in (A.41), note that
Vt+1(O,PL, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SO, PL, pi2:Nt P )
=Lt+1(O,PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )− Lt+1(SO, PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P ) + Vt+1(O,PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
− Vt+1(W12 · · ·W(N−1)(N−2)WN(N−1)O,PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
≤Lt+1(O,PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )− Lt+1(SO, PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
≤(PL − PL−1)U. (A.42)
The equality in (A.42) follows from the definition of Lt+1 and the fact that SO =
W12 · · ·W(N−1)(N−2)WN(N−1)O. The inequalities in (A.42) follow by the induction
hypothesis for Property II.10 and Property II.8 at t+ 1.
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Therefore, using (A.42) and (A.41) we get
Lt(O, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2:N
t )− βLt+1(SO, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + β(¯ˆpi1t − p¯i1t )PU + β(PL − PL−1)U
K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )U. (A.43)
The last equality in (A.43) follows from the definition of the vector U .
Induction step for Property II.8:
We first consider the lower bound of Property II.8.
(i) When Ot(N) 6= 1 (i.e. n 6= N), we also have S−mOt(N) = Ot(m) 6= 1. Then,
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t ) ≥βLt+1(Ot, pˆi1tP, pi1:Nt P )
≥βLt+1(S1−mOt, pˆi1tP, pi1:Nt P )
≥Lt(S−mOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt ). (A.44)
The first inequality in (A.44) follows from (A.38) and the fact that Ot(N) 6= 1.
The second inequality in (A.44) follows from the induction hypothesis for Property
II.8 at t + 1. The last inequality in (A.44) follows from (A.39) and the fact that
S−mOt(N) 6= 1.
(ii) When Ot(N) = 1 (i.e. n = N).
Since S−mOt(N) = Ot(m) 6= 1, from (A.39) we get
Lt(S
−mOt, pˆi1t , pi
1:N
t )
≤βLt+1(S1−mOt, pˆi1tP, pi1:Nt P )
=βLt+1(S
1−mOt, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, pi
2:N
t P ) + βLt+1(S
1−mOt, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i
1
tP, pi
2:N
t P )
+ β
K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))Lt+1(S1−mOt, PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P ). (A.45)
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Since Ot(N) = 1, applying (A.40) we obtain
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )− Lt(S−mOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + βLt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P ) + βLt+1(Ot, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i1tP, pi2:Nt P )
+ β
[
Vt+1(Ot, PL, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
] K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))
− Lt(S−mOt, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2:Nt )
≥(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + βLt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )− βLt+1(S1−mOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )
+ βLt+1(Ot, ¯ˆpi
1
tP, p¯i
1
tP, pi
2:N
t P )− βLt+1(S1−mOt, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i1tP, pi2:Nt P )
+ β
[
Vt+1(Ot, PL, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
−Lt+1(S1−mOt, PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
] K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))
≥(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + βLt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )− βLt+1(S1−mOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )
+ β
[
Vt+1(Ot, PL, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
−Lt+1(S1−mOt, PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
] K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i)). (A.46)
The equality in (A.46) follows from (A.40) and the fact that Ot(N) = 1. The first
inequality in (A.46) follows from (A.45). The second inequality in (A.46) follows from
the induction hypothesis for Property II.8 at t+ 1.
Letting Ot+1 := S
1−mOt and n := N + 1−m,m := N −m, we have m < n and
Ot+1(n) = S
1−mOt(n) = 1, SOt = S−(m)Ot+1. (A.47)
Consequently, the induction hypothesis for the upper bound of Property II.8 at t+ 1
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gives
Lt+1(S
1−mOt, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, pi
2:N
t P )− Lt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )
=Lt+1(Ot+1, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, pi
2:N
t P )− Lt+1(S−(m)Ot+1, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )
≤(pˆi1tP − pi1tP )U. (A.48)
Letting m′ := 1, we have m′ < n = N and Am′nOt = SOt. Therefore,
Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )− Vt+1(Ot, PL, pi2:Nt P ) + Lt+1(S1−mOt, PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
≤Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )− Vt+1(Ot, PL, pi2:Nt P ) + Lt+1(Ot, PL, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
=Vt+1(Am′nOt, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )− Vt+1(Ot, PL−1, pi2:Nt P )
≤h− PL−1R. (A.49)
The first inequality in (A.49) follows from the induction hypothesis for the lower
bound of Property II.8 at t + 1. The last inequality in (A.49) follows from the
induction hypothesis for Property II.11 at t+ 1.
Using (A.48) and (A.49) in (A.46) we obtain
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )− Lt(S−mOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
≥(pˆi1t − pi1t )R− β(pˆi1tP − pi1tP )U − β
K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))(h− PL−1R)
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )(R− βU) + (¯ˆpi1t − p¯i1t )R +
K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))(RL −RL−1 − β(h− PL−1R))
≥0. (A.50)
The last inequality in (A.50) is true because: the terms (pˆi1t − pi1t )(R − βU) and
(¯ˆpi1t − p¯i1t )R are positive by parts (iv) and (ii) of Property II.6; the term (RL−RL−1−
β(h− PL−1R)) is positive by Condition (A4).
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The proof of the lower bound of Property II.8 is now complete.
Now consider the upper bound of Property II.8.
Let O′t := S
N−nOt;, then O′t(N) = 1 and SO
′
t(1) = 1. Consequently,
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )− Lt(S−mOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
≤Lt(O′t, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )− Lt(SO′t, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
≤Lt(O′t, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )− βLt+1(SO′t, pˆi1tP, pi1:Nt P )
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )U. (A.51)
The first inequality in (A.51) is true because of the lower bound of Property II.8 at t.
The second inequality in (A.51) follows from (A.39) and the fact that SO′t(N) 6= 1.
The third inequality in (A.51) follows from (A.43) and the fact that O′t(N) = 1.
This completes the proof of Property II.8 at time t.
Induction step for Property II.9:
(i) When Ot(N) 6= 1 (i.e. n 6= N), assume Ot(N) = 2 without loss of generality.
Then because of (A.36),
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )− Lt(WnmOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
=β
∑
i<L
pi2(i)
[
Lt+1(SOt, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )
−Lt+1(W(n+1)(m+1)(SOt), pˆi1tP, pi1tP, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
]
+ β
∑
i≥L
pi2(i)
[
Lt+1(Ot, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )
−Lt+1(WnmOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
]
. (A.52)
By the induction hypothesis for Property II.9, each term in (A.52) is positive and
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smaller than (pˆi1tP − pi1tP )M . Thus,
0 ≤Lt(Ot, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )− Lt(WnmOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
≤β(pˆi1tP − pi1tP )M ≤ (pˆi1t − pi1t )M. (A.53)
The last inequality in (A.53) holds by part (iii) of Property II.6.
(ii) Ot(N) = 1 (i.e. n = N).
We first consider the lower-bound. Using (A.34) and the linearity of Lt (Lemma A.1)
we get
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
=Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2:N
t )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2:Nt )
+ Lt(Ot, ¯ˆpi
1
t , pˆi
1
t , pi
2:N
t )− Lt(WNmOt, ¯ˆpi1t , pˆi1t , pi2:Nt )
+
[
Lt(Ot, eL, eL−1, pi2:Nt )− Lt(WNmOt, eL, eL−1, pi2:Nt )
] [ K∑
i=L
(pˆi1t (i)− pi1t (i))
]
.
(A.54)
We consider each of the terms
(a) Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2:N
t )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2:Nt ).
(b) Lt(Ot, ¯ˆpi
1
t , pˆi
1
t , pi
2:N
t )− Lt(WNmOt, ¯ˆpi1t , pˆi1t , pi2:Nt ).
(c)
[
Lt(Ot, eL, eL−1, pi2:Nt )− Lt(WNmOt, eL, eL−1, pi2:Nt )
] [∑K
i=L(pˆi
1
t (i)− pi1t (i))
]
.
that appear in the right hand side of (A.54) separately.
(a) Consider the first term.
Let O′t = S(WNmOt) = W1m+1(SOt), then O
′
t(m + 1) = 1 and Wm+1,1O
′
t = SOt.
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Therefore,
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1
t , pi
2:N
t )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2:Nt )
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + βLt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1t , pi2:Nt )
≥(pˆi1t − pi1t )R + βLt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )− βLt+1(S(WNmOt), pˆi1tP, pi1tP, pi2:Nt P )
≥(pˆi1t − pi1t )R− β(pˆi1tP − pi1tP )M ≥ 0. (A.55)
The first equality in (A.55) follows from (A.40) and that fact that pˆi1t (i) = pi
1
t (i) = 0
for i ≥ L. The first inequality in (A.55) follows from (A.38). The second inequality
in (A.55) follows from the induction hypothesis for the upper bound of Property II.9
at t+ 1. The last inequality in (A.55) holds by part (iv) of Property II.6.
(b) Consider the second term. From the induction hypothesis for Property II.8 at
t+ 1 and the fact that SOt = S
−(N−1)Ot and Ot(N) = 1, we obtain.
Lt(Ot, ¯ˆpi
1
t , p¯i
1
t , pi
2:N
t )− Lt(WNmOt, ¯ˆpi1t , p¯i1t , pi2:Nt )
=(¯ˆpi1t − p¯i1t )R + βLt+1(Ot, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i1tP, pi2:Nt P )− Lt(WNmOt, ¯ˆpi1t , p¯i1t , pi2:Nt )
≥(¯ˆpi1t − p¯i1t )R + βLt+1(SOt, ¯ˆpi1tP, p¯i1tP, pi2:Nt P )− Lt(WNmOt, ¯ˆpi1t , p¯i1t , pi2:Nt ). (A.56)
Then, similar to the first term (a), the second term is positive.
(c) Consider the third term.
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Assume Ot(m) = 2 without any loss of generality. Then WNmOt(N) = 2. Therefore,
Lt(Ot, eL, eL−1, pi2:Nt )− Lt(WNmOt, eL, eL−1, pi2:Nt )
=RL −RL−1 + β
∑
i<L
pi2(i)
[
Vt+1(Ot, PL, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
−Lt+1(SWNmOt, PL, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
]
+ β
∑
i≥L
pi2(i)
[
Vt+1(Ot, PL, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
−Lt+1(WNmOt, PL, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
]
. (A.57)
Let O′t := S(WNmOt) = W1m+1(SOt); then O
′
t(m+ 1) = 1 and Wm+1,1O
′
t = SOt.
For each term in the first sum in (A.57), we have PL−1 ≥st Pi (i < L in the first sum
in (A.57)). Therefore, by the induction hypothesis for Property II.10 at t+ 1 we get
Vt+1(Ot, PL, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
− Lt+1(SWNmOt, PL, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
≥Vt+1(Ot, PL, Pi, pi3:Nt P )− Vt+1(O′t, PL, Pi, pi3:Nt P ). (A.58)
Furthermore, since PL ≥st piOt(l)t P for all l = 1, 2, . . . , N by Property II.4, repeatedly
applying Property II.10 at t+ 1 we obtain
Vt+1(Ot, PL, Pi, pi
3:N
t P ) ≥ Vt+1(W(m+2)(m+1) · · ·WN(N−1)Ot, PL, Pi, pi3:Nt P ). (A.59)
Note thatW(m+2)(m+1) · · ·WN(N−1)Ot = AN(m+1)Ot andAm1(AN(m+1)Ot) = S(WNmOt) =
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O′t. Consequently, the induction hypothesis for Property II.11 at t+ 1 gives
Vt+1(W(m+2)(m+1) · · ·WN(N−1)Ot, PL, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
− Vt+1(O′t, PL, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
=Vt+1(AN(m+)1Ot, PL, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )− Vt+1(Am1(AN(m+1)Ot), PL, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
≥− (h− PiPN−mR). (A.60)
For each term in the second sum in (A.57), we have
Vt+1(Ot, PL, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
− Lt+1(WNmOt, PL, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
≥Vt+1(Ot, PL, Pi, pi3:Nt P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
− Lt+1(Ot, PL, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
=Vt+1(Ot, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )− Vt+1(SOt, PL−1, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
≥− (h− PL−1R). (A.61)
The inequalities in (A.61) follows from the induction hypothesis at t+ 1 for the lower
bound of Property II.9 and Property II.11 respectively.
Using the lower bounds provided by (A.60) and (A.61) for terms in (A.57), we obtain
Lt(Ot, eL, eL−1, pi2:Nt )− Lt(WNmOt, eL, eL−1, pi2:Nt )
≥RL −RL−1 − β
∑
i<L
pi2t (i)(h− PiPN−mR)− β
∑
i≥L
pi2t (i)(h− PL−1R)
≥RL −RL−1 − β(h− PL−1R) ≥ 0. (A.62)
The second and the last inequalities in (A.62) follows from part (ii) of Property II.6
and condition (A4) respectively.
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Since the three terms (a), (b) and (c) in (A.54) are positive, the proof for the lower
bound of Property II.9 is complete when Ot(N) = 1 (case (ii)).
We now proceed to establish the upper bound of Property II.9 when Ot(N) = 1
(case (ii)). Assume Ot(m) = 2 without any loss of generality; then WNmOt(N) = 2.
Therefore,
Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
=Lt(Ot, pˆi
1
t , pi
1:N
t )− βLt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1:Nt P )
+ βLt+1(SOt, pˆi
1
tP, pi
1:N
t P )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )U + βLt+1(SOt, pˆi1tP, pi1:Nt P )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )U + βLt+1(S(WNmOt), pˆi1tP, pi1:Nt P )− Lt(WNmOt, pˆi1t , pi1:Nt )
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )U + β
∑
i≥L
pi2t (i)
[
Lt+1(S(WNmOt), pˆi
1
tP, pi
1
tP, Pi, pi
3:N
t P )
−Lt+1(WNmOt, pˆi1tP, pi1tP, Pi, pi3:Nt P )
]
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )U + β
∑
i≥L
pi2t (i)(pˆi
1
tP − pi1tP )U
≤(pˆi1t − pi1t )U + β
∑
i≥L
pKi(pˆi
1
tP − pi1tP )U
=(pˆi1t − pi1t )M. (A.63)
The first inequality in (A.63) follows from (A.43). The second inequality in (A.63)
follows from the induction hypothesis for the lower bound of Property II.9 at t + 1.
The second equality in (A.63) follows from (A.36). The third inequality in (A.63) fol-
lows from the induction hypothesis for Property II.8 and the fact that pˆi1tP ≥st pi1tP
(since pˆi1t ≥st pi1t and Property II.3). The last inequality in (A.63) is true because
pi2t ≤st PK . The last equality in (A.63) follows from the definition of M .
The proof of the upper bound of Property II.9 at t is now complete. The proof of the
induction step for Property II.9 at t is also complete.
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Induction step for Property II.11:
(i) When Ot(N) 6= 1 (i.e. n 6= N), assume Ot(N) = N without loss of generality.
Then,
Vt(AnmOt, pi
1:N
t )− Vt(Ot, pi1:Nt )
=
∑
i<L
piNt (i)
[
Vt+1(S(AnmOt), pi
1:N−1
t P, Pi)− Vt+1(SOt, pi1:N−1t P, Pi)
]
+
∑
i≥L
piNt (i)
[
Vt+1(AnmOt, pi
1:N−1
t P, Pi)− Vt+1(Ot, pi1:N−1t P, Pi)
]
≤
∑
i<L
piNt (i)
(
h− pi1tP (PN−n−1R)
)
+
∑
i≥L
piNt (i)
(
h− pi1tP (PN−nR)
)
≤h− pi1tPN−nR. (A.64)
The inequalities in (A.64) follows from the induction hypothesis for Property II.11
and part (ii) of Property II.6 respectively.
(ii) When Ot(N) = 1 (i.e. n = N), assume Ot(N − 1) = N without loss of generality.
Then ANmOt(N) = Ot(N − 1) = N .
By the recursive equation and the linearity of the function Vt+1 ( eq. (2.58) and
Lemma A.1) we obtain
Vt(ANmOt, pi
1:N
t )− Vt(Ot, pi1:Nt )
=(piNt − pi1t )R
+ β
∑
i<L
piNt (i)
[
Vt+1(S(ANmOt), pi
1:N−1
t P, Pi)− Vt+1(ANmOt, pi1:N−1t P, Pi)
]
+ β
∑
i<L
pi1t (i)
[
Vt+1(ANmOt, Pi, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(SOt, Pi, pi2:Nt P )
]
+ β
∑
i≥L
pi1t (i)
[
Vt+1(ANmOt, Pi, pi
2:N
t P )− Vt+1(Ot, Pi, pi2:Nt P )
]
. (A.65)
Furthermore, each term in the second and the third sum in (A.65) is negative from
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repeatedly using Property II.10 at t+ 1. Therefore,
Vt(ANmOt, pi
1:N
t )− Vt(Ot, pi1:Nt )
≤(piNt − pi1t )R
+ β
∑
i<L
piNt (i)
[
Vt+1(S(ANmOt), pi
1:N−1
t P, Pi)− Vt+1(ANmOt, pi1:N−1t P, Pi)
]
≤(piNt − pi1t )R + β
∑
i<L
piNt (i)(h− PiR)
=piNt v − pi1tR. (A.66)
The second inequality in (A.66) follows from the induction hypothesis for Property
II.11 and v is the vector such that
vi =
 Ri + β(h− PiR), for i < L,Ri, for i ≥ L. (A.67)
It can be verified that vi increases with i. Then, from part (i) of Property II.6 and
the fact that piNt ≤st PK we obtain
Vt(ANmOt, pi
1:N
t )− Vt(Ot, pi1:Nt ) ≤ piNt v − pi1tR ≤ PKv − pi1tR = h− pi1tR. (A.68)
The last equality in (A.68) follows from the definition of h.
This completes the proof of the induction step for Property II.11 at t, and the proof
of the entire induction step.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix for Decentralized Routing
Proof of Lemma III.4. Since there is one possible arrival to any queue and one pos-
sible departure from any queue at each time instant, (3.31) holds.
When (U1,gˆt , U
2,gˆ
t ) = (0, 0), both X
1,gˆ
t and X
2,gˆ
t are below the threshold and no
customers are routed form any queue. Therefore, the upper bound of the queue
lengths at t+ 1 is
UB gˆt+1 = dTHte − 1. (B.1)
Moreover, the lower bound of the queue lengths at t + 1 is the same as the lower
bound of X
1,gˆ
t , X
2,gˆ
t . That is,
LBgˆt+1 =LB
gˆ
t . (B.2)
When (U1,gˆt , U
2,gˆ
t ) = (1, 1), both X
1,gˆ
t and X
2,gˆ
t are greater than or equal to the
threshold. Since the routing only exchanges two customers between the two queues,
the queue lengths remain the same as the queue lengths before routing. As a result,
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the upper bound and lower bound of the queue lengths at t+ 1 are given by
UB gˆt+1 =UB
gˆ
t . (B.3)
LBgˆt+1 = dTHte . (B.4)
When (U i,gˆt , U
j,gˆ
t ) = (1, 0), i 6= j, X i,gˆt is greater than or equal to the threshold; Xj,gˆt
is below the threshold. Since one customer is routed from Qi to Qj,
X i,gˆt+1 = X
i,gˆ
t − 1, (B.5)
Xj,gˆt+1 = X
j,gˆ
t + 1. (B.6)
Therefore, the upper bound of the queue lengths at t+ 1 becomes
UB gˆt+1 = max
{
UB
i,gˆ
t − 1, dTHte − 1 + 1
}
= max
{
UB
i,gˆ
t − 1, dTHte
}
, (B.7)
and lower bound of the queue lengths at t+ 1 is given by
LBgˆt+1 = min
{
dTHte − 1, LBj,gˆt + 1
}
. (B.8)
Proof of Lemma III.8. The proof is done by induction.
At time t = 0, X1,gˆ0 +X
2,gˆ
0 = X
1,g
0 +X
2,g
0 = x0.
Suppose the lemma is true at time t.
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At time t+ 1, from the system dynamics (3.1)-(3.3) we get, for any g,
X1,gt+1 +X
2,g
t+1
=
(
X1,gt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gt −D2t
)+
+ A1t + A
2
t . (B.9)
Therefore, it suffices to show that
(
X1,gˆt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gˆt −D2t
)+
≤st
(
X1,gt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gt −D2t
)+
. (B.10)
Consider any realization (X1,gt , X
2,g
t ) = (x
1, x2).
If x1, x2 > 0, then
⌊
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌋
,
⌈
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌉
> 0. Therefore,
(
X1,gt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gt −D2t
)+
=x1 + x2 −D1t −D2t
=
(⌊
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌋
−D1t
)+
+
(⌈
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌉
−D2t
)+
. (B.11)
If xi = 0 and xj ≥ 2 (i 6= j), then ⌊1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌋
> 0 and
⌈
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌉
> 0. Therefore,
(
X1,gt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gt −D2t
)+
=xj −Djt
≥x1 + x2 −D1t −D2t
=
(⌊
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌋
−D1t
)+
+
(⌈
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌉
−D2t
)+
. (B.12)
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If xi = 0 and xj = 1 (i 6= j), then ⌊1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌋
= 0 and
⌈
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌉
= 1. Therefore,
(
X1,gt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gt −D2t
)+
=1−Djt
≥st1−D2t
=
(⌊
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌋
−D1t
)+
+
(⌈
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌉
−D2t
)+
, (B.13)
If x1, x2 = 0, then
⌊
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌋
,
⌈
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌉
= 0. Therefore,
(
X1,gt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gt −D2t
)+
=0
=
(⌊
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌋
−D1t
)+
+
(⌈
1
2
(x1 + x2)
⌉
−D2t
)+
. (B.14)
As a result of (B.11)-(B.14), we obtain
(
X1,gt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gt −D2t
)+
≥st
(⌊
1
2
(X1,gt +X
2,g
t )
⌋
−D1t
)+
+
(⌈
1
2
(X1,gt +X
2,g
t )
⌉
−D2t
)+
. (B.15)
Then, from (B.15), the induction hypothesis and Corollary III.7 we obtain
(
X1,gt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gt −D2t
)+
≥st
(⌊
1
2
(X1,gt +X
2,g
t )
⌋
−D1t
)+
+
(⌈
1
2
(X1,gt +X
2,g
t )
⌉
−D2t
)+
≥st
(⌊
1
2
(X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t )
⌋
−D1t
)+
+
(⌈
1
2
(X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t )
⌉
−D2t
)+
=
(
min(X1,gˆt , X
2,gˆ
t )−D1t
)+
+
(
max(X1,gˆt , X
2,gˆ
t )−D2t
)+
≥st
(
X1,gˆt −D1t
)+
+
(
X2,gˆt −D2t
)+
. (B.16)
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The first and second stochastic inequalities in (B.16) follow from (B.15) and the
induction hypothesis, respectively. The equality in (B.16) follows from Corollary
III.7. The last stochastic inequality in (B.16) is true because D1t , D
2
t are i.i.d. and
independent of X1,gˆt , X
2,gˆ
t .
Thus, inequality (B.10) is true, and the proof of the lemma is complete.
Proof of Lemma III.15. The proof is done by induction. At t = 0, (3.67), (3.68) and
(3.69) hold if we let Y i0 = X
i,g0
0 for i = 1, 2.
Assume the assertion of this lemma is true at time t; we want to show that the
assertion is also true at time t+ 1.
For that matter we claim the following.
Claim 1
X1,gˆt+1 +X
2,gˆ
t+1 = X
1,gˆ
t +X
2,gˆ
t a.s., (B.17)
max
i
(
X i,gˆt+1
)
≤ max
i
(
X
i,gˆ
t
)
a.s. (B.18)
Claim 2
There exists Y it+1, i = 1, 2 such that
P
(
Y it+1 = yt+1|Y i0:t = y0:t
)
=P
(
X i,g0t+1 = yt+1|X i,g00:t = y0:t
)
for all y0:t, (B.19)
X
1,gˆ
t +X
2,gˆ
t ≤Y 1t+1 + Y 2t+1 a.s., (B.20)
max
i
(
X
i,gˆ
t
)
≤max
i
(
Y it+1
)
a.s. (B.21)
We assume the above claims to be true and prove them after the completion of the
proof of the induction step.
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For all y0:t+1, from (B.19) and the induction hypothesis for (3.67) we get for i = 1, 2
P
(
Y i0:t+1 = y0:t+1
)
=P
(
Y it+1 = yt+1|Y i0:t = y0:t
)
P
(
Y it = yt, . . . , Y
i
0 = y0
)
=P
(
X i,g0t+1 = yt+1|X i,g00:t = y0:t
)
P
(
X i,g00:t = y0:t
)
=P
(
X i,g00:t+1 = y0:t+1
)
. (B.22)
From (B.17) and (B.20) we obtain
X1,gˆt+1 +X
2,gˆ
t+1 =X
1,gˆ
t +X
2,gˆ
t
≤Y 1t+1 + Y 2t+1 a.s. (B.23)
Furthermore, combination of (B.18) and (B.21) gives
max
i
(
X i,gˆt+1
)
≤ max
i
(
X
i,gˆ
t
)
= max
i
(
Y it+1
)
a.s. (B.24)
Therefore, the assertions (3.67), (3.68) and (3.69) of the lemma are true at t + 1 by
(B.22), (B.23) and (B.24), respectively.
We now prove claims 1 and 2.
Proof of Claim 1
From the system dynamics (3.1)-(3.2)
X1,gˆt+1 = X
i,gˆ
t − U i,gˆt + U j,gˆt , (B.25)
X2,gˆt+1 = X
i,gˆ
t − U i,gˆt + U j,gˆt . (B.26)
Therefore, (B.17) follows by summing (B.25) and (B.26).
For (B.18), consider X1,gˆt+1 ( the case of X
2,gˆ
t+1 follows from similar arguments).
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When U2,gˆt = 0,
X1,gˆt+1 = X
1,gˆ
t − U1,gˆt ≤ max
i
(
X
i,gˆ
t
)
. (B.27)
When U1,gˆt = U
2,gˆ
t = 1,
X1,gˆt+1 = X
1,gˆ
t ≤ max
i
(
X
i,gˆ
t
)
. (B.28)
When U1,gˆt = 0, U
2,gˆ
t = 1, X
1,gˆ
t is less than the threshold and X
2,gˆ
t is greater than or
equal to the threshold. Therefore, by (B.25),
X1,gˆt+1 = X
1,gˆ
t + 1 ≤dTHte
≤X2,gˆt ≤ max
i
(
X
i,gˆ
t
)
. (B.29)
Therefore, (B.18) follows from (B.27)-(B.29).
Proof of Claim 2
We set
Y it+1 :=
(
Y it − D˜it
)+
+ A˜it (B.30)
where Y it satisfy the induction hypothesis, and A˜
i
t, D˜
i
t, i = 1, 2 are specified as follows.
Let
Mx =argmaxi{X i,gˆt }, mx = argmini{X i,gˆt } (B.31)
My =argmaxi{Y it }, my = argmini{Y it }, (B.32)
where Mx = 1,mx = 2 (resp. My = 1,my = 2) when {X1,gˆt = X2,gˆt } (resp. {Y 1t =
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Y 2t }); define
(
A˜
My
t , D˜
My
t , A˜
my
t , D˜
my
t
)
:=

(
AMxt , D
mx
t , A
mx
t , D
Mx
t
)
in case 1,(
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
in case 2,
(B.33)
where the two cases are :
Case 1: {Y Myt −1 = XMx,gˆt = Xmx,gˆt and
(
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
= (0, 1, 1, 0) or (0, 0, 1, 1)}.
Case 2: All other instances.
Assertion: The random variables Y 1t+1, Y
2
t+1, defined by (B.30)-(B.33) satisfy (B.19)-
(B.21).
As the proof of this assertion is long, we first provide a sketch of its proof and
then we provide a full proof.
Sketch of the proof of the assertion
• Equation (B.33) implies the following: In case 2 we associate the arrival to and
the departure from the longer queue Mx to those of the longer queue My, i.e.
we set A˜
My
t = A
Mx
t , D˜
My
t = D
Mx
t . We do the same for the shorter queue mx,my,
i.e. A˜
my
t = A
mx
t , D˜
my
t = D
mx
t .
In case 1, we have the same association for the arrivals as in case 2, that is
A˜
My
t = A
Mx
t , A˜
my
t = A
mx
t , but we reverse the association of the departures, that
is D˜
My
t = D
mx
t , D˜
my
t = D
Mx
t . Therefore the arrivals A˜
i
t, and departures D˜
i
t, have
the same distribution as the original Ait, D
i
t, respectively, i = 1, 2. Then (B.19)
follows from (B.30).
• To establish (B.20), we note that, because of (B.33), the sum of arrivals to
(respectively, departures from) queues My and my equals to the sum of arrivals
to (respectively, departures from) queues Mx and mx.
When X i,gˆt , Y
i
t 6= 0, i = 1, 2, the function (x−d)++a is linear x, as (x−d)++a =
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x− d+ a. Then from (B.30), (B.33) and the induction hypothesis we obtain
Y 1t+1 + Y
2
t+1 −X1,gˆt −X2,gˆt
=Y 1t + Y
2
t −X1,gˆt −X2,gˆt ≥ 0 (B.34)
and this establish (B.20) when X i,gˆt , Y
i
t 6= 0, i = 1, 2. In the full proof of the
assertion, we show that show that (B.20) is also true when X i,gˆt , Y
i
t are not all
non-zero.
• To establish (B.21) we consider the maximum of the queue lengths. In case 2,
we show that (B.30)-(B.33) ensure that
Y
My
t+1 ≥ XMx,gˆt , (B.35)
max
(
Y
My
t+1 , Y
my
t+1
)
≥ Xmx,gˆt ; (B.36)
then (B.21) follows from (B.35)-(B.36).
In case 1 (B.21) is verified by direct computation in the full proof.
Proof of the assertion
For all y0:t, we denote by Ey0:t the event {Y i0:t = y0:t}.
Let Z˜t =
(
A˜
My
t , D˜
My
t , A˜
my
t , D˜
my
t
)
, then for any realization zt ∈ {0, 1}4 of Z˜t we have
P
(
Z˜t = zt|Ey0:t
)
=P
(
Z˜t = zt, case 1|Ey0:t
)
+ P
(
Z˜t = zt, case 2|Ey0:t
)
. (B.37)
When zt 6= (0, 1, 1, 0) or (0, 0, 1, 1), we get
P
(
Z˜t = zt, case 1|Ey0:t
)
= 0, (B.38)
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and
P
(
Z˜t = zt, case 2|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
= zt|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
A1t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t
)
= zt
)
, (B.39)
where the last equality in (B.39) holds because the random variablesAMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
are independent of Y0, Y1, . . . , Yt and have the same distribution as A
1
t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t .
Therefore, combining (B.38) and (B.39) we obtain for zt 6= (0, 1, 1, 0) or (0, 0, 1, 1)
P
(
Z˜t = zt|Ey0:t
)
= P
((
A1t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t
)
= zt
)
(B.40)
When zt = (0, 1, 1, 0) or (0, 0, 1, 1), let E denote the event {Y Myt − 1 = XMx,gˆt =
Xmx,gˆt }; then we obtain
P
(
Z˜t = zt, case 1|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
AMxt , D
mx
t , A
mx
t , D
Mx
t
)
= zt, E|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
A1t , D
2
t , A
2
t , D
1
t
)
= zt
)
P (E|Ey0:t) , (B.41)
and
P
(
Z˜t = zt, case 2|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
= zt, E
c|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
A1t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t
)
= zt
)
P (Ec|Ey0:t) , (B.42)
where the last equality in (B.41) and (B.42) follow by the fact that the random
variables AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t are independent of Y0, Y1, . . . , Yt (hence, the event E
which is generated by Y0, Y1, . . . , Yt) and have the same distribution as A
1
t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t .
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Therefore, combining (B.41) and (B.42) we obtain for zt = (0, 1, 1, 0) or (0, 0, 1, 1)
P
(
Z˜t = zt|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
A1t , D
2
t , A
2
t , D
1
t
)
= zt
)
P (E|Ey0:t)
+ P
((
A1t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t
)
= zt
)
P (Ec|Ey0:t)
=P
((
A1t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t
)
= zt
)
, (B.43)
where the last equality in (B.43) is true because A1t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t are independent and
D1t has the same distribution as D
2
t .
As a result of (B.40) and (B.43), for any zt ∈ {0, 1}4 we have
P
(
Z˜t = zt|Ey0:t
)
= P
((
A1t , D
1
t , A
2
t , D
2
t
)
= zt
)
. (B.44)
Now consider any y0:t+1. By (B.44) we have for i = My or my
P
(
Y it+1 = yt+1|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
yit − D˜it
)+
+ A˜it = yt+1|Ey0:t
)
=P
((
yit −Dit
)+
+ Ait = yt+1
)
=P
(
X i,g0t+1 = yt+1|X i,g00:t = y0:t
)
. (B.45)
which is (B.19).
Now consider the sum Y 1t+1 + Y
2
t+1.
From (B.33), we know that
A˜
My
t + A˜
my
t = A
Mx
t + A
mx
t a.s., (B.46)
D˜
My
t + D˜
my
t = D
Mx
t +D
mx
t a.s. (B.47)
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Therefore, (B.46) implies
Y 1t+1 + Y
2
t+1 −X1,gˆt+1 −X1,gˆt+1
=
(
Y
My
t − D˜Myt
)+
+
(
Y
my
t − D˜myt
)+
−
(
XMx,gˆt −DMxt
)+
−
(
Xmx,gˆt −Dmxt
)+
. (B.48)
We proceed to show that the right hand side of (B.48) is positive. From the induction
hypothesis for (3.69)-(3.68) we have
Y
my
t + Y
My
t ≥ Xmx,gˆt +XMx,gˆt a.s., (B.49)
Y
My
t ≥ XMx,gˆt a.s. (B.50)
There are three possibilities: {Y Myt = XMx,gˆt }, {Y Myt > XMx,gˆt , Xmx,gˆt = 0} and
{Y Myt > XMx,gˆt , Xmxt > 0}.
First consider {Y Myt = XMx,gˆt }. By (B.49) we have
Y
my
t ≥ Xmx,gˆt a.s. (B.51)
Note that {Y Myt = XMx,gˆt } belongs to case 2 in (B.33). From case 2 of (B.33) we also
know that
DMxt = D˜
My
t , D
mx
t = D˜
my
t . (B.52)
Then, because of (B.50)-(B.52) we get
(
XMx,gˆt −DMxt
)+
+
(
Xmx,gˆt −Dmxt
)+
≤
(
Y
My
t −DMxt
)+
+
(
Y
my
t −Dmxt
)+
=
(
Y
My
t − D˜Myt
)+
+
(
Y
my
t − D˜myt
)+
a.s. (B.53)
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If Y
My
t > X
Mx,gˆ
t and X
mx,gˆ
t = 0
(
XMx,gˆt −DMxt
)+
+
(
Xmx,gˆt −Dmxt
)+
=
(
XMx,gˆt −DMxt
)+
≤XMx,gˆt ≤ Y Myt − 1
≤
(
Y
My
t − D˜Myt
)+
+
(
Y
my
t − D˜myt
)+
(B.54)
If Y
My
t > X
Mx,gˆ
t and X
mx
t > 0, then
(
XMx,gˆt −DMxt
)+
+
(
Xmx,gˆt −Dmxt
)+
=XMx,gˆt −DMxt +Xmx,gˆt −Dmxt
=XMx,gˆt +X
mx,gˆ
t − D˜Myt − D˜myt
≤Y Myt + Y myt − D˜Myt − D˜myt
≤
(
Y
My
t − D˜Myt
)+
+
(
Y
my
t − D˜myt
)+
(B.55)
where the second equality in (B.55) follows from (B.47) and the first inequality in
(B.55) follows from the induction hypothesis for (3.68).
The above results, namely (B.53)-(B.55), show that the right hand side of (B.48) is
positive, and the proof for (B.20) is complete.
It remains to show that (B.21) is true.
We first consider case 2.
In case 2, we know from (B.33) that
(
A˜
My
t , D˜
My
t , A˜
my
t , D˜
my
t
)
=
(
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
. (B.56)
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Then,
X
Mx,gˆ
t =
(
XMx,gˆt −DMxt
)+
+ AMxt
=
(
XMx,gˆt − D˜Myt
)+
+ A˜
My
t
≤
(
Y
My
t − D˜Myt
)+
+ A˜
My
t
=Y
My
t+1 , (B.57)
where the second equality is a consequence of (B.56) and the inequality follows from
the induction hypothesis for (3.69).
To proceed further we note that in case 2 there are three possibilities: {Y Myt = XMx,gˆt },
{Y Myt − 2 ≥ Xmx,gˆt } and {Y Myt > XMx,gˆt , Y Myt − 2 < Xmx,gˆt }
If Y
My
t = X
Mx,gˆ
t , (B.51) is also true. Following similar arguments as in (B.57) we
obtain
X
mx,gˆ
t ≤ Y myt+1 . (B.58)
If Y
My
t − 2 ≥ Xmx,gˆt
X
mx,gˆ
t ≤ Xmx,gˆt + 1 ≤ Y Myt − 1 ≤ Y Myt+1 . (B.59)
If Y
My
t > X
Mx,gˆ
t and Y
My
t − 2 < Xmx,gˆt it can only be Y Myt − 1 = XMx,gˆt = Xmx,gˆt .
Since we are in case 2,
(
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
) 6= (0, 1, 1, 0). Therefore,
Amxt −Dmxt ≤ AMxt −DMxt + 1. (B.60)
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Then we get
X
mx,gˆ
t =
(
Y
My
t − 1−Dmxt
)+
+ Amxt
= max
(
Amxt , Y
My
t − 1−Dmxt + Amxt
)
≤max
(
Amxt , Y
My
t −DMxt + AMxt
)
≤max
(
Amxt , Y
My
t+1
)
≤max
(
Y
my
t+1 , Y
My
t+1
)
. (B.61)
Combining (B.57), (B.58), (B.59) and (B.61) we get (B.21) when case 2 is true.
Now consider case 1. We have Y
My
t − 1 = XMx,gˆt = Xmx,gˆt .
When
(
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
= (0, 1, 1, 0), then
X
Mx,gˆ
t =
(
XMx,gˆt − 1
)+
≤Xmxt
=Xmxt + 1
=
(
Y
My
t −Dmxt
)+
+ AMxt
=Y
My
t+1 (B.62)
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When
(
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
= (0, 0, 1, 1) we get
X
Mx,gˆ
t =X
Mx,gˆ
t
≤Xmx,gˆt
= max
(
Xmx,gˆt , 1
)
= max
((
Y
My
t −Dmxt
)+
+ AMxt , A
mx
t
)
= max
(
Y
My
t+1 , A
mx
t
)
≤max
(
Y
My
t+1 , Y
my
t+1
)
. (B.63)
Combining (B.62) and (B.63) we obtain (B.21) for case 1.
As a result, (B.21) holds for both cases 1 and 2.
Remark:
We note that we need the two cases described in (B.33) for the following reasons. If
we eliminate case 1 and always associate
(
A˜
My
t , D˜
My
t , A˜
my
t , D˜
my
t
)
with
(
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
as in case 2, then when {Y Myt − 1 = Xmx,gˆt and
(
AMxt , D
Mx
t , A
mx
t , D
mx
t
)
= (0, 1, 1, 0)},
the shorter queue mx increases by one customer, and the longer queue My decreases
by one customer; therefore X
mx,gˆ
t = Y
My
t+1 + 1 and (B.21) is not satisfied.
Proof of Lemma III.16. From Lemma III.15, at any time t there exists Y it such that
such that (3.67)-(3.69) hold.
Adopting the notations Mx,mx and My,my in the proof of Lemma III.15, we have at
every time t
Xmx,gˆt ≤ XMX ,gˆt a.s., (B.64)
Y
my
t ≤ Y Myt a.s. (B.65)
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Furthermore, from (3.69) we have
XMx,gˆt ≤ Y Myt a.s. (B.66)
If Xmx,gˆt ≤ Y myt , (B.66) and the fact that c(·) is increasing give
c
(
XMX ,gˆt
)
+ c
(
XmX ,gˆt
)
≤ c
(
Y
My
t
)
+ c
(
Y
my
t
)
. (B.67)
If Xmx,gˆt > Y
my
t , then
Y
my
t < X
mx,gˆ
t ≤ XMx,gˆt ≤ Y Myt . (B.68)
Since c(·) is convex, it follows from (B.68) that
c
(
Y
My
t
)
− c
(
XMx,gˆt
)
Y
My
t −XMx,gˆt
≥
c
(
Xmx,gˆt
)
− c (Y myt )
Xmx,gˆt − Y myt
. (B.69)
From (3.68) in Lemma III.15 we know that
Y
My
t −XMx,gˆt ≥ Xmx,gˆt − Y myt . (B.70)
Combining (B.69) and (B.70) we get
c
(
Y
My
t
)
+ c
(
Y
my
t
) ≥ c(XMx,gˆt )+ c(Xmx,gˆt ) . (B.71)
Proof of Lemma III.17. Let {Y 1t , t ∈ Z+} and {Y 2t , t ∈ Z+} be the processes defined
in Lemma III.15. Then {Y it , t ∈ Z+} has the same distribution as {X i,g0t , t ∈ Z+} for
i = 1, 2.
Since µ > λ, the processes {Y it , t ∈ Z+}, i = 1, 2 are irreducible positive recurrent
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Markov chains. Moreover, the two processes {Y 1t , t ∈ Z+} and {Y 2t , t ∈ Z+} have the
same stationary distribution, denoted by pig0 . Under Assumption III.11, by Ergodic
theorem of Markov chains (see [69, chap. 3]) we get
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
c(Y 1t ) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
c(Y 2t )
=
∞∑
x=0
pig0(x)c(x) a.s. (B.72)
Let W iT (Y0:T−1) :=
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 c(Y
i
t ), i = 1, 2.
We show that {W iT (Y0:T−1), T = 1, 2, . . . } is uniformly integrable for i = 1, 2. That
is,
sup
T
E
[
W iT (Y0:T−1)1{W iT (Y0:T−1)>N}
]
→ 0 (B.73)
as N →∞.
Let pg0(x, y), x, y ∈ Z+ be the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. Note that
the initial PMF of the process {Y it , t ∈ Z+}, i = 1, 2 is pii0. From Assumption III.11
we know that pii0(x) = 0, i = 1, 2 for all x > M .
Letting R := maxx≤M
pii0(x)
pig0 (x)
<∞, we obtain for i = 1, 2
E
[
W iT (Y0:T−1)1{W iT (Y0:T−1)>N}
]
=
∑
y0:T−1
W iT (y0:T−1)1{W iT (y0:T−1)>N}P(Y0:T−1 = y0:T−1)
=
∑
y0:T−1
W iT (y0:T−1)1{W iT (y0:T−1)>N}pi
i
0(y0)Π
T−1
t=1 p
g0(yt−1, yt)
≤R
∑
y0:T−1
W iT (y0:T−1)1{W iT (y0:T−1)>N}pi
g0(y0)Π
T−1
t=1 p
g0(yt−1, yt)
=RE
[
W pi
g0
T 1{Wpig0T >N}
]
, (B.74)
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where W pi
g0
T =
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 c(Y
pig0
t ) and {Y pig0t , t ∈ Z+} is the chain with transition prob-
abilities pg0(x, y) and initial PMF pig0 .
Note that {Y pig0t , t ∈ Z+} is stationary because the initial PMF is the stationary dis-
tribution pig0 . From Birkhoff’s Ergodic theorem we know that {W pig0T , T = 1, 2, . . . }
converges a.s. and in expectation (see [105, chap. 2]). Therefore, {W pig0T , T = 1, 2, . . . }
is uniformly integrable, and the right hand side of (B.74) goes to zeros uniformly as
N → ∞. Consequently, {W iT (Y0:T−1), T = 1, 2, . . . } is also uniformly integrable for
i = 1, 2.
Since WT = W
1
T (Y0:T−1) + W
2
T (Y0:T−1) for all T = 1, 2, . . . , {WT , T = 1, 2, . . . } is
uniformly integrable.
Proof of Corollary III.18. From Lemma III.16, there exists {Y 1t , Y 2t , t ∈ Z+} such
that (3.67) holds and
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
)
≤ c (Y 1t )+ c (Y 2t ) a.s. (B.75)
Let
WT :=
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(
c
(
Y 1t
)
+ c
(
Y 2t
))
, (B.76)
VT :=
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(
c
(
X1,gˆt
)
+ c
(
X2,gˆt
))
. (B.77)
From (B.75) it follows that
VT ≤ WT , T = 1, 2, . . . (B.78)
From Lemmas III.17, {WT , T = 1, 2, . . . } is uniformly integrable, therefore {VT , T =
1, 2, . . . }, which is bounded above by {WT , T = 1, 2, . . . } is also uniformly integrable.
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From the property of uniformly integrability, if {VT , T = 1, 2, . . . } converges a.s., we
know that {VT , T = 1, 2, . . . } also converges in expectation. Furthermore,
J gˆ
(
pi10, pi
2
0
)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
c
(
Y 1t
)
+ c
(
Y 2t
))]
= lim sup
T→∞
E [VT ]
≤ lim sup
T→∞
E [WT ] = Jg0 . (B.79)
Proof of Lemma III.19. First we show that {St, t ≥ T0 + 1} is a Markov chain.
For st ≥ 2,
P (St+1 = st+1|ST0+1:t = sT0+1:t)
=P
((
st −D1t −D2t + A1t + A2t
)
= st+1|ST0+1:t = sT0+1:t
)
=P
((
st −D1t −D2t + A1t + A2t
)
= st+1|St = st
)
=P (St+1 = st+1|St = st) . (B.80)
The first and last equalities in (B.80) follow from the construction of the process
{St, t ≥ T0 + 1}. The second equality in (B.80) is true because T0 is a stopping
time with respect to {X1,gˆt , X2,gˆt , t ∈ Z+}, and Ait, Dit, i = 1, 2 are independent of all
random variables before t. Similarly, for st = 0 we have, by arguments similar to the
above,
P (St+1 = st+1|ST0+1:t = sT0+1:t)
=P
(
A1t + A
2
t = st+1|ST0+1:t−1 = sT0+1:t−1, St = 0
)
=P
(
A1t + A
2
t = st+1|St = 0
)
=P (St+1 = st+1|St = 0) . (B.81)
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The first and last equality in (B.81) follow from the construction of the process
{St, t ≥ T0 + 1}. The second equality in (B.81) is true because Ait, Dit, i = 1, 2
are independent of all variables before t. For st = 1,
P (St+1 = st+1|ST0+1:t = sT0+1:t)
=P
(
st + 1{X1,gˆt =0}(D
1
t −D2t )−D1t + A1t + A2t = st+1|ST0+1:t = sT0+1:t
)
=P
(
1−D2t + A1t + A2t = st+1, X1,gˆt = 0|ST0+1:t−1 = sT0+1:t−1, St = 1
)
+ P
(
1−D1t + A1t + A2t = st+1, X1,gˆt = 1|ST0+1:t−1 = sT0+1:t−1, St = 1
)
=P
(
1−D1t + A1t + A2t = st+1, X1,gˆt = 0|ST0+1:t−1 = sT0+1:t−1, St = 1
)
+ P
(
1−D1t + A1t + A2t = st+1, X1,gˆt = 1|ST0+1:t−1 = sT0+1:t−1, St = 1
)
=P
(
1−D1t + A1t + A2t = st+1|ST0+1:t−1 = sT0+1:t−1, St = 1
)
=P
(
1−D1t + A1t + A2t = st+1|St = 1
)
=P (St+1 = st+1|St = st) . (B.82)
The first equality in (B.82) follows from the construction of the process {St, t ≥
T0 + 1}. The second and forth equalities follow from the fact that X1,gˆt can be ei-
ther 0 or 1. In the third equality, D2t is replaced by D
1
t in the first term; this is
true because D1t and D
2
t are identically distributed and independent of X
1,gˆ
t and all
past random variables. The fifth equality holds because T0 is a stopping time with
respect to {X1,gˆt , X2,gˆt , t ∈ Z+} and Ait, Dit, i = 1, 2 are independent of all past random
variables. The last equality follows from the same arguments that lead to the first
through the fifth equalities.
Therefore, the process {St, t ≥ T0 + 1} is a Markov chain.
Since λ, µ > 0, the Markov chain is irreducible.
We prove that the process {St, t ≥ T0 + 1} is positive recurrent. Note that, for all
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s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , because of the construction of {St, t ≥ T0 + 1}
E [St+1|St = s]
≤E [St + A1t + A2t |St = s]
=s+ 2λ <∞. (B.83)
Moreover, for all s ≥ 2,
E [St+1|St = s]
=E
[
s−D1t −D2t + A1t + A2t |St = s
]
=s− 2µ+ 2λ < s. (B.84)
Using Foster’s theorem (see [69, chap. 5]), we conclude that the Markov chain {St, t ≥
T0 + 1} is positive recurrent.
Proof of Lemma III.20. Let (Ω,F ,P) denote the basic probability space for our prob-
lem. Define events Et ∈ F , t = 0, 1, . . . to be
Et ={ω ∈ Ω :
(
U1,gˆt′ (ω), U
2,gˆ
t′ (ω)
)
6= (0, 0) ∀t′ ≥ t} (B.85)
If the claim of this lemma is not true, we get
P
( ∞⋃
t=0
Et
)
= 1− P
((
U1,gˆt , U
2,gˆ
t
)
= (0, 0) i.o.
)
> 0. (B.86)
Therefore, there exist some t0 such that P(Et0) > 0. Since t0 is a constant, it is a
stopping time with respect to {X1,gˆt , X2,gˆt , t ∈ Z+}.
Consider the process {St, t = t0 + 1, t0 + 2, ...} defined in Lemma III.19 with the
stopping time t0. From Lemma III.19 we know that {St, t ≥ t0 + 1} is an irreducible
positive recurrent Markov chain. Furthermore, along the sample path induced by any
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ω ∈ Et0 , we claim that for all t ≥ t0 + 1
St(ω) =X
1,gˆ
t (ω) +X
2,gˆ
t (ω)
=X
1,gˆ
t−1(ω) +X
2,gˆ
t−1(ω). (B.87)
The claim is shown by induction below.
By the definition of {St, t ≥ t0 + 1} in Lemma III.19, we have at time t0 + 1 for any
ω ∈ Et0
St0+1(ω) =X
1,gˆ
t0+1
(ω) +X2,gˆt0+1(ω)
=X
1,gˆ
t0
(ω) +X
2,gˆ
t0
(ω), (B.88)
where the last inequality in (B.88) follows from the system dynamics (3.1)-(3.3).
Assume equation (B.87) is true at time t (t ≥ t0 + 1). At time t + 1 we have, by
(3.1)-(3.3),
X1,gˆt+1 +X
2,gˆ
t+1
=(X1,gˆt −D1t )+ + (X2,gˆt −D2t )+ + A1t + A2t
=X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t −D1t −D2t + A1t + A2t
+D1t 1{X1,gˆt =0} +D
2
t 1{X2,gˆt =0}. (B.89)
Since along the sample path induced by ω ∈ Et0 ,
(
U1,gˆt−1(ω), U
2,gˆ
t−1(ω)
)
6= (0, 0) and
X i,gˆt = X
i,gˆ
t−1 − U i,gˆt−1 + U j,gˆt−1, the event {X i,gˆt = 0}
⋂
Et0 (i = 1 or 2) implies that
X
i,gˆ
t−1 = 1, U
i,gˆ
t−1 = 1 and U
j,gˆ
t−1 = 0. For this case, X
i,gˆ
t−1 = 1 and U
i,gˆ
t−1 = 1 further
imply that the threshold is smaller than one. Then, the only possibility for U j,gˆt−1 = 0
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is X
j,gˆ
t−1 = 0. Therefore,
{
X i,gˆt = 0
}⋂
Et0
⊆
{
X
i,gˆ
t−1 = 1, U
i,gˆ
t−1 = 1, X
j,gˆ
t−1 = 0 and U
j,gˆ
t−1 = 0
}
⊆{St = 1}. (B.90)
Consequently, from (B.90), for any ω ∈ Et0
D1t (ω)1{X1,gˆt (ω)=0} +D
2
t (ω)1{X2,gˆt (ω)=0}
=1{St(ω)=1}
(
D1t (ω)1{X1,gˆt (ω)=0} +D
2
t (ω)1{X2,gˆt (ω)=0}
)
.
=1{St(ω)=1}
(
1{X1,gˆt (ω)=0}(D
1
t (ω)−D2t (ω)) +D2t (ω)
)
. (B.91)
Moreover,
(
U1,gˆt−1(ω), U
2,gˆ
t−1(ω)
)
6= (0, 0) implies that
(
X
1,gˆ
t−1(ω), X
2,gˆ
t−1(ω)
)
6= (0, 0).
Hence,
St(ω) = X
1,gˆ
t−1(ω) +X
2,gˆ
t−1(ω) 6= 0, (B.92)
and
X1,gˆt+1(ω) +X
2,gˆ
t+1(ω)
=X1,gˆt (ω) +X
2,gˆ
t (ω)−D1t (ω)−D2t (ω) + A1t (ω) + A2t (ω)
+ 1{St(ω)=1}
(
1{X1,gˆt (ω)=0}(D
1
t (ω)−D2t (ω)) +D2t (ω)
)
=X1,gˆt (ω) +X
2,gˆ
t (ω)−D1t (ω)−D2t (ω) + A1t (ω) + A2t (ω)
+ 1{St(ω)=1}
(
1{X1,gˆt (ω)=0}(D
1
t (ω)−D2t (ω)) +D2t (ω)
)
+ 1{St(ω)=0}
(
D1t (ω) +D
2
t (ω)
)
=St+1(ω), (B.93)
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where the first and second equalities in (B.93) follow from (B.91) and (B.92), respec-
tively. The last equality in (B.93) follows from the construction of {St, t ≥ t0 + 1}.
Furthermore, by the system dynamics (3.1)-(3.3) we have
X
1,gˆ
t (ω) +X
2,gˆ
t (ω) =X
1,gˆ
t+1(ω) +X
2,gˆ
t+1(ω)
=St+1(ω). (B.94)
Thus, equation (B.87) is true for any ω ∈ Et0 for all t ≥ t0 + 1.
Then, for any ω ∈ Et0
St(ω) = X
1,gˆ
t−1(ω) +X
2,gˆ
t−1(ω) 6= 0 for all t ≥ t0 + 1 (B.95)
because
(
U1,gˆt−1(ω), U
2,gˆ
t−1(ω)
)
6= (0, 0) for all t ≥ t0 + 1. Since P(Et0) > 0, (B.95)
contradicts the fact that {St, t ≥ t0 + 1} is recurrent.
Therefore, no such event Et0 ∈ F with positive probability exists, and the proof of
this lemma is complete.
Proof of Lemma III.22. For any fixed centralized policy g ∈ Gc, the information
I1t , I
2
t available to the centralized controller includes all primitive random variables
X i0, A
i
0:t, D
i
0:t, i = 1, 2 up to time t. Since all other random variables are functions of
these primitive random variables and g, we have
U i,gt =g
i
t(I
1
t , I
2
t )
=git(X
1
0 , X
2
0 , A
1
0:t, A
2
0:t, D
1
0:t, D
2
0:t), (B.96)
for i = 1, 2. For any initial queue lengths x10, x
2
0, we now define a policy g˜ from g
for the case when both queues are initially empty. Let g˜ be the policy such that for
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i = 1, 2
U i,g˜t =g˜
i
t(I
1
t , I
2
t )
:=
 g
i
t(x
1
0, x
2
0, A
1
0:t, A
2
0:t, D
i
0:t, D
2
0:t) if X
i,g˜
t > 0
0 if X
i,g˜
t = 0
= min
(
U i,gt , X
i,g˜
t
)
≤ U i,gt , (B.97)
where X1,g˜t and X
2,g˜
t denote the queue lengths at time t due to policy g˜ with initial
queue lengths X1,g˜0 = X
2,g˜
0 = 0.
At time 0 we have X i,g0 = x
i
0 ≥ 0 = X i,g˜0 for i = 1, 2. We now prove by induction that
for all time t
X i,gt ≥ X i,g˜t , i = 1, 2. (B.98)
Suppose the claim is true at time t. Then, from the system dynamics (3.1)-(3.2) and
(B.98) we obtain, for i = 1, 2,
X
i,g
t =
(
X i,gt −Dit
)+
+ Ait
≥
(
X i,g˜t −Dit
)+
+ Ait = X
i,g˜
t . (B.99)
Furthermore from (3.1)-(3.2) and (B.97)
X i,gt+1 =X
i,g
t − U i,gt + U j,gt
≥X i,gt − U i,gt + U j,g˜t (B.100)
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If X
i,g˜
t > 0, then, because of (B.97) and (B.99)
X
i,g
t − U i,gt =X i,gt −min
(
U i,gt , X
i,g˜
t
)
=X
i,g
t − U i,g˜t ≥ X i,g˜t − U i,g˜t . (B.101)
If X
i,g˜
t = 0, since X
i,g
t − U i,gt ≥ 0, (B.97) implies
X
i,g
t − U i,gt ≥ 0 = X i,g˜t − U i,g˜t . (B.102)
Combining (B.100)-(B.102) and (3.1)-(3.2) we get
X i,gt+1 ≥X i,gt − U i,gt + U j,g˜t
≥X i,g˜t − U i,g˜t + U j,g˜t = X i,g˜t+1. (B.103)
Therefore, we complete the proof of the claim (B.98).
Since the cost function is increasing, (B.98) implies that for all g ∈ Gc and any initial
condition X10 = x
1
0, X
2
0 = x
2
0,
inf
g∈Gc
JgT (0, 0) ≤ J g˜T (0, 0) ≤ JgT (x10, x20). (B.104)
Consequently, for any PMFs pi10, pi
2
0
inf
g∈Gc
JgT (0, 0) ≤ inf
g∈Gc
JgT (pi
1
0, pi
2
0). (B.105)
Moreover, the result of Lemma III.9 ensures that gˆ gives the smallest expected cost
among policies in Gc for any finite horizon when X10 = X20 = 0. It follows that, for
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any finite T ,
J gˆT (0, 0) = inf
g∈Gc
JgT (0, 0) ≤ J g˜T (0, 0) ≤ JgT (x10, x20). (B.106)
For infinite horizon cost, we divide each term in (B.106) by T and let T to infinity,
and we obtain, for any pi10, pi
2
0,
J gˆ(0, 0) = inf
g∈Gc
Jg(0, 0) ≤ J g˜(0, 0) ≤ Jg(x10, x20). (B.107)
Proof of the claim in the proof of Theorem III.14. We prove here our claim expressed
by equation (3.90) to complete the proof of Theorem III.14. By (3.78),
ST0+1 = X
1,gˆ
T0+1
+X2,gˆT0+1. (B.108)
We prove by induction that X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t = St for all t ≥ T0 + 1.
Assume that X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t = St at time t, t ≥ T0 + 1. Then for time t+ 1, because of
the systems dynamics (3.1)-(3.3),
X1,gˆt+1 +X
2,gˆ
t+1
=(X1,gˆt −D1t )+ + (X2,gˆt −D2t )+ + A1t + A2t
=X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t −D1t −D2t + A1t + A2t
+D1t 1{X1,gˆt =0} +D
2
t 1{X2,gˆt =0}. (B.109)
When X i,gˆt = 0 (i = 1 or 2), U
j,gˆ
t−1 should be 0 because
0 = X i,gˆt = X
i,gˆ
t−1 − U i,gˆt−1 + U j,gˆt−1 (B.110)
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and X
i,gˆ
t−1 − U i,gˆt−1 ≥ 0.
We consider the following two cases separately:
Case 1 U i,gˆt−1 = 0.
Case 2 U i,gˆt−1 = 1.
Case 1 When U i,gˆt−1 = 0, we must have X
i,gˆ
t−1 = 0 by (B.110). Then X
j,gˆ
t−1 ∈ {0, 1} for
the following reason. When U i,gˆt−1 = U
j,gˆ
t−1 = 0, the sizes of both queues are
between the lower bound and the threshold. That is
LB
gˆ
t−1 ≤X i,gˆt−1 ≤ dTHte − 1, (B.111)
LB
gˆ
t−1 ≤Xj,gˆt−1 ≤ dTHte − 1. (B.112)
Combining (B.111), (B.112) with X
i,gˆ
t−1 = 0 we obtain
X
j,gˆ
t−1 =
∣∣∣Xj,gˆt−1 −X i,gˆt−1∣∣∣
≤dTHte − 1− LBgˆt−1
≤1
2
(
UB
gˆ
t−1 − LBgˆt−1
)
≤ 1.5, (B.113)
where the last inequality in (B.113) is true because of (3.31) in Lemma III.4,
(3.89), and
UB
gˆ
t−1 − LBgˆt−1 ≤UB gˆt + 1− LBgˆt + 1 ≤ 3.
Therefore, X
j,gˆ
t−1 ≤ 1 because Xj,gˆt−1 takes integer values.
Case 2 When U i,gˆt−1 = 1, we must have X
i,gˆ
t−1 = 1 by (B.110). This implies that the
threshold is not more than 1, and the only possible value of X
j,gˆ
t−1 less than
the threshold is 0.
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As a consequence of the above analysis for the cases 1 and 2, {X i,gˆt = 0} implies
St = X
i,gˆ
t−1 +X
j,gˆ
t−1 ≤ 1. (B.114)
Thus, for i = 1, 2,
{
X i,gˆt = 0
}
=
{
X i,gˆt = 0, St ≤ 1
}
. (B.115)
Then,
D1t 1{X1,gˆt =0} +D
2
t 1{X2,gˆt =0}
=D1t 1{X1,gˆt =0,St≤1} +D
2
t+11{X2,gˆt =0,St≤1}
=D1t 1{X1,gˆt =0,St=1} +D
2
t 1{X1,gˆt 6=0,St=1}
+D1t 1{St=0} +D
2
t 1{St=0}. (B.116)
Combining (B.109) and (B.116) we obtain
X1,gˆt+1 +X
2,gˆ
t+1
=X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t −D1t −D2t + A1t + A2t
+D1t 1{X1t=0,St=1} +D
2
t 1{X1t 6=0,St=1}
+D1t 1{St=0} +D
2
t 1{St=0}
=St+1, (B.117)
where the last equality follows by the definition of St+1.
Therefore, at any time t ≥ T0 + 1 we have
X1,gˆt +X
2,gˆ
t = St. (B.118)
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The proof of claim (3.90), and consequently, the proof of Theorem III.14 is complete.
Proof of Lemma III.4. This lemma follows from the system dynamics and the fact
that for i = 1, 2 and any k = 0, 1, . . . , K
{U i,DRMt = k} = {γt(k) ≤ X i,DRMt ≤ γt(k + 1)− 1}. (B.119)
Proof of Lemma III.25. Assuming all variables in the proof are generated from the
policy DRM . From (3.98) and (3.101) we have
UBit+1 =γt(U
i
t + 1)− U it + U jt − 1
=LBt +
⌊
(2U it +M + 1) max
(
1,
UBt − LBt + 1
2K +M + 1
)⌋
− U it + U jt − 1
=LBt + U
i
t + U
j
t +M +
⌊
(2U it +M + 1)
(
max
(
1,
UBt − LBt + 1
2K +M + 1
)
− 1
)⌋
=LBt + U
i
t + U
j
t +M +
⌊
2U1t +M + 1
2K +M + 1
(
UBt − LBt − 2K −M
)+⌋
.
(B.120)
Similarly, when U it 6= 0 we have
LBit+1
=LBt + U
i
t + U
j
t +M − 1 +
⌊
2U1t +M − 1
2K +M + 1
(
UBt − LBt − 2K −M
)+⌋
; (B.121)
when U it = 0,
LBit+1 =LBt + U
i
t + U
j
t . (B.122)
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Let U1t ≥ U2t without loss of generality. Then (B.120)-(B.122) implies that
UBt+1 = UB
1
t+1, LBt+1 = LB
2
t+1, (B.123)
Therefore,
UBt+1 − LBt+1 ≤UBt+1 − (LBt + U it + U jt )
=M +
⌊
2U1t +M + 1
2K +M + 1
(
UBt − LBt − 2K −M
)+⌋
, (B.124)
where the above inequality follows from (B.121) and (B.122), and the equality follows
from (B.120).
Note that from (3.31),
UBt − LBt = UBt +K − (LBt −K)+ ≤ UBt − LBt + 2K (B.125)
Putting (B.125) into (B.124) we obtain
UBt+1 − LBt+1 −M ≤
⌊
2U1t +M + 1
2K +M + 1
(
UBt − LBt − 2K −M
)+⌋
≤
⌊
2U1t +M + 1
2K +M + 1
(UBt − LBt −M)+
⌋
≤ (UBt − LBt −M)+ (B.126)
where the last inequality holds because U1t ≤ K.
Proof of Theorem III.27. Assuming all variables in the proof are generated from the
policy DRM .
Let Yt = (X
i
t , X
i
t, UB
i
t, LB
i
t, UB
i
t, LB
i
t, i = 1, 2) be the variable including all states
and bounds for the two queues at time t. It is clear that {Yt, t ∈ Z+} is a Markov
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chain. Define a Lyapunov function h(yt) for {Yt} to be
h(yt) = X
1
t +X
2
t + (2K + 1)(UBt − LBt) (B.127)
We claim that
E [h(Yt+1)− Yt|Yt = yt] ≤ − (B.128)
for some  > 0 and for all yt /∈ C, where C = {yt : ubt − lbt > M}. Suppose (B.128)
is true, then from Theorem 11.3.4 in [93] we obtain
E[τM ] = E[E[τM |Y0]] ≤ E
[
1

h(Y0)|Y0 /∈ C
]
≤ 1

(2(UB0 +K) + (2K + 1)UB0) <∞
(B.129)
To prove (B.128), we consider two cases: max(U1t , U
2
t ) = K and max(U
1
t , U
2
t ) ≤ K−1.
First consider the case when max(U1t , U
2
t ) = K.
Let U1t = K without loss of generality. Then
X2t+1 = X
2
t − U2t + U1t ≥ U1t = K. (B.130)
Furthermore, we have X
1
t ≥ γt(K) because of U1t = K. Consequently,
X1t+1 =X
1
t − U1t + U2t
≥γt(K)−K
=LBt +
⌊
(2K +M − 1) max
(
1,
UBt − LBt + 1
2K +M + 1
)⌋
−K
≥(2K +M − 1)−K ≥ K. (B.131)
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Since X it+1 ≥ K, (X it+1 −Dit)+ = X it+1 −Dit for i = 1, 2. Therefore,
(X
1
t+1 +X
2
t+1)− (X2t +X2t )
=X1t+1 −D1t + A1t +X1t+1 −D2t + A2t −X1t −X2t
=A1t + A
2
t −D1t −D2t . (B.132)
where the last equality follows by (3.1) and (3.2).
For the second part of the function h(·), Lemma III.25 ensures, for Yt /∈ C,
(UBt+1 − LBt+1)− (UBt − LBt)
=(UBt+1 − LBt+1 −M)− (UBt − LBt −M)
≤(UBt − LBt −M)+ − (UBt − LBt −M) = 0. (B.133)
Consequently, under the case when yt /∈ C and max(U1t , U2t ) = K,
E [h(Yt+1)− Yt|Yt = yt]
≤E [A1t + A2t −D1t −D2t ]
=− (µ1 + µ2 − λ1 − λ2). (B.134)
Now consider the second case when max(U1t , U
2
t ) ≤ K − 1. From Lemma III.25
we have
UBt+1 − LBt+1 −M ≤
⌊
2 max(U1t , U
2
t ) +M + 1
2K +M + 1
(UBt − LBt −M)+
⌋
≤
⌊
2K +M − 1
2K +M + 1
(UBt − LBt −M)+
⌋
(B.135)
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Using (B.135), for any Yt /∈ C, we get
(UBt+1 − LBt+1)− (UBt − LBt)
≤M +
⌊
2K +M − 1
2K +M + 1
(UBt − LBt −M)+
⌋
− (UBt − LBt)
=
⌊
2K +M − 1
2K +M + 1
(UBt − LBt −M)
⌋
− (UBt − LBt −M)
=
⌊ −2
2K +M + 1
(UBt − LBt −M)
⌋
≤− 1 (B.136)
On the other hand, from system dynamics we have
(X
1
t+1 +X
2
t+1)− (X1t +X2t )
=(X1t+1 −D1t )+ + A1t + (X2t+1 −D2t )+ + A2t −X1t −X2t
≤X1t+1 + A1t +X2t+1 + A2t −X1t −X2t
=A1t + A
2
t (B.137)
where the last equality follows by (3.1) and (3.2).
Therefore, under the case when yt /∈ C and max(U1t , U2t ) ≤ K − 1,
E [h(Yt+1)− Yt|Yt = yt]
≤E [A1t + A2t + (2K + 1)(−1)]
=(λ1 + λ2 − 2K)− 1 ≤ −1 (B.138)
From the above analysis, (B.128) follows from (B.134) and (B.138) with
 = min(1, µ1 + µ2 − λ1 − λ2). (B.139)
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APPENDIX C
Appendix for Multiple Access Communication
Proof of Lemma IV.1. The lemma is proved by induction. Equation (4.7) is true at
t = 0 because all queues are initially empty. Suppose (4.7) is true at t = k. At time
t = k + 1 we have
Pλ,CIMA(qk+1|f0:k) = P
λ,CIMA(qk+1, fk|f0:k−1)∑
q′k+1
Pλ,CIMA(q′k+1, fk|f0:k−1)
. (C.1)
Let v = v(bCIMAt ). Consider the numerator in (C.1). There are two cases: fk = 1 and
fk = 0.
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When fk = 1, we have
Pλ,CIMA(qk+1, Fk = 1|f0:k−1)
=
∑
qk
Pλ,CIMA(qk+1, qk, Fk = 1|f0:k−1)
=
∑
qk
Pλ,CIMA(qk+1, qk, Qvk > 0|f0:k−1) (C.2)
=
∑
qk,q
v
k>0
[
Pλ,CIMA(qk|f0:k−1)Pλ(Avk = qvk+1 − qvk + 1)
∏
n6=v
Pλ(Ank = qnk+1 − qnk )
]
(C.3)
=
∑
qk,q
v
k>0
[
N∏
n=1
Pλ,CIMA(qnk |f0:k−1)Pλ(Avk = qvk+1 − qvk + 1)
∏
n6=v
Pλ(Ank = qnk+1 − qnk )
]
(C.4)
=
∏
n6=v
∑
qnk
Pλ(Ank = qnk+1 − qnk )Pλ,CIMA(qnk |f0:k−1)

∑
qvk>0
Pλ(Avk = qvk+1 − qvk + 1)Pλ,CIMA(qvk|f0:k−1). (C.5)
Equation (C.2) holds because Fk = 1 if and only if Q
v(BCIMAt )
k > 0. Equation (C.3)
is true because of the system dynamics (4.1) and the fact that Ank , n = 1, 2, . . . , N
are mutually independent and independent of all variables before k. Equation (C.4)
follows from the induction hypothesis for (4.7). Equation (C.5) is true because each
term in (C.4) depends only on each qnk for n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
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Using (C.5), the denominator in (C.1) becomes
∑
q′k+1
∏
n6=v
∑
qnk
Pλ(Ank = q′nk+1 − qnk )Pλ,CIMA(qnk |f0:k−1)

∑
qvk>0
Pλ(Avk = q′vk+1 − qvk + 1)Pλ,CIMA(qvk|f0:k−1)

=
∑
qvk>0
Pλ,CIMA(qvk|f0:k−1)
=Pλ,CIMA(Qvk > 0|f0:k−1); (C.6)
equation (C.6) is true because all possible values of qnk , n 6= v are summed out.
Substituting (C.5) and (C.6) back into (C.1) we obtain for fk = 1
Pλ,CIMA(qk+1|f0:k)
=
∏
n 6=v
∑
qnk
Pλ(Ank = qnk+1 − qnk )Pλ,CIMA(qnk |f0:k−1)

∑
qvk>0
Pλ(Avk = qvk+1 − qvk + 1)
Pλ,CIMA(qvk|f0:k−1)
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk > 0|f0:k−1)

=:
N∏
n=1
φn(qnk+1), (C.7)
where, for n 6= v,
φn(qnk+1)
:=
∑
qnk
Pλ(Ank = qnk+1 − qnk )Pλ,CIMA(qnk |f0:k−1)
=Pλ(Ank = 1)Pλ,CIMA(Qnk = qnk+1 − 1|f0:k−1) + Pλ(Ank = 0)Pλ,CIMA(Qnk = qnk+1|f0:k−1)
=λnPλ,CIMA(Qnk = qnk+1 − 1|f0:k−1) + (1− λn)Pλ,CIMA(Qnk = qnk+1|f0:k−1), (C.8)
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and for n = v,
φv(qvk+1)
:=
∑
qvk>0
Pλ(Avk = qvk+1 − qvk + 1)
Pλ,CIMA(qvk|f0:k−1)
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk > 0|f0:k−1)
=Pλ(Avk = 1)
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk = qvk+1|f0:k−1)1{qnt+1>0}
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk > 0|f0:k−1)
+ Pλ(Avk = 0)
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk = qvk+1 + 1|f0:k−1)
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk > 0|f0:k−1)
=λv
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk = qvk+1|f0:k−1)1{qvk+1>0}
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk > 0|f0:k−1)
+ (1− λv)P
λ,CIMA(Qvk = q
v
k+1 + 1|f0:k−1)
Pλ,CIMA(Qvk > 0|f0:k−1)
.
(C.9)
Equations (C.8) and (C.9) follow from (C.7) and the fact that Ank takes values in
{0, 1} for all n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
From (C.8) and (C.9) we conclude that φn(qnk+1) is a probability mass function (PMF)
for all n. This along with (C.7) establish that the marginal conditional PMF satisfies
Pλ,CIMA(qnk+1|f0:k) =φn(qnk+1) (C.10)
for all n, and this establish the induction step when fk = 1.
When fk = 0, by arguments similar to those in (C.2)-(C.10), we get
Pλ,CIMA(qk+1|f0:k) =
N∏
n=1
Pλ,CIMA(qnk+1|f0:k), (C.11)
where for n 6= v, by an argument similar to (C.8), we get
Pλ,CIMA(qnk+1|f0:k)
=λnPλ,CIMA(Qnk = qnk+1 − 1|f0:k−1) + (1− λn)Pλ,CIMA(Qnk = qnk+1|f0:k−1), (C.12)
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and for n = v, by an argument similar to (C.9), we obtain
Pλ,CIMA(qvk+1|f0:k) = λv1{qvk+1=1} + (1− λv)1{qvk+1=0}. (C.13)
Therefore, the induction step is complete and (4.7) holds for all t. Furthermore,
(4.8) is established by (C.8) and (C.12); (4.9) is established by (C.9), and (4.10) is
established by (C.13).
Proof of Lemma IV.2. Equation (4.11) follows directly from (4.1), the queue length
dynamics, and (4.6), the definition of the CIMA protocol.
For the common upper bounds, let v = v(BCIMAt ), which is a function of F0:t−1.
For n 6= v, we get Bn,CIMAt+1 = Bn,CIMAt + 1 form (4.8) in Lemma IV.1.
For n = v and Ft = 1, we obtain B
v,CIMA
t+1 = B
v,CIMA
t from (4.9) in Lemma IV.1.
For n = v and Ft = 0, (4.10) in Lemma IV.1 gives B
v,CIMA
t+1 = 1, and the proof of the
lemma is complete.
Proof of Lemma IV.4. From (4.11) and (4.12) in Lemma IV.2 we know that QCIMAt+1
and BCIMAt+1 are functions of Q
CIMA
t , B
CIMA
t , A
n
t and Ft. From (4.6), the definition of
the CIMA protocol, we know that
Ft = U
v(BCIMAt )
t = 1
{
Q
v(BCIMAt ),CIMA
t >0
}.
Therefore, Ft is a function of Q
CIMA
t and B
CIMA
t . Consequently, Y
CIMA
t+1 is a function
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of QCIMAt , B
CIMA
t and A
n
t . Let f(Y
CIMA
t , A
n
t ) := Y
CIMA
t+1 , we have
P(Y CIMAt+1 = yt+1|Y CIMAk = yk, k ≤ t)
=P(f(Y CIMAt , Ant ) = yt+1|Y CIMAk = yk, k ≤ t)
=P(f(yt, Ant ) = yt+1|Y CIMAk = yk, k ≤ t)
(∗)
=P(f(yt, Ant ) = yt+1|Y CIMAt = yt)
=P(Y CIMAt = yt+1|Y CIMAt = yt),
where (*) is true because Ant is independent of Q
CIMA
t , B
CIMA
t and all random variables
before time slot t.
Therefore, {Y CIMAt , t = 0, 1, . . . } is a Markov chain.
Detailed derivation of (4.14) in the proof of Theorem IV.3. From the definition of the
Lyapunov function h(·) ( cf (4.13)) we have
E
[
h(Y CIMAt+1 )− h(Y CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
=E
[
N∑
n=1
(Qn,CIMAt+1 −Qn,CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
+ αE
[
N∑
n=1
(Bn,CIMAt+1 −Bn,CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
.
(C.14)
For n 6= v, from (4.11) and (4.12) in Lemma IV.2, we get
E
[
(Qn,CIMAt+1 −Qn,CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
+ αE
[
(Bn,CIMAt+1 −Bn,CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
=E
[
Ant |Y CIMAt = y
]
+ αE
[
1|Y CIMAt = y
]
=λn + α, (C.15)
where the last equality in (C.15) holds because Ant is independent of Y
CIMA
t .
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For n = v, from (4.11) and (4.12) in Lemma IV.2, we obtain
E
[
(Qv,CIMAt+1 −Qv,CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
+ αE
[
(Bv,CIMAt+1 −Bv,CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
=E
[
Avt − 1 + 1{Qvt=0}|Y CIMAt = y
]
+ αE
[
(1−Bvt )1{Qv=0}|Y CIMAt = y
]
=E
[
Avt − 1 + 1{qv=0}|Y CIMAt = y
]
+ αE
[
(1− bv)1{qv=0}|Y CIMAt = y
]
=λv − 1 + (1 + α(1− bv))1{qv=0}, (C.16)
where the last equality in (C.16) follows from the fact that Avt is also independent of
Y CIMAt .
substituting (C.15) and (C.16) back into (C.14) we get
E
[
h(Y CIMAt+1 )− h(Y CIMAt )|Y CIMAt = y
]
=
∑
n6=v
λn + α(N − 1) + λv − 1 + (1 + α(1− bv))1{qv=0}
(a)
= − + α(N − 1) + (1 + α(1− bv))1{qv=0}
(b)
= − /2 + (1 + α(1− bv))1{qv=0}
≤− /2 if bv ≥ 1
α
+ 1, (C.17)
where (a) in (C.17) is true because
∑N
n=1 λ
n = 1 − , and (b) in (C.17) is true
because α = 
2(N−1) . Consequently, inequality (4.14) in the proof of Theorem IV.3 is
established.
Proof of Lemma IV.7. The lemma holds if there is no unsuccessful transmission from
time t to t + q + N − 1. Otherwise, suppose the first unsuccessful transmission is
from user n at time t1, t ≤ t1 ≤ t+ q +N − 1. Since v(BCIMAt1 ) = n and no packet is
transmitted at time t1, every user will update the upper bound B
n,CIMA
t1+1
= 1 for user
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n. From the evolution of the upper bounds we have
Bn,CIMAτ = τ − t1 (C.18)
for any time τ if user n is not selected again by CIMA before time τ .
There are two possibilities: (1) user n is not selected by CIMA again before time
t + q + N ; (2) user n is selected by CIMA again at time t2 where t1 + 1 ≤ t2 ≤
t+ q +N − 1.
First consider the case when user n is not selected by CIMA again before time
t+ q +N . Then (C.18) holds for any time τ from t1 + 1 to t+ q +N − 1. From the
specification of CIMA, if any other user m has an unsuccessful transmission at time
t′, t1 + 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t+ q +N − 1, for any subsequent time τ ≥ t′ + 1 we will have
Bm,CIMAτ ≤ τ − t′ < τ − t1 = Bn,CIMAτ . (C.19)
Therefore, user m will not be selected by CIMA again from time t′+1 to t+q+N−1.
Consequently, any user m 6= n can have at most one unsuccessful transmission from
time t to t+ q +N − 1. Since any of the N users can have at most one unsuccessful
transmission from time t to t + q + N − 1, the number of successful transmissions
during this time period is at least (t+ q +N − 1)− t+ 1−N = q.
Next consider the case when user n is selected by CIMA again at time t2 where
t1 +1 ≤ t2 ≤ t+ q+N −1. From the specification of CIMA, we must have Bn,CIMAt2 =
maxmB
m,CIMA
t2 for user n to transmit at time t2. Therefore, letting τ = t2 in (C.18)
we get
t2 − t1 = Bn,CIMAt2 ≥ Bm,CIMAt2 (C.20)
for all m 6= n. Let Sm,m 6= n be the number of successful transmissions for user m
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between time t1 and t2. We prove in the following that S
m ≥ Qm,CIMAt1 .
If user m has an unsuccessful transmission between t1 and t2, then the queue at user
m is empty at the time of the unsuccessful transmission. Therefore, Sm ≥ Qm,CIMAt1
because all the Qm,CIMAt1 packets queued at time t1 are successfully transmitted by
user m between time t1 and t2.
If user m transmits successfully in every time slot selected by CIMA, from (C.20) and
the evolution of the upper bounds we obtain
t2 − t1 ≥ Bm,CIMAt2 = Bm,CIMAt1 + t2 − t1 − Sm. (C.21)
Since Bm,CIMAt1 ≥ Qm,CIMAt1 , (C.21) implies
Sm ≥ Bm,CIMAt1 ≥ Qm,CIMAt1 . (C.22)
Consequently, for every user m 6= n
Sm ≥ Qm,CIMAt1 . (C.23)
Note that the total number of successful transmissions between t1 and t2 is
∑
m6=n S
m;
therefore,
t2−1∑
τ=t1+1
U¯τ =
∑
m6=n
Sm ≥
∑
m 6=n
Qm,CIMAt1 = Q
tot,CIMA
t1 (C.24)
where the last equation in (C.24) holds because Qn,CIMAt1 = 0.
From the dynamics of queues we get
Qtot,CIMAt1 =Q
tot,CIMA
t +
t1−1∑
τ=t
(
N∑
n=1
Anτ − U¯τ
)
≥ q −
t1−1∑
τ=t
U¯τ (C.25)
Combining (C.24) and (C.25), the total number of successful transmissions from time
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t to t+ q +N − 1 in the second case is at least
t+q+N−1∑
τ=t
U¯τ ≥
t1−1∑
τ=t
U¯τ +
t2−1∑
τ=t1+1
U¯τ
≥q −Qtot,CIMAt1 +Qtot,CIMAt1 = q. (C.26)
Detailed derivation of (4.19) and (4.21) in the proof of Theorem IV.6. Detailed deriva-
tion of (4.19): From (4.18) and the dynamics of queues we obtain
Qtot,CIMATk =Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1 +
Tk−1∑
t=Tk−1
(
N∑
n=1
Ant − U¯CIMAt
)
=Qtot,CIMATk−1 −
Tk−1∑
t=Tk−1
U¯CIMAt +
Tk−1∑
t=Tk−1
N∑
n=1
Ant
=
Tk−1∑
t=Tk−1
N∑
n=1
Ant (C.27)
≤
Tk−1+Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1 +N−1∑
t=Tk−1
N∑
n=1
Ant . (C.28)
Equation (C.27) follows from the definition of Tk. Inequality (C.28) is true because
of (4.18) and the fact that Ant are all positive. Note that A
n
t is independent of Tk−1
and Qtot,CIMATk−1 for t ≥ Tk−1. Therefore, taking the expectation on both sides of (C.28)
we get
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E
[
Qtot,CIMATk
]
≤E
Tk−1+Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1 +N−1∑
t=Tk−1
N∑
n=1
Ant

=E
E
Tk−1+Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1 +N−1∑
t=Tk−1
N∑
n=1
Ant
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Tk−1, Qtot,CIMATk−1


=E
Tk−1+Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1 +N−1∑
t=Tk−1
N∑
n=1
E
[
Ant |Tk−1, Qtot,CIMATk−1
]
=E
Tk−1+Q
tot,CIMA
Tk−1 +N−1∑
t=Tk−1
N∑
n=1
λn

=λtot
(
E
[
Qtot,CIMATk−1
]
+N
)
. (C.29)
Detailed derivation of (4.21):
For any time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , suppose Tk−1 < t ≤ Tk (T0 := 0). Using (4.19) and the
dynamics of queues we get
E
[
Qtot,CIMAt
]
=E
Qtot,CIMATk−1 + t−1∑
τ=Tk−1
(
N∑
n=1
Anτ − U¯CIMAτ
)
≤E
Qtot,CIMATk−1 + t−1∑
τ=Tk−1
(
N∑
n=1
Anτ
)
≤E
Qtot,CIMATk−1 + Tk−1∑
τ=Tk−1
(
N∑
n=1
Anτ
)
(a)
=E
[
Qtot,CIMATk−1 +Q
tot,CIMA
Tk
]
≤2 λ
totN
1− λtot ; (C.30)
(a) in (C.30) follows from (C.27) and the last inequality in (C.30) follows from (4.20).
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APPENDIX D
Appendix for Dynamic Stochastic Games with
Asymmetric Information
Proof of Lemma V.8. The lemma is proved by induction. Since the initial states are
independent, (5.19) holds at t = 1. Suppose the lemma is true at time t. Given any
hct+1 = {c1:t+1, y1:t, a1:t} at t+ 1, we have from Bayes’ rule
pˆit+1(xt+1)
=P(A1:t=a1:t)(xt+1|y1:t)
=
P(A1:t=a1:t)(xt+1, yt|y1:t−1)∑
x′t+1∈Xt+1 P(A1:t=a1:t)(x
′
t+1, yt|y1:t−1)
. (D.1)
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The numerator in (D.1) can be further expressed by
P(A1:t=a1:t)(xt+1, yt|y1:t−1)
=
∑
xt∈Xt
P(A1:t=a1:t)(xt+1, yt, xt|y1:t−1)
(a)
=
∑
xt∈Xt
N∏
n=1
pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )
=
N∏
n=1
∑
xnt ∈Xnt
pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t ). (D.2)
Equation (a) in (D.2) follows from the system dynamics, the fact At = at and the
induction hypothesis for the lemma. Substituting (D.2) into both the numerator and
denominator of (D.1) we get
pˆit+1(xt+1)
=
N∏
n=1
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
′n
t )
=
N∏
n=1
ψˆnt (y
n
t , at, pˆit)(x
n
t+1). (D.3)
Proof of Lemma V.13. If λ is a CIB strategy profile and ψ is a CIB update rule
consistent with λ, we define g ∈ G to be the strategy profile constructed by (5.27)
from (λ, ψ).
We proceed to recursively define a belief system µ and maps {µct , t ∈ T } that
satisfy (5.31)-(5.32), and are such that µ is consistent with g. For that matter, we
first define the signaling-free belief µˆct : Hct 7→ ∆(X1:t) given hct = {a1:t−1, y1:t−1} ∈ Hct
such that for any x1:t ∈ X1:t
µˆct(h
c
t)(x1:t) := P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)(x1:t|y1:t−1). (D.4)
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At time t = 1 we define, for all hn1 = (x
n
1 , h
c
1) ∈ Hn1 , n ∈ N and for all x1 ∈ X1
µc1(h
c
1)(x1) :=P(x1) (D.5)
µn1 (h
n
1 )(x1) :=1{xn1 |hn1 }P(x
−n
1 ) (D.6)
Then, (5.31) and (5.32) are satisfied at time 1, and g is consistent with µ before time
1. (basis of induction)
Suppose µct(h
c
t)(·) and µnt (hnt )(·) are defined, (5.31) and (5.32) are satisfied at time
t, and g is consistent with µ before time t (induction hypothesis).
We proceed to define µct+1(h
c
t+1)(·), and µnt+1(hnt+1)(·), and prove that (5.31) and
(5.32) are satisfied at time t+ 1, and g is consistent with µ before time t+ 1. We first
define
ηkt (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t) := η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, (ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t)))
=qkt (y
k
t ;x
k
t , at)λ
k
t (x
n
t , ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))(a
n
t ). (D.7)
At time t+ 1, for any histories hct+1 and h
n
t+1, n ∈ N , we define the beliefs
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x1:t+1) :=
∏
k∈N
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1), (D.8)
µnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1)
:=1{xn1:t+1}(h
n
t+1)
∏
k 6=n
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1), (D.9)
where for any k ∈ N
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
:=
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t)∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
(D.10)
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when the denominator of (D.10) is non-zero; when the denominator of (D.10) is zero,
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) is defined by
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
:=

0 when µˆct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) = 0,
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1)
|{x′k1:t∈Xk1:t: µˆct+1(hct+1)(x′k1:t,xkt+1)6=0}|
when µˆct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) 6= 0.
(D.11)
Then (5.31) at t+ 1 follows directly from the above construction. We proceed to
prove (5.32) at t+ 1.
First consider the case when the denominator of (D.10) is zero. Then, for any
k ∈ N , we obtain, because of (D.11),
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1)
=
∑
xk1:t∈Xk1:t
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
=
∑
xk1:t∈Xk1:t:
µˆct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)6=0
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1)
|{x′k1:t ∈ X k1:t : µˆct+1(hct+1)(x′k1:t, xkt+1) 6= 0}|
=γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1). (D.12)
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When the denominator of (D.10) is non-zero, from (D.10) we get
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1)
=
∑
xk1:t∈Xk1:t
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
=
∑
xk1:t∈Xk1:t
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t)∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
=
∑
xkt ∈Xkt
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
t )∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
(a)
=
∑
xkt ∈Xkt
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)γψ,t(h
c
t)(x
k
t )∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)γψ,t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
=γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1), (D.13)
where (a) in (D.13) follows from the induction hypothesis for (5.31) at time t, and
the last equality in (D.13) is true because of (5.28) (ψ is consistent with λ).
Therefore, (5.32) is true at time t+ 1 from (D.12) and (D.13).
To show consistency at time t + 1, we need to show that Bayes’ rule, given by
(5.15), is satisfied when the denominator of (5.15) is non-zero, and (5.16) holds for
any histories hnt+1.
We first note that, the construction (D.10), (D.11) and the definition of signaling-
free belief µˆct+1 ensure that
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) = 0 if µˆ
c
t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) = 0. (D.14)
Therefore, (5.16) follows from (D.14) since the signaling-free belief satisfies
µˆnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1)
=1{xn1:t+1}(h
n
t+1)
∏
k 6=n
µˆct(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) (D.15)
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which follows by an argument similar to that of Lemma V.8.
Now consider (5.15) at t+1 when the denominator is non-zero. From (D.9)-(D.10)
the left hand side of (5.15) equals to
µnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1) = 1{xn1:t+1}(h
n
t+1)∏
k 6=n
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t)∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
. (D.16)
On the other hand, the numerator of the right hand side of (5.15) is equal to
Pgtµ (x1:t+1, yt, at|hnt , ant )
=µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t)
∏
k∈N
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)q
k
t (y
k
t ;x
k
t , at)
∏
k 6=n
λkt (x
k
t , ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))(a
k
t )
=1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k∈N
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)q
k
t (y
k
t ;x
k
t , at)∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t)
∏
k 6=n
λkt (x
k
t , ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))(a
k
t )
=1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)∏
k 6=n
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) (D.17)
The first equality in (D.17) follows from (5.12) and (5.27). The second equality in
(D.17) follows from the induction hypothesis for (5.31). The last equality in (D.17)
follows from (D.7).
Substituting (D.17) back into both the numerator and the denominator in the
right hand side of (5.15), we obtain (D.16). Therefore, (5.15) is satisfied for any
history hnt+1 ∈ Hnt+1 for any n ∈ N when the denominator of (5.15) is non-zero,
hence, (g, µ) is consistence before time t+ 1. This completes the induction step and
the proof of the lemma.
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Proof of Lemma V.14. If agent n uses an arbitrary strategy g′n, following the same
construction (D.9)-(D.10) in Lemma V.13, we can obtain a belief system µ′ from
g′ := (g′n, g−n) and ψ such that
µ′nt (h
n
t )(x1:t) = 1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µ′ct (h
c
t)(x
k
1:t). (D.18)
Since µ′ct (h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) defined by (D.10) and (D.11) depends only on the strategies g
′−n =
g−n of all agents other than n, we have for all hct ∈ Hct
µ′ct (h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) = µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t). (D.19)
Therefore, for any history Hnt ∈ Hnt
µ′nt (h
n
t )(x1:t) = 1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t). (D.20)
The same argument for the proof of consistency in Lemma V.13 shows that µ′ is
consistent with g′ = (g′n, g−n). Therefore, when Pg′n,g−n(hnt ) > 0, from Bayes’ rule we
have
Pg′n,g−n(x1:t|hnt ) =Pg
′n,g−n
µ′ (x1:t|hnt ) = µ′nt (hnt )(x1:t)
=1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t). (D.21)
Proof of Lemma V.16. To simply the notation, we use Πt to denote Π
γψ
t and Bt =
(Ct,Πt, Πˆt).
Let (g, µ) = f(λ, ψ) as in Lemma V.13. Suppose every agent k 6= n uses the
strategy gk along with the belief system µ.
Below, we show that agent n’s best response problem (5.14) is a Markov Decision
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Process (MDP) with state process {(Xnt , Bt), t ∈ T } and action process {Ant , t ∈ T }.
Since the strategies g−n of all other agents are fixed, when agent n selects an
action ant ∈ Ant at time t ∈ T , agent n’s expected instantaneous utility at hnt ∈ Hnt
under µ is given by
Eg−nµ [φnt (Ct, Xt, At)|hnt , ant ] . (D.22)
Since Akt , k 6= n satisfies (5.27), the distribution of Akt only depends on Xkt and Bt.
Therefore, the distribution of A−nt only depends on X
−n
t and Bt. Then, for any
realization x−nt ∈ X−nt , hnt = (xn1:t, hct) ∈ Hnt and ant ∈ Ant ,
Eg−nµ
[
φnt (Ct, Xt, At)|x−nt , ant , hnt
]
=Eg−nµ
[
φnt (ct, xt, (a
n
t , A
−n
t ))|x−nt , xn1:t, ant , hct , bt
]
=Eg
−n
t
[
φnt (ct, xt, (a
n
t , A
−n
t ))|x−nt , bt
]
=:φ¯nt (xt, a
n
t , bt, g
−n
t ); (D.23)
the first equality in (D.23) holds because given ψ, Bt = (Ct, γψ,t(H
c
t ), γˆt(H
c
t )) is a
function of Hct ; the second equality in (D.23) is true because the distribution of A
−n
t
depends only on X−nt , Bt and the strategy g
−n
t . From (D.23), agent n’s instantaneous
utility (D.22) can be written as
Eg−nµ [φnt (Ct, Xt, At)|hnt , ant ]
=Eg−nµ
[
Eg−nµ
[
φnt (Ct, Xt, At)|X−nt , ant , hnt
] |hnt , ant ]
=Eg−nµ
[
φ¯nt ((x
n
t , X
−n
t ), a
n
t , bt, g
−n
t )|hct , xn1:t, ant
]
(a)
=Eµ
[
φ¯nt ((X
−n
t , x
n
t ), a
n
t , bt, g
−n
t )|hct
]
(b)
=Epit
[
φ¯nt ((X
−n
t , x
n
t ), a
n
t , bt, g
−n
t )
]
=:φ˜nt (x
n
t , bt, a
n
t , g
−n
t ). (D.24)
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Equation (a) is true because, from Lemma V.14, X−nt and X
n
t are independent con-
ditional on hct . Equation (b) follows from the fact that pit is the distribution of Xt
conditional on hct under µ, which is established by (5.32) in Lemma V.13.
Next, we show that the process {(Xnt , Bt), t ∈ T } is a controlled Markov chain
with respect to the action process {Ant , t ∈ T } for agent n.
From the system dynamics and the belief evolution (5.22), we know that (Xnt+1, Bt+1)
is a function of {Xnt , Y −nt , Ant , A−nt , Bt,Wt} where Wt denotes all the noises at time
t. Furthermore, the distribution of (Y kt , A
k
t ) depends only on {Xkt , Bt,Wt, gkt } for any
k 6= n. Therefore,
(Xnt+1, Bt+1) = f˜t(X
n
t , X
−n
t , A
n
t , Bt,Wt, g
−n
t ). (D.25)
Suppose agent n uses an arbitrary strategy g˜n. Then, for any realizations xnt+1 ∈ X nt+1,
bt+1 = (ct+1, pit+1, pˆit+1) ∈ Bt+1, hnt = (xn1:t, hct) ∈ Hnt and ant ∈ Ant , we obtain
Pg˜n,g−nµ (xnt+1, bt+1|hnt , ant )
=
∑
x−nt ∈X−nt
Pg˜n,g−nµ (xnt+1, bt+1|x−nt , hnt , ant )Pg˜
n,g−n
µ (x
−n
t |hnt , ant )
=
∑
x−nt ∈X−nt
Pg˜n,g−nµ (xnt+1, bt+1|x−nt , hnt , ant )pit(x−nt )
=
∑
x−nt ∈X−nt
Pg
−n
t (xnt+1, bt+1|xnt , x−nt , bt, ant )pit(x−nt )
=Pg−nµ (xnt+1, bt+1|xnt , bt, ant ). (D.26)
The second equality in (D.26) follows from Lemma V.14 and (5.32) in Lemma V.13.
The third equality in (D.26) follows from (D.25). The last equality follows from the
same arguments as the first through third equalities.
Equation (D.26) shows that the process {(Xnt , Bt), t ∈ T } is a controlled Markov
Chain with respect to the action process {Ant , t ∈ T } for agent n. This process along
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with the instantaneous utility (D.24) define a MDP. From the theory of MDP (see [1,
Chap. 6]), there is an optimal strategy of agent n that is of the form
λ′nt (x
n
t , bt) = λ
′n
t (x
n
t , (ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))) (D.27)
for all hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) ∈ Hnt for all t ∈ T . This completes the proof of Lemma V.16.
Proof of Theorem V.20. Suppose (λ∗, ψ∗) solves the dynamic program defined by
(5.40)-(5.43). Let V nt , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , denote the value functions computed by (5.40)
and (5.43) from (λ∗, ψ∗). Then ψ∗ is consistent with λ∗ from (5.42).
Let (g∗, µ∗) = f(λ∗, ψ∗) defined by Lemma V.13. Then µ∗ is consistent with
g∗ because of Lemma V.13. Furthermore, for all n ∈ N , t ∈ T , V nt (xnt , bt) (where
bt = (ct, γψ∗,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))) is agent n’s expected continuation utility from time t on
under µ∗ at hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) when agent n uses g
∗n and all other agents use g∗−n.
If every agent k 6= n uses the strategy g∗k, from Lemma V.16 we know that there
is a best response g′n, under the belief system µ∗, of agent n such that for all t ∈ T
g′nt (h
n
t ) = λ
′n
t (x
n
t , bt) (D.28)
for some CIB strategy λ′nt for all h
n
t = (h
c
t , x
n
1:t). Define a CIB strategy profile λ
′ :=
(λ′n, λ∗−n).
Let V ′nt , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , be the functions generated by (5.40) and (5.43) from
(λ′, ψ∗). Then V ′nt (x
n
t , bt) (where bt = (ct, γψ∗,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))) is agent n’s expected
continuation utility from time t on under µ∗ at hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) when agent n uses g
′n
and all other agents use g∗−n. Since g′n is a best response, for all n ∈ N , t ∈ T and
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hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) ∈ Hnt we must have
V ′nt (x
n
t , bt) ≥ V nt (xnt , bt). (D.29)
On the other hand, V ′nt (x
n
t , bt) is player n’s expected utility in stage gameGt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt)
when player n uses λ′n|bt , and other players use λ∗−n|bt . However, from (5.41),
V nt (x
n
t , bt) is player n’s maximum expected utility in stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt) when
other players use λ∗−n|bt because the strategy λ∗nt |bt is a best response for player n in
the stage game. This means that for all n ∈ N , t ∈ T and bt ∈ Bt
V nt (x
n
t , bt) ≥ V ′nt (xnt , bt). (D.30)
Combining (D.29) and (D.29) we get
V nt (x
n
t , bt) = V
′n
t (x
n
t , bt). (D.31)
Equation (D.31) implies that, at any time t, the strategy g∗nt:T gives agent n the
maximum expected continuation utility from time t on under µ∗. This complete the
proof that (g∗, µ∗) is a PBE. As a result, the pair (λ∗, ψ∗) forms a CIB-PBE of the
dynamic game described in Section 5.2.
In order to prove Theorem V.22, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma D.1. In Game M
pˆint+1 = ψˆ
n
t (y
n
t , pˆit). (D.32)
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Proof of Lemma D.1. From Lemma V.8
pˆint+1 =ψˆ
n
t (y
n
t , at, pˆit)(x
n
t+1)
=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
′n
t )
. (D.33)
Since pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at) = p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t ) and q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at) = q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t ) in Game M, the
assertion of the lemma holds.
Lemma D.1 shows that in Game M the signaling-free beliefs do not depend on
the actions.
We now prove Theorem V.22.
Proof of Theorem V.22. Consider a CIB update rule ψ∗ given by
ψn∗t (y
n
t , at, bt) = ψˆ
n
t (y
n
t , pˆit). (D.34)
Based on ψ∗ defined by (D.34), we solve the dynamic program defined by (5.40)-(5.43)
to get a CIB strategy profile λ∗ and show that (λ∗, ψ∗) forms a CIB-PBE for Game
M. Note that under the update rule ψ∗ given by (D.34), we have for any n and t
Πnt = Πˆ
n
t (D.35)
Therefore, in the following we will replace Πnt by Πˆ
n
t and drop Π
n
t if both Π
n
t and Πˆ
n
t
are present.
The dynamic program for Game M can be solved by induction. We prove the
following claim:
At any time t, there exists a CIB strategy λ∗t that satisfies (5.41), and the value
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functions V nt , n ∈ N , generated by (5.40) and (5.43) from (λ∗t:T , ψ∗t:T ) satisfy
V nt (x
n
t , bt) = U˜
n
t (ct, pˆit) + V˜
n
t (x
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit) (D.36)
for some functions U˜nt (ct, pˆit) and V˜
n
t (x
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit) when tk + 1 ≤ t ≤ tk+1 for some
tk ∈ T .
The above claim holds at t = T + 1 since V nT+1 = 0, n ∈ N .
Suppose the claim is true at t+ 1.
At time tk + 1 ≤ t < tk+1 for some tk ∈ T , Xnt+1 = Xnt , Yt = empty, and
Ct+1 = (Ct, At) = (Ctk+1, Atk+1:t). Then because of (5.57), (D.34) and the induction
hypothesis for (D.36), player n’s utility in stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt) is equal to
UnGt(Vt+1,ψ∗t ,bt)
=φnt (ct, X
−n
t , At) + V
n
t+1(X
n
t+1, Ct+1, ψˆt(pˆit, Yt))
=φnt (ct, X
−n
t , At) + U˜
n
t+1((ct, At), ψˆt(pˆit)) + V˜
n
t+1(X
n
t , ctk+1, ψˆt(pˆit)) (D.37)
for any bt ∈ Bt and n ∈ N . Define
φ˜nt (X
−n
t , At, bt) := φ
n
t (ct, X
−n
t , At) + U˜
n
t+1((ct, At), ψˆt(pˆit)), (D.38)
V˜ nt (X
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit) := V˜
n
t+1(X
n
t , ctk+1, ψˆt(pˆit)). (D.39)
At t = tk for some tk ∈ T , Xntk+1 = fntk(Xntk ,W n,Xtk ), Y ntk = hntk(Xntk ,W n,Ytk ) and
Ctk+1 = f
c
tk
(Ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
). Then because of (5.57), (D.34) and the induction hypoth-
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esis for (D.36), player n’s utility in stage game Gtk(Vtk+1, ψ
∗
tk
, btk) is equal to
UnGtk (Vtk+1,ψ∗tk ,btk )
=φntk(ctk , X
−n
tk
, Atk) + V
n
tk+1
(Xntk+1, Ctk+1, ψˆt(pˆitk , Ytk))
=φntk(ctk , X
−n
tk
, Atk) + U˜
n
t+1(f
c
tk
(ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
), ψˆt(pˆit, htk(Xtk ,W
Y
tk
)))
+V˜ nt+1(f
n
tk
(Xntk ,W
n,X
tk
), f ctk(ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
), ψˆt(pˆit)) (D.40)
for any bt ∈ Btk and n ∈ N . Define
φ˜ntk(ctk , X
−n
tk
, Atk , pˆitk) := φ
n
tk
(ctk , X
−n
tk
, Atk), (D.41)
V˜ ntk(X
n
tk
, ctk−1+1, pˆitk) := Epˆitk
[
U˜nt+1(f
c
tk
(ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
), ψˆt(pˆit, htk(Xtk ,W
Y
tk
)))
+ V˜ nt+1(f
n
tk
(Xntk ,W
n,X
tk
), f ctk(ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
), ψˆt(pˆitk))|Xtk
]
. (D.42)
Therefore, for any t, because of (D.37)-(D.42) player n’s expected utility condi-
tional on (Xt, At) in stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt), for bt = (ct, pˆit) ∈ Bt, is equal to
Epˆit
[
UnGt(Vt+1,ψ∗t ,bt)|Xt, At
]
= φ˜nt (ct, X
−n
t , At, pˆit) + V˜
n
t (X
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit). (D.43)
when tk + 1 ≤ t ≤ tk+1 for tk ∈ T .
Since the second term in (D.43) does not depend on the players’ strategies, an
equilibrium of the stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt) is also an equilibrium of the game
G′t(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt) where each player n ∈ N has utility
UnG′t(Vt+1,ψ∗t ,bt) :=φ˜
n
t (ct, X
−n
t , At, pˆit). (D.44)
For any bt ∈ Bt, since Ant is a finite set for any n ∈ N in Game M, the
game G′t(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt) has at least one Bayesian Nash equilibrium λ˜
∗
t (bt) = {λ˜∗nt (bt) ∈
∆(Ant ), n ∈ N} (see [5, 6]). Define λ∗nt (xnt , bt) := λ˜∗nt (bt) for all xnt ∈ X nt , n ∈ N .
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Then, we get a CIB strategy λ∗t ∈ BNEt(Vt+1, ψ∗t ) so that (5.41) is satisfied at t.
Moreover, from (5.43),
V nt (x
n
t , bt)
=Dnt (Vt+1, λ
∗
t , ψ
∗
t )(x
n
t , bt)
=Eλ
∗
t
pˆit
[
φ˜nt (ct, X
−n
t , At, pˆit) + V˜
n
t (X
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit)|xnt
]
(a)
=Eλ
∗
t
pˆit
[
φ˜nt (ct, X
−n
t , At, pˆit)
]
+ V˜ nt (x
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit)
=:U˜nt (ct, pˆit) + V˜
n
t (x
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit) (D.45)
where (a) is true because Ant only depends on bt using λ
∗n
t , and X
−n
t and X
n
t are
independent under pˆit. Then (D.36) is satisfied at t, and the the proof of the claim is
complete.
As a result of the claim, we obtain a CIB strategy profile λ∗ and a CIB update rule
ψ∗ such that (5.40), (5.41) and (5.43) are satisfied. It remains to show the consistency
(5.42). Using the dynamics of Game M and the fact that λ∗nt (x
n
t , bt) := λ˜
∗n
t (bt), we
obtain
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)η
n
t (x
n
t , y
n
t , at, bt)pi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt η
n
t (x
′n
t , y
n
t , at, bt)pi
n
t (x
′n
t )
=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t )q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t )λ˜
∗n
t (bt)(a
n
t )pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t )λ˜
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Thus, ψ∗t satisfies (5.28), and ψ
∗
t is consistent with λ
∗
t . Therefore (5.42) holds.
Since (λ∗, ψ∗) solves the dynamic program defined by (5.40)-(5.43), it is a CIB-
PBE according to Theorem V.20.
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